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Abstract 
In this Thesis we study some aspects related to the determinants and the 
consequences of acquiring education in the UK. Chapter one outlines the 
, structure of the Thesis. 
In chapter two we analyse the probability of staying-on at school ;o age 
16 in England and \Vales using data from the 1970 British Cohort StudY. 
A primary focus is on the effect of household incorne. The issue of income 
endogeneity is addressed using instrumental variable techniques. We find 
a statistically significant, but small, positive effect of income and -stronger 
effects of long-term family characteristics, such as parental education, oil the 
staying-oii decision. 
In chapter three we investigate social class influences on the probability of 
enrolling in different degree subjects in the UK during the period 1981-1991 
using Universities' Statistical Record data. We consider three broad subject 
groups and estimate a trinomial probit model. Our results show the absence 
of social class differences in the period under study. Moreover, the analy. "is 
turns out to be robust to the use of a finer disaggregation of subjects and of a 
different econometric model (i. e. a flexible-thresholds ordered probit model). 
In chapter four we estimate the log-wage premium to a first degree using 
data from the British Cohort Study 1970. We replicate the analysis in Bluil- 
dell et at (2000), who used data on the 1958 British birth cohort, and find 
evidence of declining returns to a first degree for women. We also investigate 
differences in premia by degree class and degree subject. We find evidence 
,, -ipporting the presence of such 
differences, although in inany cases degree 
class and subject premia arc not very precisely est, imated, probably due to 
small sample size. We also consider the robustness of our results wheil taking 
account of the endogencity of educational outconics and of the possibility of 
heterogeneous treatment effect,,. 
Chapter five briefly surnmarises the main findings of the Thesis. 
I .) 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Educational research has a long tradition in the UK and has ofteii been used 
as an analytical support for policy interventions aimed at improving or re- 
forming the educational system. There are many examples. In the 1980. s 
several studies were published on the factors responsible for the low par- 
ticipation rates in post-compulsory education in the UK (see, for example, 
Pissarides, 1981,1982, Rice, 1987, Micklewright, 1989, among others). The 
topic was considered of primary interest since it was a common thought that 
the performance of the UK economy was adversely affected by the low lev- 
els of skills and qualifications of its workforce (see, for instance, Finegold, 
1993). More recently, the introduction of home students tuition fees and the 
replacement of mcans-testcd maintenance grants with student loans followed 
the recommendations of the Dearing Report (Dearing, 1997). There 1, "' cur- 
rently a lively debate on the opportunity of universities charging students 
top-up fee.,; (which will be in place in England starting from 2000) and of 
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introducing differential fees by subject (see Greenaway and Haynes. 2003). 
The main worry is that these recently introduced measures might adversely 
affect mainly poor students' participation in Higher Education (see -NLI(Iiin 
and Gregg, 2003) and reduce intergenerational mobility (see Dearden Ct al. 
1997). This Thesis aims at contributing to this debate and to applied educa- 
tional research in the UK by analysing some of the causes and consequences 
of individual educational choices. 
We start in chapter two with an analysis of the individual decision to go 
on to post-compulsory education in England and Wales. In the UN all ambi- 
tious target of 50% participation in Higher Education (IIE) for the 18-30 age 
group has been set for 2010. It is clear that to reach this goal it is necessarv to 
increase the fraction of the population continuing beyond post-conipulsory 
schooling. This analysis is important in order to assess the role of family 
background variables on students' school continuation decisions in a period 
of relatively low participation rates beyond post-compulsory education in the 
UK, and in particular the relative impact of household pecuniary and noil- 
pecuniary characteristics. NVith respect to the existing literature we use a 
less exploited data set (the 1970 British Cohort Study) and seek to address 
several issues often neglected by previous studies, among which arc sur%'cY 
non response and the cndogcneity of family income. In more detail, Chapter 
two presents an empirical analysis of the factors affecting the choice of staviii(" 
on at school at age 16 in England and Wales. The choice at 16 represents the 
first choice concerning enrollment in education that, British individuals have 
to make. This decision also strongly affects their future academic and work- 
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ing lives. The issue was particularly topical in the Ul\ xý, hcre the "'taying-on 
rate at 16 in the late 1980s was relatively low (about in 19, ST-88, DfEE 
1999) compared with other OECD countries, and given the consequent effort 
of UK governments in the direction of widening access to botli further and 
higher education. In this chapter we are mainly concerned with the influence 
of family background on the staying-on decision with a particular emplia- 
sis on the effect of parental income. The influence of parental income has 
a central importance since family finances, unlike child abilitv or household 
non-pecuniary characteristics, are the main determinant of children's cduca- 
tion that policy makers can affect in the short-run through economic policV. 
In the US there has been a lively debme on the effect of household incon-le 
and credit constraints on the demand for education. The findings of the 
most recent literature (see for instance Cameron and Heckman, 1998,2001 
and Carnciro and Heckman, 2002, for the US and Chevalier and Lanot, 2002, 
and Blanden and Gregg, 2004, for the UK) seem to attribute a marginal role 
to household income and point to children's abilitY and long-term household 
characteristics, such as parental education and socio-economic stmus, as the 
main forces driving educational decisions. The same conclusion has been 
reached by UK studies, although only a very limited number of them have 
tried to address the numerous problems arising in the empirical work (among 
which Blanden and Gregg, 2004). The main problems are the endogeneity 
of familY income and the need to control for other household characteristics 
NvIiich inay be correlated with income and affect, a child's education. NV(Iseek 
to address this iind other issues using data from the British Coliort -StudY 
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1970 (BCS70) to estimate a binary probit model of the scliool continuation 
decision at age 16. We seek to address the endogeneity problem using instru- 
mental variables (IV). To the best of our knowledge there is only one wher 
paper about the UK trying to tackle the issue of income endogeneity. Blan- 
den and Gregg (2004). 1 Our chapter differs from Blanden and Gregg (2004) 
since while they exploit the longitudinal dimension of the BCS 710 to identify 
"temporary" variations in household income, we try to identify exogenous, 
and not necessarily temporary, sources of variations in income using vari- 
ables such as parents' industry of employment or grandfathers' social class, 
following the approach in Shea (2000) and Maurin (2002). Morem-cr, un- 
like Blandcn and Gregg (2004), who matched income data from the FaiiiilY 
Expenditure Survey, we transform the grouped income variable available in 
the BCS70 into a continuous variable using interval regression techniques 
and avoid the problems caused by imputation from an external source. Last 
but not least, we also investigate the problems potentially generated by non- 
rcsponsc to the income question in the BCS70 (the missing rate was about 
16% in the age 10 follow-up survey. ). NVe obtain the following results. Firstly, 
in line with the previous UK literature, also when the endogcneity problem 
is tackled, the positive effect of income is statistically significant but of lim- 
ited magnitude. The effect turns out to be higher for women than for men 
confirming early results by Rice (1987) and Micklewright (1989), who used 
different data sets. By contrast, non-pecuniary influences of long-term family 
'Chevalier and Lanot (2002) simply control for a child's abilitY in the education equa- 
tions bia do not try to address the endogenelty problem. 
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characteristics such as parental education and social clas., ", or parental inter- 
est in a child's education, a measure of parenting quality, appear to be some 
important determinants of the choice of staying-on at 16. Secondly, income 
non-responsc does not seem to be an important issue for our analysi, "'. 
In chapter three, we contribute to the current debate on fliglier Education 
(HE hereafter) by analysing the determinants of choice of field ofstudy at t 11(, 
undergraduate level conditional on being enrolled at university. We consider 
the period 1981-1991. The period largely prc-dates the boom in university 
student numbers which took place during the early 1990s, the progressivc 
replacement of mcans-tested maintenance grants with student loans and the 
introduction of home students tuition fees and offers therefore an interest- 
ing benchmark with respect to the actual design of the UK sYstein of HE. 
We argue that the past characteristics of the UK HE systcin Nvere likelY to 
attenuate social class differences in subject choice, while the recent inno- 
vations, such as the substitution of maintenance grants with student loans, 
the introduction of top-up fees, and the eventual introduction of differential 
fees across subjects might have a different impact on students with different 
social class origin. We outline here the content of the chapter in more de- 
tail. After having studied family background influences on the probability of 
staying-on at 16 in the previous chapter, we study here the probability of en- 
tering different undergraduate fields of study conditional on enrolling in HE. 
The issue is especially important given the evidence of marked differences in 
graduates' labour market outcomes by degree subject. In dils chapter. after 
giving some motivation for the importance of the topic, we review some of 
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the reasons as to why social class may or may not be an important determi- 
nant of the choice of degree subject. The main hypotheses, put forward by 
both economists and sociologists, which can generate social class differences 
are that low social class students are more sensitive to economic returns and 
enroll in high return subjects or tend to enroll in technical subjects compared 
with high social class students, who are more likely to enroll in subjects pro- 
viding 'cultural capital' or in which they have a comparative advantage in the 
probability of finding a good job. The main factors which would tend to have 
an tequalising' effect are the absence of subject preferences heterogeneity by 
social class, and the equality of costs and benefits from enrolling in different 
degree subjects across social classes. The data set used is the Universities' 
Statistical Record. We report in the chapter a behavioural model that moti- 
vates the specific econometric model used, a trinomial probit, which allows 
for a non-zero correlation between the unobservables affecting the utilities 
of the different groups of subjects considered. We firstly consider a broad 
aggregation of subjects: Quantitative, Non-Quantitative and Medicine and 
Law. Our analysis on the 1981-1991 period does not generally support the 
existence of significant differences across social classes in the probability of 
enrolling in different subject groups, showing that in the period under study 
the design of the HE system in the UK appeared to grant equal opportuni- 
ties in terms of access to different study fields (conditional on enrolling in 
HE) to individuals with different social class origins. In this chapter we also 
include a sensitivity analysis using a different econometric model and a finer 
grouping of subjects, which confirms the robustness of our findings. 
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In the final part of the Thesis we provide some evidence on the returns 
to education, in the narrow sense of log-wage premia, from the 1970 British 
cohort. The analysis is important since most of the evidence on the high 
private returns to HE in the UK is based on the 1958 British cohort. It is 
clear then that judgments on the opportunity of the introduction and the 
amount of top-up fees should be made on the basis of the private economic 
returns estimated from a more recent cohort of individuals. We also inves- 
tigate differences by degree performance and degree subject. The analysis 
gives then some useful insights into the opportunity of charging students for a 
risky investment, given the ex-ante uncertainty on future degree performance 
which might deter more risk-adverse, typically less wealthy, individuals from 
enrolling in HE or in certain fields. In this case our analysis is also useful for 
the debate on fee differentiation by subject since it indicates what subjects 
ensure the highest wage returns. In particular, in chapter four we estimate 
the economic rewards to a first degree in terms of log-wage premia using the 
1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70). We also consider the extent of vari- 
ation of the wage returns by degree class and degree subjects. This turns 
out to be important to update the estimates on the return to a first degree 
obtained from the 1958 British cohort by Blundell et al. (2000) and to assess 
the magnitude of any variation in a first degree log-wage premium according 
to observed degree characteristics, such as performance and subject. Firstly, 
we replicate the analysis in Blundell et al. (2000), who used data from the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS), which refers to the 1958 British 
birth cohort, on BCS70 data and find evidence of a fall in the returns to a 
1ý1 
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first degree for women. Secondly, we investigate differences in the return to 
a first degree by degree class and degree subject. We find some evidence of a 
higher wage premium to 'good' degrees compared with lower degree classifi- 
cations and of differences in the returns to different degree subjects. Both for 
men and women, the subject group that ensures the highest return is Social 
Sciences while Art and Humanities ranks at the bottom. However, in many 
cases the effects are not very precisely estimated, probably due to small cell 
size. In this chapter we also assess the robustness of our results to consider- 
ing educational outcomes endogenous, using the control function approach, 
and to allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects, using a propensity score 
matching-average treatment effect on the treated framework. 
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Chapter 2 
Parents' income and children's 
staying-on at school in England 
and Wales: Evidence from the 
1970 British Cohort Study 
22 
in the BCS70. In this respect, our analysis differs from other papers using 
the BCS70, such as Chevalier and Lanot (2002) who use dummies for income 
groups, and Blandcn and Gregg (2004) who impute income from the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES). Second, we address the issue of the endogenc- 
ity of income by using instrumental variables techniques in order to identify 
exogenous sources of household income variation. Our method differs from 
Chevalier and Lanot (2002), who simply control for child's ability, and Blan- 
den and Gregg (2004), who use transitory variations in income to isolate the 
effect of household finances. Last but not least, we investigate the potential 
effect of income non-response on our estimates. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section introduces the prob- 
lems arising in empirical studies of the effect of family income on children's 
education. Section 2.3 briefly reviews past UK empirical literature. Sec- 
tion 2.4 describes the main features of our empirical analysis and our main 
findings. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Empirical assessment of the effect of fam- 
ily income 
There are several reasons why parental income may have a direct effect on 
children's educational attainment. ' Following Becker's (1975) human cap- 
ital investment theory, rich parents can invest more financial resources in 
their children's quantity of education. Parents' money can also be used to 
'See Havernan and Wolfe (1995) for a comprehensive survey. 
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buy better educational quality, which may affect both current educational 
performance and children's future demand for education. Moreover, low in- 
come parents might push their children towards work in the labour market 
in order to contribute to family finances; in the absence of sufficient money 
transfers from their parents children from low income families may decide to 
work while studying (see Dustmann and Micklewright 2001), with possible 
negative effects on their school performance, or decide to quit education at 
the minimum leaving age to earn money and finance their own consumption. 
When one wants to investigate the role of family income it is necessary to 
address several issues. The main problem is that family income may be en- 
dogenous with respect to a child's education. The endogeneity may arise from 
the correlation of some unobserved family factors with both family income 
and a child's education. Two such factors might be a child's inherited ability, 
which causes the so-called ability bias (see Griliches, 1977), and unobserved 
parental traits, such as parenting quality, which affect a child's education 
and are likely to be correlated with household income (simultaneity bias). 
The general 'solution' to these problems is the use of instrumental variables 
(IV) techniques which require the analyst to find variables uncorrelated with 
the unobserved child's or parental traits but correlated with parental income. 
In both cases, Shea (2000) and Maurin (2002), for instance, have suggested 
indicators of parents' industry of employment and financial capital as pos- 
sible sources of valid instruments. Another problem is that income may be 
affected by a substantial measurement error and also in this case a possible 
remedy is the use of IV. 
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In this chapter we rely on IV techniques to find some exogenous sources 
of variation in household income which can allow us to identify its 'causal' 
impact on a child's education. Our analysis is therefore in the tradition of 
the empirical studies which have attempted to assess whether family income 
has a direct 'causal' effect on child's education and the magnitude of this 
effect using non-experimental data, some of which will be reviewed in sec- 
tion 2.3. As we estimate a reduced form model, we might only be able to 
identify the 'causal' impact of an unconditional income transfer but not the 
effect of conditional income transfers, such as Educational Maintenance Al- 
lowances (EMAs), which are transferred only to individuals who decide to 
go on in post-compulsory education. The assessment of the effect of EMAs 
in a regression framework requires a structural model that takes account of 
all costs and benefits related to the educational decisions, whose estimation 
would require much more information, which we do not have, and many as- 
sumptions, which we want to avoid. Moreover, the potential impact of EMAs 
has been the object of recent evaluation using experimental data, which has 
shown their effectiveness. Ashworth et al. (2002) using data from the first 
two years of implementation of the EMA pilot scheme find that in pilot ar- 
cas EMAs have increased men's participation by 4.3 percentage points and 
women's participation by 3 percentage points when considering the whole 
population (i. e. both the eligible and ineligible population). 
In this chapter, we only consider the British cohort born in 1970 using 
data from the BCS70 while we do not perform a comparison between the 
1970 and the 1958 British cohorts. Such a comparison has already been 
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undertaken by Blanden and Machin (2004) and Blandcn and Gregg (2004) 
among others. In both articles the authors find an increase in the association 
between family income and a child's educational attainment between the 1958 
and the 1970 British cohorts. 
In our empirical analysis we include among the determinants of a child's 
education family income along with a set of characteristics relating to the 
family background, such as parents' education and social class. The rationale 
for including them is to separate out the non-pecuniary effects of long-term 
family characteristics and family income. The problem of ability bias should 
be already attenuated by the inclusion of a measure of child's ability at age 
10. The simultaneity bias should instead be mitigated by the inclusion of a 
proxy for 'parenting quality' (see Mayor 1997), i. e. the interest of the parents 
in a child's education assessed by the teacher when the child was 10 years old, 
which Feinstein and Symons (1999) find as the most important 'parenting' 
variable. However, to fully address both problems, we use IV techniques 
in order to identify exogenous sources of variations in income uncorrelated 
with a child's ability and parenting quality. On the grounds that the chosen 
instruments are uncorrelated with measurement error in parental income, IV 
also help to address the problem of measurement error. 
2.3 Past empirical literature 
This section presents a brief survey of past empirical work concerning the 
role of family income and other family characteristics on a child's education 
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using UK micro-data. ' As we said, a primary focus of this chapter is on the 
assessment of the causal effect of parental income. In this respect, all studies 
that we review here have included family income among the explanatory 
variables although some have not attempted to identify the causal impact of 
income and have only estimated simple correlations. Here we report only the 
main findings of these papers concerning the effect of household income and 
other household characteristics of particular interest. 
Rice (1987) estimates the demand for post-compulsory education in the 
UK using data from the 1976 Family Expenditure Survey (FES). She in- 
cludes, among the other factors, controls for family income and social class, 
but due to data unavailability, she does not include either parental education 
or child ability among the explanatory variables. For this reason, due to the 
effect of unobserved innate ability and omitted proxies for parenting qual- 
ity, we expect an overestimate of the effects of income and social class. Her 
findings show marked differences in the probability of undertaking further 
education by social class but a significant effect of income only for females, 
with the effect being greatest for individuals with low income. 
Micklewright (1989) analyses the school continuation decision in England 
and Wales using the National Child Development Study (NCDS), which col- 
lects data on the 1958 British cohort. The decision to go on to further edu- 
2 There are also some papers studying staying-on decisions and demand for university 
education using macro data, such as Pissarides (1981,1982). Moreover, this topic has 
been widely studied in the US. Recent contributions includes Mayer (1997), Cameron and 
Heckman (1998,2001), and Carneiro and Heckman (2002), among others. All these papers 
find a small effect of family income on children's education. 
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cation after reaching the minimum leaving age was taken by individuals from 
the 1958 cohort in 1974. A major advantage of the NCDS with respect to the 
FES is that the former has an indicator of a child's ability which may con- 
tribute to reducing the problem of ability bias. Micklewright (1989) includes 
among the explanatory variables the sum of age 16 maths and comprehen- 
sion test scores. The author finds an important role for parents' education, 
social class, and child ability for the demand of post-compulsory education 
for both men and women. He also finds an insignificant effect of income for 
boys irrespective of whether or not controls for ability and school type are 
included. By contrast, the effect of income for girls is statistically signifi- 
cant but small: a one-standard deviation reduction in gross weekly income 
(20 pounds) reduces the probability of continuing by 4.5 percentage points 
from an average value of around 50%. Since Micklewright (1989) builds a 
continuous measure of income by taking the mid-points of the 11 bounded 
ranges reported in the NCDS and a measure of median income for the top 
unbounded range, he states that his income measure may be problematical 
and suffer from considerable measurement error. For this reason he repli- 
cates the analysis using a dummy for household's bad financial conditions. 
However, in the specification controlling for child ability and school type the 
dummy variable for bad financial conditions is not statistically significant 
neither for men nor for women. 
Dearden (1999a) estimates an education equation (the years of full-time 
education) for men using the NCDS- The author includes controls for child 
ability and some proxies for parenting quality, such as parental interest in 
2S 
child's education. Dearden (1999) finds a strong effect of parental education 
and social class and a statistically significant negative effect of the proxy for 
financial difficulties on children's educational achievement. 
Ermisch and Francesconi (2001a) estimate the determinants of educa- 
tional attainment (the highest educational qualification achieved) using data 
from the first seven waves of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and 
an ordered logit model. The authors do not estimate separate models by 
gender. They find a significant effect of parental education, with a stronger 
effect for mother's education. As to family income, there are only statistically 
significant differences between individuals with income in the bottom quar- 
tile and the other quartiles. The probability gap between the first and the 
fourth quartile is for instance 3.2 percentage points. The effect is, therefore, 
small in magnitude. It must be noted that unlike the previously reviewed 
articles, Ermisch and Francesconi (2001a), due to data unavailability, do not 
include controls for either parental social class or a child's ability. Then, 
the estimated effects of parents' income and education may partly reflect 
non-pecuniary aspects related to their socio-economic status and unobserved 
ability. 
Chevalier and Lanot (2002) estimate the determinants of the age at leav- 
ing education using both the NCDS and the BCS70 and ordered probit mod- 
els. The authors try to address the issue of income endogeneity by controlling 
for a child's ability and family contextual factors, such as parental interest 
in children's education. Chevalier and Lanot (2002) do not include a contin- 
uous measure of income but include dummies for income groups. They find 
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a strong effect of parental education and social class in both cohorts and for 
both genders. Also the effect of parental income is statistically significant, al- 
though the marginal effects computed at the sample means are rather small, 
especially for the BCS70. The effect of family financial resources is therefore 
dominated by that of other non-pecuniary family characteristics. 
Blanden and Gregg (2004) estimate the effect of family income on chil- 
dren's educational outcomes using several data sets, namely the NCDS, the 
BCS70 and the BHPS. A special emphasis is given to the estimates from 
the BCS70 since two measures of parental income are available, at age 10 
and age 16, and the data set also includes measures of a child's ability. The 
identification strategy of the authors relies on exploiting the longitudinal di- 
mension of the BCS70 by simultaneously using information on family income 
at age 10 and age 16, which enables them to identify the effect of transitory 
components of income. The authors use two identifying strategies: the first 
includes both measures of income in the regression, while the second includes 
only the change in income between age 10 and age 16. The estimated effects 
of a one third reduction in the level of income are of reducing the probability 
of staying-on by 3.9 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively, when applying 
the two strategies above. As observed by the authors the small effect found 
when using the second method may be due to the measurement error that 
affects short run variations in income. Blanden and Gregg's (2004) identify- 
ing strategy rests on the assumption that changes in income between age 10 
and age 16 are exogenous with respect to a child's education. This means 
that the education regressions must control for all factors which may simul- 
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taneously affect family income changes between age 10 and 16 and a child's 
education. Some examples of such factors are a child's health or behavioural 
problems that might induce some parents to withdraw from the labour force 
to devote more time to their children, affecting, therefore, both family in- 
come and a child's education. In their study the authors build a continuous 
measure of family income from the grouped variable by matching families 
in the BSC70 with similar families in the FES and taking the median in- 
come within each band. This procedure has the advantage of reducing the 
potential problems of income endogeneity since the unobserved factors affect- 
ing both family income and a child's education are 'averaged' across families 
with similar observed characteristics coming from another data source. How- 
ever, the accurateness of the imputation procedure cannot be checked and 
its effect on the estimates of the effect of family income on a child's educa- 
tion is unknown. For this reason it may be useful to compare Blanden and 
Gregg's (2004) findings with estimates based on a different procedure that 
we implement in the current chapter. 
2.4 The empirical analysis 
The following subsections describe the data, the explanatory variables and 
the econometric model used in the empirical analysis to estimate the staying- 
on decision model. 
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2.4.1 Data description 
In this chapter, we use data drawn from the BCS70. The BCS70 began in 
1970 when data were collected on the births and families of 17,198 babies 
born in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland from the 5" to the 
11" of April. ' There are currently five complete follow-up surveys available: 
5-ycar, 10-ycar, 16-year, 26-year and 30-year. In order to carry out our 
analysis we need the family income and the age at leaving continuous full- 
time education of individuals included in the BCS70. For this reason we use 
a matched sample of individuals who replied to both the 10-year and the 30- 
year follow-up surveys. The choice of the two waves needs some explanations. 
We focus on the 10-ycar follow-up for income and other family and individual 
characteristics since the 16-year follow-up has a much higher rate of income 
non-response. ' We need to use data from the 10-year follow-up in any case, 
for a child's ability and would have therefore a high number of unmatched 
individuals between the 10-year and the 16-year follow-ups and, therefore, 
with missing ability scores. The dependent variable, a dummy for being 
enrolled in education at age 16, is derived from the age at leaving full-time 
'Subjects from Northern Ireland were included in the birth survey, but have been 
excluded from all subsequent sweeps. 
4 In a previous version of the chapter we used family income and background variables 
at age 16. However, in the present version we follow the suggestion of an anonymous 
referee and use the 10-year follow-up. The rate of income non-response is 15.7% in the 
10-year follow-up and 33.9% in the 16-year follow-up. Data from the 10-year follow-up are 
also used in the analysis of Chevalier and Lanot (2002). 
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education coming from the 30-year follow-up. ' Since educational data arc 
retrospective, the dependent variable may be affected by measurement error. 
In order to have an idea of the impact of panel attrition on the composition of 
the sample used in the estimates, we report in Table 2.1 for various samples 
the means of some family background variables that we consider particularly 
important in our analysis, father's and mother's years at leaving education 
and father's social class from the first wave. The table shows that panel 
attrition seems to be random with respect to some important aspects of 
family background. In the empirical analysis we focus only on individuals 
residing in England and Wales and drop individuals residing in Scotland on 
the grounds that the Scottish educational system is substantially different. ' 
2.4.2 Explanatory variables 
In this section, we describe some of the explanatory variables included in the 
econometric model. In order to ensure comparability of results, for the spec- 
5Some alternative sources for this piece of information are the 16-year follow-up that 
contains a question on whether the teenager is (or about to be) continuing his/her educa- 
tion. However, the response rate is only 61% (the information is available only for 7,073 
individuals on a total sample of 11,615 individuals). By contrast the information on the 
age at leaving full-time education from the 30-year follow-up is available for 99.80% of the 
individuals not still in education, i. e. for 10,930 individuals on a total sample of 10,952 
units. Also the 26-year follow-up provides these information, but the main problem is that 
the wave suffered from a high rate of panel attrition and collected information only on 
9,003 individuals. 
'The same sample selection criterion has been followed also by Micklewright (1989) 
and Chevalier and Lanot (2002) among others. 
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ification of the education equation we generally follow the previous literature 
and adopt a specification similar to those reviewed in section 2.3. When not 
stated otherwise, all variables are measured when the child was 10 years old. 
Among the covariates in the education equation we include some proxies 
for quantitative and verbal ability (British Ability Scales score), personal 
characteristics (ethnicity, region of residence), long-term family character- 
istics (parents' education and social class, mother's type of employment), 
other household characteristics (home ownership), a proxy for parenting qual- 
ity (parental interest in child's education) and family income. We describe, 
here, only some variables of special interest: 
British ability scales (BAS). ' This is an indicator of 'child quality'. ' 
The BAS score is computed according to performance on a question- 
naire that assesses both verbal and mathematical ability. The BAS 
score is computed at age 10, so as to reflect mostly innate ability and 
early parental inputs. We include a dummy for individuals with a miss- 
ing BAS score. The inclusion of ability scores enables the researcher 
to reduce the problem of so-called ability bias. Indeed, in the case that 
the ability of a child is unobserved, the positive relationship between 
family income and a child's education may be only spurious and driven 
by the correlation between a child's ability and his/her parents' ability, 
which affects their income. 
'See Elliot et al. (1979). 
8 According to Becker (1975), for instance, mature individuals decide on the total 
amount of investment in education on the basis of their parents' earlier choice of in- 
vestment in 'child quality'. 
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Parents' education and social class. We include both mother's and 
father's education and an individual's social class determined as the 
social class of the father, if he is present, or that of the mother if 
the father is not present. These are long-term family factors. The 
impact of parents' education and social class on children's educational 
outcomes may operate through several channels: it may affect the taste 
for education (non-pecuniary effects), the 'quality of parenting', 9 or be a 
proxy for permanent income, affecting the consumption and investment 
demand for education. By simultaneously including both long-term 
family characteristics and family income we estimate the effects of these 
factors free from cross- correl at ions. In this sense the effect of long-term 
family factors captures non-pecuniary effects, while that of income the 
pecuniary effect net of the impact of long-term family factors such as 
parental education and social class that are likely to affect parents' 
permanent income. 
- Parents' interest in children's education. We include dummies for the 
level of parental interest in children's education as assessed by the 
teacher when the child was 10 years old. There are five possible levels: 
interested, moderately interested, scarcely interested, not interested, 
cannot say. We aggregate the second and third categories, due to small 
cell size, and build an indicator of parental interest in child's education 
9See for instance Datcher-Loury (1988), who finds that greater time devoted to child 
care by highly educated mothers raises children's years of schooling. 
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by taking the maximum between father's and mother's interest. " Fein- 
stein and Symons (1999), for instance, find in their study of secondary 
school attainment that the quality of 'parenting' is more important 
than parental education, and that the most important parental input 
is interest in children's education. 
We also include dummies for the region of residence to assess the impact 
of regional factors such as school quality and local labour market conditions, 
and home property as a proxy of parental wealth. 
The matched sample includes 3,888 men and 4,186 women. Tables 2.2 and 
2.3 report means and standard deviations for the samples and the variables 
that we use in our preferred specification reported in section 2.4.3. It is 
immediate to see the high percentage of students in our samples who quit 
full-time education at age 16 (i. e. in 1986), 61% of men and 50% of women. 
Blau (1999) claims that some of the explanatory variables included in pre- 
vious studies, such as parents' education, should be excluded from a reduced 
form model of the demand for education because, although predetermined, 
they are potentially endogenous. However, our personal point of view is that 
in the context of the estimation of education equations the main source of en- 
dogeneity which may affect parental variables such as parents' education and 
social class is the correlation between parents' and children's academic abili- 
ties and that once the latter is included or proxied in the education equation 
the problem is greatly attenuated. For this reason and in order to make our 
results comparable with the past UK literature, which generally controls for 
1OTo avoid multicollinearity problems since the two variables are highly correlated. 
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parental education and socio-economic status, we include in the stkNring-on 
model these long-term parental characteristics. A way to fully address the 
problem would be to use IV methods also for these variables, which would 
require finding other valid instruments in addition to those used for parents' 
income. " However, following Blau (1999) and Maurin (2002), we do not 
include in the education equation variables related to the family structure. 12 
The reason is that we want to exclude choice variables that might be de- 
termined by parents jointly with children's education. Indeed, the economic 
theory of fertility (see Becker, 1981) states that the quantity of children is 
jointly determined with their quality, e. g. their level of education, and both 
are influenced by family financial resources. For the same reason we exclude 
from the regressors school type at age 10. 
"Chevalier (2004), for instance, uses changes in the minimum school leaving age in the 
UK as an instrument to identify the effect of parents' education on children's education. 
He finds that both mother's and father's education have a positive effect on a child's 
education and that this effect is direct and robust to the inclusion of several control 
variables. Moreover, in most cases in his analysis the endogeneity of parental education is 
rejected. 
12The role of family structure on children's achievement has been investigated in detail 
in Ermisch and R-ancesconi (2001b). 
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Family income 
The BCS70 reports gross weekly parents' income in categorical form. " It 
may be convenient to use a continuous measure of household income rather 
than the grouped variable for at least two reasons, one statistical and the 
other practical. Firstly, the use of a continuous income variable rather than 
income groups increases the precision of the estimate of the effect of in- 
come. Secondly, the BCS70 groups weekly household income into classes of 
50 pounds sterling. This means that if income groups are used, differences in 
educational attainment can only be assessed between individuals falling into 
different groups. However, policy makers are likely to be interested in finer 
policy interventions. Indeed, for individuals with household income at the 
lower bound of each group a 50 pounds increase in income would be necessary 
to change group. 50 pounds at the 1980 value are equivalent to about 124 
pounds at the 1999 value. The Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA) 
pilot scheme started in September 1999 in the UK provided 16-18 years old 
students with a financial allowance of 30 or 40 pounds per week (for annual 
family income less than 13,000 pounds), depending on the piloting area, if 
they remained in full-time education after year 11 (see Chevalier and Lanot 
2002). Then, it is evident that a transfer of 50 pounds per week at the 1980 
value, for instance, would largely exceed the amount of income transferred 
within the EMA pilot scheme. 
13 Parents income is combined gross income of child's mother and father (excludes child 
benefits but includes all other earned and unearned income before deductions of tax, 
national insurance, etc. ). 
38 
In order to obtain a continuous income variable, we follow Stewart (1983), 
using interval regression techniques to predict parents' income. Appendix A 
briefly reviews the method used to estimate the income equation. Hence, 
our study differs from the other studies that have used the BCS70, such as 
Chevalier and Lanot (2002) who use grouped income and Blanden and Gregg 
(2004) who use income from an external source (the FES). Moreover, in order 
to address the issue of income endogencity through IV we need to include in 
the income regression some variables which are excluded from the education 
equation, i. e. that do not have a direct effect on the staying-on decision. We 
follow some exclusion restrictions used in the previous literature: parents' 
industry (Shea, 2000, Maurin, 2002), and grandfathers' socio-economic sta- 
tus (Maurin, 2002). According to Shea (2000) industry wage premia reflect 
rents rather than unobserved ability differences. Evidence in favour of the 
validity of this exclusion restriction is provided by some of the literature on in- 
terindustry wage differences. First, estimates of the amount of the differences 
which can be accounted for by unmeasured workers' ability generally leave 
a substantial part of the differences unexplained (see for instance Krueger 
and Summers 1988, Katz and Summers 1989). Moreover, the literature has 
shown that wage premia are higher in industries with higher profits, and 
that industries that pay higher wages do so in all occupations, findings that 
are difficult to reconcile with the unobserved ability hypothesis. " However, 
as Shea (2000) acknowledges there are other studies supporting the unob- 
"Which states that some industries pay higher wages to attract workers with higher 
ability. For a brief review see Romer (1996). 
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served ability view, such as Murphy and Topel (1990) among others. Maurin 
(2002) uses another instrument, grandfathers' socio-economic status. The 
variable is expected to be highly correlated with family income, due to the 
well established intergenerational correlation between parents' and children's 
incomes or socio-economic status (SES). In this case the identifying assump- 
tion is that grandfathers' SES has no direct effect on children's educational 
outcomes but only an indirect effect through the impact on family income. 
Studies which have used IV have generally assumed the validity of one in- 
strument and tested the validity of the other instruments. Shea (2000, p. 
162) assumes that his instruments (industry and union wage premia, job 
loss) are uncorrelated with unobserved ability. Maurin (2002, p. 322) as- 
sumes that grandfathers' past socio-economic status is a valid instrument 
and tests the validity of father's industry, which turns out to be also a valid 
instrument. In the current chapter we follow a different approach, we test for 
the potential validity of our candidate instrumental variables by implement- 
ing the tests suggested by Bound et al. (1995), i. e. testing the significance 
of all instruments in both the income equation and the education equation 
that uses instrumented income. In the model for parental income we include 
as explanatory variables: parental ethnic groups, education, social classes 
and industries (one-digit SIC 80), the region of residence and grandfathers' 
social class. 15 The results of the parental income interval regression are re- 
ported in Table 2.4. The variables included are generally highly significant. 
Our estimates show significant variation in parental income by industry and 
15This last piece of information comes from the 5-year follow-up survey. 
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grandparents' social class. The Wald tests reported in Table 2.5 show that 
father's and mother's industries and grandfathers' social classes are all sta- 
tistically significant determinants of parental income at the 1% level. The 
estimated effects of the explanatory variables are generally in the expected 
direction: parental income increases with parental education and social class, 
is lower for ethnic minorities and is positively related to grandfathers' social 
class. The Pseudo R2 of the model is 17.75%. 
2.4.3 Econometric model and results 
Although the percentage of observations with missing income in the 10-year 
follow-up is much lower than that in the 16-year follow-up, our estimates may 
still be affected by the so-called sample selection bias (see Heckman, 1979). 
For this reason, we decide to model non-response to the income question. 
The estimated model is therefore described by the following two equations: 
aln(&) + XjO + ui 
where Sj* is a latent variable measuring an individual's demand for post- 
compulsory education. We only observe the binary variable Si assuming 
value I if the individual i leaves education at age 16 and zero otherwise; 16 X, 
16Like most of the previous literature, in this chapter we model the school continuation 
decision as a dichotomous variable. In our case, we are mainly interested in the role 
of family background variables on the probability of staying on at 16. However, these 
variables may have a different impact, on the different choices available at sixteen. For 
instance, Andrews and Bradley (1997) analysed the transition from school by modeling 
six possible choices (two types of schooling, youth training, two forms of employment 
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are observable characteristics and ui unobservables affecting the staying-on 
decision; 9i is family income, which has been predicted using in the first stage 
the interval regression, 17 and a our parameter of interest; while the second 
equation is 
R* i == Wi-Y + vi (2.2) 
where Rj* is a latent variable measuring the propensity to answer to the in- 
come question. We only observe the binary variable R, assuming value I if 
family income is non-missing and zero otherwise. Wi is the vector of observ- 
able characteristics affecting the choice to answer to the income question. We 
assume that these factors are the same factors affecting the level of income 
that are included in the interval regression estimated in the previous section. 
vi is a vector of unobservables affecting the probability of answering to the 
income question. 
The sample selection bias arises from the potential correlation between 
the error terms of the two equations ui and vi. Since in income surveys 
higher non-response is sometimes observed at high income levels, one possible 
source of selection could be due to unobserved parents' earnings ability that 
is not controlled for by our included covariates. If parents' earnings ability 
and unemployment) and using a multinornial logit model. They found that the different 
outcomes could not be aggregated. In our case it is not possible to model the choice in 
a similar way given that data on the type of transition are provided only in the 16-year 
follow-up and contain a high number of missings (39%). 
17We include the natural logarithm of income rather the level of income following the 
suggestion of an anonymous referee and using a specification close to Blanden and 
Gregg 
(2004). 
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positively affects income response and negatively affects a child's probability 
to leave education, for instance, we would observe a negative correlation 
between the error terms of the two equations. 
Assuming that ui and vi are jointly normally distributed with correlation 
p, the model constituted by equations (2.1) and (2.2) can be estimated with 
a probit model with selection (see van de Ven and van Praag 1981) using 
maximum likelihood. " The effect of income in the education equation is es- 
timated through a two-stage procedure and, therefore, to identify the effect 
of parental income we need some variables affecting schooling decisions only 
through their influence on income. 19 We have already seen in section 2.4.2 
that our potential identifying instruments are parents' industry and grand- 
fathers' social class. For this reason to have a basic idea of their validity 
we estimate the probit model with selection without exclusion restrictions 
and perform some Wald tests for the significance of the instruments in the 
education equation using instrumented income . 
20 The tests are reported in 
18If the correlation p is not statistically significant the education equation, i. e. equation 
(2.1), can be consistently and efficiently estimated using a simple binary probit model. 
19More precisely the model is formally identified also in the absence of exclusion restric- 
tions because of the non-linearity of predicted income in the explanatory variables (see 
Appendix A). However, using exclusion restrictions is important to avoid that identifica- 
tion rests only on functional form. 
20As we said the model using predicted income from the interval regression is virtually 
identified also in the absence of exclusion restrictions (due to the non-linearity of the 
income prediction in the explanatory variables, see Appendix A. ). The same is true for 
the probit model with selection. Standard errors have been computed with bootstrap since 
the income variable has been generated from the first stage income interval regression for 
household income. 
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Table 2.5 . 
2' The results show that for men father's and mother's industries 
and mother's father social class can be dropped from the education equa- 
tion. A possible reason for the significance of father's father social class is 
that it may be a proxy for wealth that will be inherited by the household, 
or it may reflect some residual child's unobserved ability uncorrelated with 
parents' ability since some genetic characters may appear only in some gen- 
erations. For women grandfathers' social classes can be dropped. In this 
case parents' industry does not appear to be a valid instrument. Since the 
same variable is not significant for men, we think that the effect on children's 
education should not reflect unobserved ability but parental tastes towards fe- 
male work. For instance, parents working in female dominated sectors might 
be more favourable to female work and female education . 
22 We follow the in- 
dications of these tests to specify the models with exclusion restrictions. For 
men, the estimates of the probit model with selection are reported in Tables 
2.6 and 2.7. Since the correlation in Table 2.7 is not significant we observe 
that there is no evidence of a sample selection bias and estimate accordingly 
a simple probit model. Table 2.10 reports the results for the probit model. 
The coefficient on parents' income is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Therefore, parental income has a significant negative effect on 
quitting full-time education at age 16. 
21 We do not report here the full set of estimates for the models without exclusion 
restrictions but they are available upon request from the author. 
221ndeed, from Table 2.11 we will observe that a father working in sectors such as 
Distribution, Banking and Other services where the presence of female workers is higher 
than in the reference group (Metal goods) raises the staying-on probability. 
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Also for women the correlation between the error terms of the two equa- 
tions is not statistically significant, i. e. we find no evidence of a sample 
selection bias (see Tables 2.8 and 2.9). The estimates of the simple probit 
model are reported in Table 2.11, which shows that the coefficient of parental 
income is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
Although parental income has a significant effect on the school continua- 
tion decision for both males and females it is necessary to compute marginal 
effects to have an idea of the magnitude of its effect on the probability of 
quitting full-time education at the minimum leaving age. For this purpose we 
report in Table 2.12 the effect of a one standard deviation increase in income 
(58.4 pounds per week) and an increase equivalent to the 1999 maximum 
of the EMA scheme on the probability of quitting education at the sample 
mean and at various levels of the quitting probability. The marginal effects 
show a limited impact of parental income on the schooling decision. Due to 
the shape of the normal density function the marginal effect is the highest at 
the 50% probability of quitting education, where a one-standard deviation 
increase in income reduces the probability of leaving education at 16 by 2.8 
percentage points for men. The effect of income is lower for 'marginal' and 
advantaged students, i. e. for the students who have very high and very low 
probabilities of quitting education at 16, respectively. The same is observed 
for women for which the corresponding marginal effect at a 50% probability 
of quitting is 3.5 percentage points. Therefore, our analysis, in line with Rice 
(1987) and Micklewright (1989), shows a stronger effect of parental income 
on daughters' than on sons' probability of staying-on. The marginal effects 
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for the 1980 equivalent of the 40 pounds, which represents the maximum 
amount of the EMA in 1999 (about 16 pounds at the 1980 value), on the 
probability of staying-on are much smaller. However, as we said, it must be 
noted that we are considering the effect of a non-contingent income transfer 
while EMAs are conditioned on the decision to continue in education and 
their effect is likely to be much stronger, especially on less advantaged stu- 
dents. Therefore, our results are not necessarily in contrast with the recent 
evidence provided on the effectiveness of the EMAs (Ashworth et al. 2002). 
In line with the previous literature, our analysis shows a substantial ef- 
fect of family long-term characteristics, such as education and social class, 
and early parental and school inputs, such as parents' interest in a child's 
education on children's staying-on probability. Men (women) with fathers 
with a degree are for instance about 17 (15) percentage points more likely 
to stay-on than individuals whose fathers have less than O-level qualifica- 
tions, 23 while those with mothers with a degree have a probability premium 
of 30 (21) percentage points. Individuals from social class I (professionals) 
are about 17 (10) percentage points more likely to continue education than 
those from social class HIM (skilled manual workers). Men (women) whose 
parents showed very little or no interest in education are about 13 (23) per- 
centage points more likely to quit full-time education at the minimum leaving 
age than individuals whose parents were very interested in education. Since 
in the probit models we control for parents' income and home property (as 
a proxy for wealth) these effects are free from the correlation with pecuniary 
230rdinary level is the lower secondary education qualification in the UK. 
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factors and have a non-pecuniary nature. 
Also the effect of child ability is remarkable. A one-standard deviation 
increase in the BAS quantitative score reduces the quitting probability by 
5.4 percentage points for men and 6.2 for women. The same variation in the 
BAS verbal score reduces the stopping probability by 6.3 percentage points 
for men and 6.1 for women. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have investigated the effect of parental income on chil- 
dren's staying-on probability at school at age 16 in England and Wales using 
data from the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70). With respect to the pre- 
vious literature the main innovations we have introduced are the following. 
Firstly, unlike previous authors who have used the BCS70 to study the school 
staying-on probability, we do not use dummies for income groups (such as 
Chevalier and Lanot 2002), or impute income from an external source (such 
as Blanden and Gregg 2004) but we obtain a continuous income measure 
from the grouped income in the BCS70 using interval regression. This is 
important since it increases the precision of the estimates and avoids the 
potential bias of the imputation technique, respectively. Secondly, in this 
chapter we seek to address the issue of income endogeneity using Instrumen- 
tal Variables techniques. In particular, unlike Chevalier and Lanot (2002), 
who try to attenuate the endogeneity problem by simply including in their 
regressions a measure of child ability, we seek to identify an exogenous source 
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of variation in family income in the spirit of Shea (2000) and Maurin (2002). 
For this purpose we use parents' industries and grandfathers' social class. 
We find that mother's father social class and mother's and father's indus- 
tries are valid instruments for men and grandfathers' social classes are valid 
instruments for women. Our identifying strategy differs from Blanden and 
Gregg (2004), who use the longitudinal dimension of the BCS70 to identify 
the transitory component of parental income. Thirdly, unlike previous stud- 
ies we address the issue of income non response in the BCS70 by estimating 
a probit model with selection, but we find no evidence of a sample selection 
bias. Our main results are as follows. Like the other two studies that used 
the BCS70 we find a statistically significant positive effect of parental income 
on a child's staying-on probability at age 16. However, the magnitude of the 
effect is relatively small, and the impact of income is stronger for women. 
This last result on gender differences confirms early findings by Rice (1987) 
and Micklewright (1989) who both used NCDS data. By contrast, other fam- 
ily characteristics such as social class, parental education and early parental 
interest in a child's education have much stronger effects on the probability 
of staying in full-time education at age 16. Our results confirms, therefore, 
the findings of the US literature and those of past UK studies of the pre- 
dominance of family non-pecuniary over pecuniary influences on children's 
education. 
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Appendix A: From grouped to continuous fam- 
ily income 
In the BCS70, family income (i. e. parents' income) is observed in a certain 
interval on a continuous scale. We want to transform the grouped variable 
into a continuous one. The procedure has been investigated by Stewart 
(1983). We summarise here only the main features of the problem and the 
proposed solution. The latent structure of the model under consideration is 
given by: 
1 10 Yi =Z iö+Pj +Ei (2.3) 
where yj is the latent family income of individual i, which falls within a 
certain interval of the real line (Ak-1 , 
Ak)- zi and pi are vectors of regressors 
affecting family income and 6 and 0 vectors of unknown parameters to be 
estimated, respectively. zi represents the variables excluded from the educa- 
tion equation (i. e. the identifying instruments) that we estimate in a second 
stage using predicted income from equation (2.3). Ei's are i. i. d. normally 
distributed random disturbances with zero mean and variance a2 and are 
assumed to be independent of zi and pi. 
Ad hoc procedures, such as assigning to each individual the midpoint 
of her income group, do not in general result in consistent estimates of the 
parameters 6 and 0, while consistent estimates can be obtained by assigning 
to each observation its conditional expectation: 
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I 
O(zk-1) - O(zk) ýj = E(yilAk-1 < yj < AK7 Zi) = Zj6 + PiO + 0' 
I'Cý 
(Zk) 
- 4t 
(Zk 
- 1) 
(2.4) 
where Zk= (Ak- zi6 - piO) la and 0(. ) and 4D (-) are the standard normal 
density and cumulative distribution functions. 
Stewart (1983) suggests several ways to estimate the parameters of inter- 
est 6,0 and or. 
In our specific case the parameters are estimated using a maximum like- 
lihood estimator. 
24 
After estimating 6,0 and a consistently, it is possible to obtain predicted 
values for yi, i. e. a continuous measure of family income. 
This measure is used in a second stage for the estimation of the education 
equations (the probit models of staying-on). 
24See 'methods and formulas' for the TOBIT command in the Stata Reference Manual 
(Stata 2003). 
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Tables 
Table 2.1: Some descriptive statistics for different samples (BCS70) 
Variable first wave 10-year 30-year 
follow-up follow-up 
Father's age at leaving education 15.84 15-84 15.94 
Mother's age at leaving education 15-59 15.60 15-67 
Father's social class % % % 
Not known 0.56 0.55 0.47 
1 4.77 4.74 5.21 
11 11.08 11.16 11.86 
IIINM 11.19 11.64 12.55 
HIM 43.87 45.25 44.77 
IV 14.38 14.35 13.75 
V 6.44 6.07 5.32 
other 2.92 2.60 2.75 
not applicable 4.79 3.64 3.32 
Wave size 17,197 13,700 10,389 
Note. This table reports some descriptive statistics for the variables of the first wave in the 
sample at birth and in the age 10 and age 30 follow-ups. Some abbreviations commonly 
used in the UK for social classes are: I (professional), II (intermediate), IIINM (skilled 
non manual), HIM (skilled manual), IV (partly skilled), V (unskilled). 
51 
Table 2.2: Sample summary statistics, men (BCS70) 
Variable Mean s. d. 
Quits at 16 0.603 0.489 
Ln(incorne) 4.771 0.486 
Child's ethnicity (white) 
Non-white 0.035 0.183 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.151 0.358 
A-level 0.085 0.279 
Professional or other 0.031 0.174 
Degree 0.123 0.329 
Missing 0.026 0.160 
Father not present 0.069 0.253 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.197 0.397 
A-level 0.038 0.191 
Professional or other 0.052 0.221 
Degree 0.030 0.171 
Missing 0.007 0.082 
Mother not present 0.060 0.237 
Social class (HIM) 
1 0.060 0.237 
11 0.224 0.417 
IIINM 0.088 0.284 
IV 0.106 0.308 
V 0.028 0.164 
OLFUa 0.034 0.182 
Missing 0.051 0.221 
Parental interest in child's education (very interested) 
No parental figure 0.002 0.045 
Missing or cannot say 0.247 0.431 
Moderately interested 0.290 0.454 
Very little or uninterested 0.074 0.262 
Home ownership (owned) 
Mortgage 0.545 0.498 
Rented or other 0.339 0.474 
Missing 0.005 0.072 
Region (South East) 
Missing 0.002 0.045 
North East 0.064 0.244 
North West 0.145 0.352 
Yorkshire 0.109 0.311 
East Midlands 0.064 0.245 
West Midlands 0.114 0.318 
East 0.072 0.258 
London 0.076 0.264 
South West 0.057 0.232 
Wales 0.074 0.262 
52 
continued 
Variable Mean s. d. 
Father's father social class (HIM) 
Not matched 0.132 0.339 
Not known 0.164 0.371 
Not applicable 0.033 0.179 
0.018 0.132 
0.113 0.317 
IIINM 0.056 0.230 
IV 0.115 0.320 
V 0.049 0.216 
Ability scores 
BAS quantitative 29-821 16-986 
BAS verbal 22.650 12.347 
BAS missing 0.211 0.408 
Mother's employment (OLF)b 
Missing 0.047 0.212 
Regular employment 0.505 0.500 
Occasional employment 0.141 . 348 
Note. This table reports means and standard deviations for the the variables used in our 
preferred specification (the binary probit model reported in Table 2.10). The sample in- 
cludes 3,888 individuals. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are indicated 
in brackets. I Out of the labour force or unemployed; b Out of the labour force. 
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Table 2.3: Sample summary statistics, women (BCS70) 
Variable Mean s. d. 
Quits at 16 0.505 0.500 
Ln(income) 4.761 0.482 
Child's ethnicity (white) 
Non-white 0.031 0.173 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.152 0.359 
A-level 0.083 0.276 
Professional or other 0.030 0.171 
Degree 0.121 0.326 
Missing 0.037 0.189 
Father not present 0.075 0.263 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.184 0.388 
A-level 0.037 0.190 
Professional or other 0.054 0.226 
Degree 0.026 0.160 
Missing 0.059 0.235 
Social class (HIM) 
1 0.056 0.229 
11 0.220 0.414 
IIINM 0.084 0.278 
IV 0.102 0.302 
V 0.025 0.156 
OLFUa 0.042 0.200 
Missing 0.064 0.244 
Parental interest in childs education (very interested) 
No parental figure 0.003 0.056 
Missing or cannot say 0.240 0.427 
Moderately interested 0.281 0.450 
Very little or uninterested 0.063 0.243 
Home ownership (owned) 
Mortgage 0.549 0.498 
Rented or other 0.338 0.473 
Missing 0.007 0.083 
Region (South East) 
Missing 0.003 0.058 
North East 0.060 0.238 
North West 0.139 0.346 
Yorkshire 0.117 0.321 
East Midlands 0.061 0.240 
West Midlands 0.108 0.310 
East 0.070 0.255 
London 0.079 0.270 
South West 0.072 0.259 
Wales 0.067 0.250 
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continued 
Variable Mean s. d. 
Mother's industry (other services) 
Missing 0.323 0.468 
Agriculture 0.013 0.113 
Extraction 0.017 0.128 
Metal goods 0.039 0.194 
Other manufacturing 0.069 0.254 
Construction 0.007 0.086 
Distribution 0.141 0.348 
Týransport 0.010 0.100 
Banking 0.088 0.283 
Father's industry (metal goods) 
Missing 0.167 0.373 
Agriculture 0.021 0.142 
Energy 0.054 0.225 
Extraction 0.058 0.234 
Other manufacturing 0.083 0.277 
Construction 0.102 0.303 
Distribution 0.085 0.279 
Transport 0.078 0.268 
Banking 0.045 0.207 
Other services 0.128 0.335 
Ability scores 
BAS quantitative 30.845 16.969 
BAS verbal 22.335 11.824 
BAS missing 0.201 0.401 
Mother's employment (OLF) 
Missing 0.041 0.198 
Mother not present 0.008 0.087 
Regular employment 0.518 0.500 
Occasional employment 0.135 0.342 
Note. This table reports means and standard deviations for the the variables used in our 
preferred specification (the binary probit model reported in Table 2.11). The sample in- 
cludes 4,168 individuals. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are indicated 
in brackets. ' Out of the labour force or unemployed; b Out of the labour force. 
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Table 2.4: Family income regression (BCS70) 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Father not present -59.117 2.041 
Mother not present -8.345 5.735 
Father's ethnicity (white) 
Missing -56-375 2.983 
Non-white -8.262 4.159 
Mother's ethnicity (white) 
Missing 6.695 7.008 
Non-white -3.136 3.927 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level 8.800 1.363 
A-level 14.014 1.761 
Professional 22.348 3.383 
Degree 35.563 2.456 
Other 3.045 9.564 
Missing 0.025 1.915 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level 8.781 1.283 
A-level 13.379 2.747 
Professional 21.542 2.656 
Degree 31.507 3.600 
Other 23.954 13.209 
Missing -3.048 1.793 
Father's social class (HIM) 
32.323 3.177 
27.178 1.599 
IIINM 6.966 1.778 
IV -5.440 1.263 
V -15.830 1.870 
Unemployed -46.633 1.648 
OLFa -37.936 1.973 
Missing -2.969 2.635 
Mother's social class (HINM) 
I and 11 5.610 2.012 
HIM -7.501 2.023 
IV -12.083 1.433 
V -18.813 1.773 
Unemployed -25.536 3.114 
OLF -20.707 1.540 
Missing -15.933 2.320 
Region (South East) 
Missing 32.781 10.201 
North East -12.901 1.895 
North West -11.907 1.513 
Yorkshire -13.435 1.616 
East Midlands -11.699 1.901 
West Midlands -10.958 1.613 
East -7.427 2.007 
London 3.595 1.938 
South West -17.431 2.038 
Wales -16-503 1.939 
Scotland -13.095 1.611 
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continued 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Father's industry (metal goods) 
Missing -3.441 1.509 Agriculture -31.161 3.134 
Energy 12-097 2.099 
Extraction -0-197 1.848 
Other manufacturing 2.839 1.756 
Construction -0.292 1.622 
Distribution -13-447 1.950 
Transport -0.978 1.821 
Banking 12-367 2.805 
Other services -7-322 1.797 
Mother's industry (other services) 
Missing 1.189 1.441 
Agriculture 4.624 4.262 
Extraction 15.621 3.616 
Metal goods 11.175 2.264 
Other manufacturing 6.837 1.611 
Construction -4.643 5.665 
Distribution -5.844 1.437 
Transport 10.758 4.191 
Banking 5.016 1.734 
Father's father social class (HIM) 
Not matched 1.579 1.404 
Not known -2.965 1.231 
Not applicable 4.930 2.564 
9.744 4.472 
1.438 1.700 
IIINM -2.559 2.058 
IV -2.664 1.332 
V -1.437 1.719 
Mother's father social class (HIM) 
Not known -3.082 1.503 
Not applicable 1.212 2.247 
1 6.997 4.169 
11 5.119 1.646 
IIINM 2.295 1.978 
IV -1.528 1.240 
V -2.727 1.640 
Constant 137.804 *** 2.082 
Pseudo R' 0.178 
N. observations 12,542 
Wald tests 
Father's industry Chi2 (10)=274.21 (0.00) 
Mother's industry Chi2(9)= 113.00 (0.00) 
Father's father social class Chi2 (8)=26.64 (0.00) 
Mother's father social class Chi2 (7)=25-37 (0.00) 
Note. The family income regression has been estimated using interval regression (Stata 
2003). The Wald test are the tests for the exclusions of the candidate instruments from 
the income equation. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are indicated 
in brackets. a Out of the labour force. * significant at 10%-. ** significant at 57(; 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.5: Wald tests for the exclusion of candidate instruments from the 
education equation, probit model with selection 
Wald tests Men Women 
1 Father's industry Chi'(10) = 13.72 (0-1863) Chiý'(9) 19-80 (0.019) 
2 Mother's industry Chi2(g) = 12.63 (0.1801) Chi2(jO) 15-80 (0.106) 
3 Father's father social class Chi2 (8) = 17.22 (0.0279) 
Chi2 (8) 6.95 (0.541) 
4 Mother's father social class Ch i2 (7) = 4.77 (0.6881) 
Chi2 (7) 6.91 (0.438) 
1+2+4 Chi2 (2 6) = 32-87 (0.1660) - 
2+3+4 - 
Chi2 (25) 34.64 (0.095) 
3+4 Chi2( 15) 18.41 (0.242) 
Note. This table reports Wald tests for the exclusion of the candidate instruments from 
the education equation in the probit model with selection estimated using instrumented 
income and without exclusion restrictions. 
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Table 2.6: Probit model with selection of quitting at 16, men (BCS70) 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Ln(income) -0.150 0.063 
Child's ethnicity (white) 
Non-white -0.939 0.141 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.299 0.067 
A-level -0.148 0.084 
Professional or other -0-690 0.150 
Degree -0.452 0.106 
Father not present -0.365 0.158 
Missing -0.107 0.122 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.326 0.060 
A-level -0.273 0.121 
Professional or other -0.551 0.125 
Degree -0.772 0.176 
Mother not present 0.273 0.362 
Social class (HIM) 
Missing -0.025 0.120 
1 -0.417 0.144 
11 -0-303 0.092 
IIINM -0.278 0.082 
IV 0.061 0.085 
V 0.002 0.159 
OLFU -0.189 0.140 
Parental interest in child's education (very interested) 
Missing -0.176 0.122 
No parental figure -0.393 0.588 
Missing or cannot say 0.257 0.068 
Moderately interested 0.226 0.057 
Very little or uninterested 0.350 0.102 
Home ownership (owned) 
Mortgage 0.102 0.075 
Rented or other 0.405 0.082 
Missing 0.392 0.325 
Region (South East) 
Missing -0.927 0.565 
North East 0.278 0.112 
North West 0.168 0.077 
Yorkshire 0.077 0.082 
East Midlands -0-008 0.098 
West Midlands -0.012 0.088 
East -0-039 0.101 
London 0.072 0.096 
South West -0.002 0.108 
Wales -0.257 0.100 
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continued 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Father's father social class (HIM) 
Not matched -0.045 0.093 Not known -0-031 0.072 
Not applicable -0.008 0.135 
1 -0.486 0.205 
11 -0.167 0.079 
IIINM 0.086 0.101 
IV 0.160 0.079 
V -0.070 0.112 
Ability scores 
BAS quantitative -0.023 0.004 
BAS verbal -0.049 0.008 
BAS missing -2.258 0.231 
Mother's employment (OLF) 
Missing 0.274 0.122 
Regular employment 0.063 0.059 
Occasional employment, unemployed 0.016 0.077 
Constant 3.360 *** 0.386 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (since parental income is predicted using an interval 
regression), 100 replications. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are 
indicated in brackets. Out of the labour force or unemployed; b Out of the labour force. 
* significant at 10%; significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.7: Selection equation: income response, men (BCS70) 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Father's ethnicity (white) 
No father figure -0.118 0,066 
Missing 0.127 0.091 
Non-white 0.068 0.156 
Mother's ethnicity (white) 
No mother figure 0.658 0.114 
Missing -1.705 0.162 
Non-white -0.161 0.143 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.048 0.033 
A-level . 0.041 0.039 
Professional 0.306 0.063 
Degree 0.162 0.045 
Missing -0.470 0,048 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.125 0.028 
A-level 0.182 0.053 
Professional or other -0.185 0.052 
Degree 0.095 0.069 
Missing -0.232 0.048 
Father's social class (HIM) 
1 -0.281 0.056 
11 -0.288 0.036 
IIINM -0.043 0.043 
IV 0.098 0.038 
V -0.303 0.062 
U -0.096 0.067 
OLF 0.593 0.107 
Missing -0.228 0.068 
Mother's social class (HINM) 
I and 11 0.004 0.042 
HIM 0.154 0.046 
IV 0.039 0.037 
V 0.282 0.062 
U -0.062 0.094 
OLF -0.058 0.040 
Missing -0.024 0.059 
Region (South East) 
Missing -1.386 0.166 
North East 0.041 0.043 
North West -0.020 0.034 
Yorkshire 0.043 0.038 
East Midlands 0.029 0.047 
West Midlands -0.214 0.039 
East -0.203 0.042 
London -0.092 0.043 
South West 0.002 0.047 
Wales -0.002 0.046 
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continued 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Father's industry (metal goods) 
Missing -0.212 0.038 
Agriculture -0-340 0.074 
Energy 0.060 0.050 
Extraction -0.083 0.048 
Other manufacturing -0.234 0.052 
Construction -0.204 0.057 
Distribution -0.293 0.045 
Týransport -0.030 0.051 
Banking -0.220 0.057 
Other services -0.021 0.043 
Mother's industry (other services) 
Missing -0.079 0.037 
Agriculture 0.067 0.080 
Extraction -0.056 0.096 
Metal goods -0.133 0.062 
Other manufacturing 0.061 0.048 
Construction -0.181 0.142 
Distribution -0-085 0.052 
Týransport -0.099 0.095 
Banking 0.022 0.040 
Father's father social class (HIM) 
Not matched -0.348 0.035 
Not known -0.095 0.030 
Not applicable -0-186 0.064 
1 0.081 0.085 
11 -0.019 0.035 
IIINM -0.099 0.046 
IV -0.057 0.035 
V 0.037 0.051 
Mother's father social class (HIM) 
Not known -0.046 0.039 
Not applicable 0.156 0.050 
1 -0-052 0.083 
11 -0.129 0.034 
IIINM 0.083 0.046 
IV -0.046 0.033 
V -0.062 0.050 
Constant 1.606 *** 0.063 
N. observations 5,085 
p -0.157 0.478 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (since parental income is predicted using an interval 
regression), 100 replications. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are 
indicated in brackets. ' Out of the labour force or unemployed; b Out of the labour force. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-8: Probit model with selection of quitting at 16, women (BCS70) 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Ln(incorne) -0-187 0.064 
Child's ethnicity (white) 
Non-white -0-853 0.198 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.177 0.063 
A-level -0-159 0.085 
Professional or other -0.258 0.149 
Degree -0.367 0.099 
Father not present -0-183 0.138 
Missing -0.125 0.111 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.278 0.062 
A-level -0.402 0.120 
Professional or other -0.387 0.122 
Degree -0-570 0.172 
Mother not present 0.317 0.326 
Missing 0.185 0.095 
Social class (HIM) 
-0.177 0.181 
-0.170 0.091 
IIINM -0-081 0.085 
IV 0.088 0.078 
V 0.077 0.148 
OLFU 0.012 0.117 
Parental interest in child's education (very interested) 
Missing -0-349 0.104 
No parental figure -0.354 0.456 
Missing or cannot say 0.158 0.064 
Moderately interested 0.285 0.055 
Very little or uninterested 0.586 0.106 
Home ownership (owned) 
Mortgage 0.058 0.072 
Rented or other 0.343 0.083 
Missing 0.170 0.234 
Region (South East) 
North East -0.128 0.093 
North West 0.058 0.081 
Yorkshire 0.162 0.077 
East Midlands 0.239 0.095 
West Midlands 0.160 0.084 
East 0.020 0.090 
London -0.122 0.118 
South West 0.174 0.091 
Wales -0-309 0.101 
63 
continued 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Ability scores 
BAS quantitative -0.020 0.004 
BAS verbal -0-036 0.007 
BAS missing -1.710 0.220 
Mother's industry (other services) 
Missing 0.039 0.083 
Agriculture 0.001 0.182 
Extraction 0.501 0.184 
Metal goods 0.128 0.121 
Other manufacturing 0.159 0.091 
Construction -0.021 0.257 
Distribution 0.177 0.071 
Transport 0.372 0.216 
Banking 0.172 0.085 
Father's industry (metal goods) 
Missing -0.090 0.089 
Agriculture -0.199 0.213 
Energy -0-065 0.109 
Extraction -0.027 0.102 
Other manufacturing -0-195 0.104 
Construction -0.148 0.094 
Distribution -0.204 0.108 
Transport -0.109 0.094 
Banking -0.229 0.125 
Other services -0.273 0.089 
Mother's employment (OLF)b 
Missing 0.110 0.124 
Regular employment 0.068 0.068 
Occasional employment, unemployed 0.003 0.079 
Constant 2.703 *** 0.389 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (since parental income is predicted using an interval 
regression), 100 replications. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are 
indicated in brackets. Out of the labour force or unemployed; b Out of the labour force. 
* significant at 10%; significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.9: Selection equation: income response, women (BCS70) 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Father's ethnicity (white) 
No father figure 0.340 0.060 
Missing 0.645 0.145 
Non-white 0.506 0.113 
Mother's ethnicity (white) 
No mother figure -0.308 0.114 
Missing -0-157 0.195 
Non-white -0-721 0.115 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.017 0.030 
A-level -0.117 0.038 
Professional -0.238 0.064 
Degree 0.016 0.045 
Missing -0-350 0.055 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level 0.250 0.029 
A-level 0.099 0.059 
Professional or other -0-083 0.073 
Degree 0.430 0.093 
Missing -0.141 0.047 
Father's social class (HIM) 
1 -0.441 0.060 
11 -0.230 0.037 
IIINM -0-008 0.050 
IV 0.141 0.035 
V 0.145 0.063 
U 0.083 0.060 
OLF -0.092 0.095 
Missing -0.066 0.070 
Mother's social class (IIINM) 
I and 11 0.190 0.059 
HIM -0-016 0.052 
IV 0.074 0.035 
V -0.078 0.082 
U -0.369 0.096 
OLF -0-157 0.035 
Missing -0.444 0.058 
Region (South East) 
North East 0.056 0.044 
North West -0.218 0.033 
Yorkshire 0.019 0.035 
East Midlands -0.199 0.047 
West Midlands -0.257 0.037 
East -0.076 0.041 
London -0.274 0.042 
South West 0.001 0.047 
Wales -0-083 0.042 
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continued 
Variable Coef. s. e. 
Father's industry (metal goods) 
Missing -0.246 0.036 Agriculture -0.644 0.079 
Energy 0.169 0.048 
Extraction 0.020 0.047 
Other manufacturing -0.230 0.043 
Construction -0.187 0.040 
Distribution -0.232 0.043 
'Iýransport 0.093 0.043 
Banking -0.115 0.063 
Other services 0.130 0.044 
Mother's industry (other services) 
Missing -0.061 0.037 
Agriculture -0-033 0.108 
Extraction 0.525 0.075 
Metal goods 0.310 0.053 
Other manufacturing -0.139 0.042 
Construction -0.151 0.118 
Distribution -0-133 0.034 
Transport -0-198 0.100 
Banking 0.160 0.047 
Father's father social class (HIM) 
Not matched -0.169 0.036 
Not known -0.154 0.035 
Not applicable -0.091 0.071 
-0.061 0.111 
-0-095 0.047 
IIINM -0.034 0.051 
IV -0.007 0.036 
V 0.055 0.051 
Mother's father social class (HIM) 
Not known -0.023 0.040 
Not applicable -0.126 0.071 
1 -0.272 0.092 
11 -0.265 0.044 
IIINM -0.007 0.042 
IV 0.188 0.036 
V -0.226 0.047 
Constant 1.724 *** 0.050 
N. observations 4,671 
p -0.384 0.628 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (since parental income is predicted using an interval 
regression), 100 replications. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are 
indicated in brackets. ' Out of the labour force or unemployed; b Out of the labour force. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.10: Probit model of quitting at 16, men (BCS70) 
Variable Coef. s. e. rn. e. 
Ln(incorne) -0.151 0.064 -0.057 
Child's ethnicity (white) 
Non-white -0.949 0.140 -0-362 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.298 0.068 -0.113 
A-level -0.149 0.087 -0.055 
Professional or other -0-675 0.147 -0.262 
Degree -0.441 0.104 -0.170 
Missing -0-133 0.097 -0.049 
Father not present -0-365 0.165 -0.139 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.322 0.060 -0.123 
A-level -0.265 0.130 -0-101 
Professional or other -0.564 0.109 -0.219 
Degree -0.774 0.191 -0-301 
Missing -0.044 0.108 -0.016 
Mother not present 0.304 1.413 0.102 
Social class (HIM) 
-0.433 0.133 -0.167 
-0-323 0.069 -0.123 
IIINM -0.280 0.086 -0-106 
IV 0.065 0.091 0.023 
V -0.009 0.153 -0.003 
OLFU a -0.181 0.136 -0.068 
Missing -0.190 0.113 -0.071 
Parental interest in child's education (very interested) 
No parental figure -0.399 1.505 -0.158 
Missing or cannot say 0.258 0.068 0.098 
Moderately interested 0.228 0.059 0.087 
Very little or uninterested 0.351 0.107 0.132 
Home ownership (owned) 
Mortgage 0.104 0.079 0.041 
Rented or other 0.408 0.082 0.154 
Missing 0.398 0.370 0.150 
Region (South East) 
Missing -1.023 0.407 -0-382 
North East 0.282 0.115 0.103 
North West 0.168 0.080 0.062 
Yorkshire 0.078 0.090 0.030 
East Midlands -0.005 0.099 -0.002 
West Midlands -0.021 0.081 -0.008 
East -0.048 0.101 -0.019 
London 0.068 0.094 0.026 
South West -0.001 0.113 0.000 
Wales -0.258 0.105 -0.101 
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continued 
Variable Coef. s. e. m. e. 
Father's father social class FII-I-M-) 
Not matched -0.062 0.077 -0.024 
Not known -0.037 0.071 -0.014 
Not applicable -0-018 0.136 -0.007 
-0.488 0.232 -0.192 
-0.170 0.076 -0.066 
IIINM 0.082 0.099 0.030 
IV 0.157 0.079 0.058 
V -0-070 0.116 -0.027 
A bility scores 
BAS quantitative -0.023 0.004 -0.007 
BAS verbal -0.049 0.008 -0.014 
BAS missing -2.266 0.226 -0-369 
Mother's employment (OLF)b 
Missing 0.266 0.123 0.098 
Regular employment 0.071 0.051 0.027 
Occasional employment, unemployed 0.023 0.079 0.009 
Constant 3.342 *** 0.422 
N. observations 3,888 
Pseudo R20.225 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (since parental income is predicted using an inter- 
val regression), 500 replications. For a continuous variable, e. g. xi, the marginal effect 
(m. e. ) is computed as 0(, 3Z), 0j where 07 is the linear predictor excluding the variable 
xi, computed at the sample mean, Oi the coefficient on xi and 0(. ) the standard normal 
density function. For a categorical variable (including dummies), e. g. Ci, the marginal 
effect is computed as 4b(rZ +, 3j) - 4)(, 37), where 07 is the linear predictor excluding all 
the categorical variables of the same group as Ci (e. g. mother's level education) computed 
at the sample mean, Oi is the coefficient on Ci and D(. ) the standard normal distribution 
function. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are indicated in brackets. 
Out of the labour force or unemployed; b Out of the labour force. * significant at 10%; 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.11: Probit model of quitting at 16, women (BCS70) 
Variable Coef. s. e. m. e. 
Ln(incorne) -0-191 0.062 -0.076 
Child's ethnicity (white) 
Non-white -0-916 0.133 -0-324 
Father's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.174 0.061 -0.069 
A-level -0.172 0.080 -0.068 
Professional or other -0.289 0.135 -0.115 
Degree -0-369 0.100 -0.146 
Missing -0.129 0.102 -0.069 
Father not present -0.174 0.149 -0.051 
Mother's education (0-level) 
< O-level -0.251 0.060 -0-100 
A-level -0.404 0.126 -0-159 
Professional or other -0.406 0.113 -0.160 
Degree -0.537 0.181 -0.209 
Missing 0.167 0.097 0.066 
Social class (HIM) 
-0.251 0.134 -0.100 
-0.206 0.072 -0-082 
IIINM -0-098 0.090 -0-039 
IV 0.101 0.073 0.040 
V 0.081 0.148 0.032 
OLFU 0.002 0.118 0.001 
Missing -0.356 0.109 -0.141 
Parental interest in child's education (very interested) 
No parental figure -0.352 0.518 -0.133 
Missing or cannot say 0.161 0.068 0.064 
Moderately interested 0.285 0.053 0.113 
Very little or uninterested 0.584 0.107 0.227 
Home ownership (owned) 
Mortgage 0.063 0.073 0.025 
Rented or other 0.358 0.081 0.142 
Missing 0.186 0.261 0.074 
Region (South East) 
Missing -0.371 0.456 -0.144 
North East -0.127 0.098 -0.050 
North West 0.035 0.077 0.014 
Yorkshire 0.167 0.077 0.067 
East Midlands 0.223 0.097 0.088 
West Midlands 0.138 0.081 0.055 
East 0.013 0.095 0.005 
London -0.165 0.093 -0.065 
South West 0.177 0.094 0.070 
Wales -0-324 0.097 -0.126 
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continued 
Variable Coef. s. e. m. e. 
Mother's industry (other services) 
Missing 0.014 0.069 0.006 
Agriculture -0.008 0.194 -0.003 
Extraction 0.535 0.186 0.207 
Metal goods 0.149 0.116 0.060 
Other manufacturing 0.147 0.096 0.059 
Construction -0.045 0.277 -0.018 
Distribution 0.166 0.074 0.066 
Transport 0.355 0.231 0.140 
Banking 0.185 0.083 0.074 
Father's industry (metal goods) 
Missing -0.115 0.084 -0.046 
Agriculture -0.284 0.164 -0.113 
Energy -0.053 0.115 -0.021 
Extraction -0.025 0.097 -0.010 
Other manufacturing -0.223 0.095 -0.089 
Construction -0.168 0.089 -0.067 
Distribution -0.231 0.094 -0.092 
Transport -0.104 0.098 -0.041 
Banking -0.242 0.128 -0.096 
Other services -0.261 0.094 -0.104 
Ability scores 
BAS quantitative -0.021 0.004 -0.008 
BAS verbal -0.037 0.007 -0.014 
BAS missing -1.746 0.205 -0.437 
Mother's employment (OLF)b 
Missing 0.064 0.114 0.026 
Mother not present 0.299 0.528 0.118 
Regular employment 0.073 0.066 0.029 
Occasional employment, unemployed -0-002 0.084 -0.001 
Constant 2.716 0.381 
N. observations 4,168 
Pseudo R20.175 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors (since parental income is predicted using an inter- 
val regression), 500 replications. For a continuous variable, e. g. xi, the marginal effect 
(m. e. ) is computed as 0(ý_Z), 3j, where 07 is the linear predictor excluding the variable 
xi, computed at the sample mean, 3i the coefficient on xi and 0(. 
) the standard normal 
density function. For a categorical variable (including dummies), e. g. Cj, the marginal 
effect is computed as 4ý(O_Z +, 3j) - 4ý(O_Z) where 
07 is the linear predictor excluding all 
the categorical variables of the same group as Ci (e. g. mother's level education) computed 
at the sample mean, Oi is the coefficient on Ci and 4ý(-) the standard normal 
distribution 
function. Reference characteristics for each group of variables are indicated in brackets. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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Table 2.12: Marginal effects of an increase in parental income from the probit 
models of staying-on at 16 
Quitting probability Men Women 
P one-s. d. (. C58) 116 one-s. d. (L58) 116 
0.1 -0.012 -0.003 -0.015 -0.004 
0.3 -0.024 -0.007 -0.030 -0-008 
0.5 -0.027 -0.008 -0.035 -0.010 
Note. Marginal effects of income variations are computed using the following expression: 
0(4ý-I(p)) -a where V is average income and a the coefficient of ln(income) in 
the staying-on equation, and 0(. ) and (D(. ) the standard normal density and distribution 
functions, respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
Social class and undergraduate 
degree subject in the UK 
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3.1 Introduction 
Widening access to education is commonly viewed as an effective way of 
promoting higher intergenerational mobility and the study of educational 
attainment has received growing attention by economists. This is especially 
true for the UK where the empirical analysis of educational attainment using 
microdata has a long tradition. Several studies have investigated the deter- 
minants of the level of education achieved (the number of years of schooling 
or the highest educational qualification) using cross-section or longitudinal 
microdata. Some examples include Rice (1987), Micklewright (1989), Er- 
misch and Francesconi (2000,2001a), Feinstein (2000) and Chevalier and 
Lanot (2002) among others. The vast majority of these studies finds that 
long-term family characteristics, such as parental education and social class, 
are of paramount importance for children's educational attainment suggest- 
ing, therefore, the presence of factors which may reduce intergenerational 
mobility. Moreover, Blanden and Machin (2004) find that the recent expan- 
sion of the Higher Education (HE) system acted to widen the participation 
gap between rich and poor children. 
However, in a period of increasing access to education, a great deal of 
the variation in individuals' labour market outcomes (employment opportu- 
nities and earnings) may be determined by the type in addition to the level 
of education achieved. Hence, in this chapter we are interested in factors 
influencing the field of study in which individuals enroll at the (university) 
undergraduate level, with a specific focus on the effect of social class. Em- 
pirical evidence that supports the importance of field of study as one of the 
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main determinants of graduates' performance in the labour market is pro- 
vided by several studies. Smith et al. (2000) and Bratti et al. (2004), for 
instance, report significant differences in first destinations of graduates from 
different subject fields. Large differences also exist in graduates' earnings by 
degree subject, as shown by Blackaby et al. (1999), Walker and Zhu (2001), 
Chevalier et al. (2002), Bratti and Mancini (2003), and Sloane and O'Leary 
(2004), among others. 
Despite the potential interest of the topic, to the best of our knowledge, 
to date there exists only one empirical study on undergraduate field of grad- 
uation in the UK, van de Werfhorst et al. (2003), which analyses survey 
data for the 1958 British cohort. In the current chapter, we aim to con- 
tribute to the existing literature on subject choice in the UK by extending 
the analysis to several cohorts of university students (from 1981 until 1991), 
using administrative individual- level data. Unlike many previous studies, we 
use cohorts of entrant students rather than cohorts of students leaving with 
a university qualification and model subject choice allowing for a non-zero 
correlation across the unobserved factors which might simultaneously affect 
the utilities received from studying different disciplines. Rirthermore, using 
several cohorts of university students we also analyse the changes in social 
class effects over time. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides some 
motivation for the study of the choice of undergraduate field of enrollment. 
Section 3.3 gives an outline of the reasons why social class should matter for 
the choice of degree subject. Section 3.4 briefly surveys the existing literature. 
"i 
Section 3.5 introduces some econometric issues and section 3.6 describes the 
econometric model. Section 3.7 discusses the main features of the data set 
and the sample used in our estimates and section 3.8 reports the empirical 
results. Section 3.9 concludes. 
3.2 Motivation 
The process through which students enroll in a particular subject is worth 
studying for several reasons. Firstly, Higher Education (HE) Institutions are 
interested in the determinants of subject choice. Indeed, once HE institutions 
have determined the potential 'target population' for specific courses (that is 
the background of the students enrolled in specific fields of study), they can 
focus their 'marketing policies' on this target, to consolidate their position, 
or alternatively act so as to attract new segments of 'potential customers' 
(i. e. students). 
Secondly, the issue is of interest also to society as a whole, since there 
is some concern about the lack of workers in high demand fields, such as 
graduates in computer sciences and IV Hence, a deeper understanding of 
the mechanism driving students' choices is important also to explain some 
apparent inefficiencies in the labour market and to forecast future labour 
market trends. 
Thirdly, the topic is also central to the policy makers involved in poverty 
reduction and HE reform. The former are interested in factors promoting in- 
'See for instance Mason (1999). 
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tergenerational mobility and the reduction of poverty. While previous studies 
have shown a substantial amount of correlation between parents' and chil- 
dren's incomes and education, ' there is much less empirical evidence on the 
effect of family and social background on the choice of subject at tertiary 
level. ' However, this is a very important issue since, as already stated, pre- 
vious research has shown that graduates' labour market outcomes differ ac- 
cording to the subject studied at university. As to HE reform, one relatively 
recent innovation introduced in the UK educational system is home student 
tuition fees for cohorts entering university from the autumn 1998. Some peo- 
ple have argued in favour of the need to differentiate tuition fees according to 
the different returns that subjects command in the labour market in terms 
of both earnings and employment prospects and to the differences in the cost 
of teaching and the quality of infrastructure used. ' However, the introduc- 
tion of 'top-up' fees might have especially adverse effects on students from 
more deprived family backgrounds. If higher fees are not counter balanced 
by the introduction of new scholarships and loans made available to students, 
the innovation could mainly hit the pockets of middle and low social class 
students discouraging them from enrolling in HE, or from enrolling in the 
2 For some studies related to intergenerational mobility in Britain see Dearden et al. 
(1997), Blanden et al. (2003) and Machin and Gregg (2003), among others. Machin 
and Gregg (2003) observe, for instance, that the educational expansion of the late 1980s 
early 1990s benefited especially high social class students, contributing to a decrease in 
intergenerational mobility. 
3 See Chevalier (2002) for a recent analysis of the role of social class influences on 
graduates' occupational choices. 
4 See the discussion in Greenaway and Haynes (2003). 
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most remunerative fields. ' In a recent article Greenaway and Haynes (2003) 
cite the case of Australia, where a balanced combination of fees and income 
loans did not damage access. Rom this evidence and the fact that in the 
last two decades in the UK the participation of low income students in HE 
did not rise as fast as the overall number of students when tuition was free, 
the authors infer that a system of differential fees and loans will not result 
in a decrease in participation of low social class students. In their view, the 
objective of providing more resources for HE without damaging access can 
be achieved through income contingent loans, which avoid up-front charges 
and make education free at the point of consumption. ' Although it could 
be true that a carefully designed system of differential fees and loans may 
not impact adversely on low income students' access, the potential impact 
on degree subject choice (or choice of institution) is less clear. The provision 
of income contingent student loans per se might not be sufficient to deter 
low income students from enrolling in high fee subjects. Indeed, the intro- 
duction of differential fees by subject would change the relative structure of 
costs and benefits from enrolling in different subjects. ' These costs and ben- 
efits may differ across social classes. In particular, we may expect students 
'Abbott and Leslie (2004), for istance, observe that most universities saw a fall in 
applications and enrollments following the introduction of tuition fees. 
6At the moment in the UK the interest rate on student loans only covers the rate of 
inflation. Loans are income contingent (Pay As You Earn - PAYE - system): students 
start to repay the debt when their annual incomes overcome the threshold of L 10,000 per 
year. 
7This may especially happen whether or not fees are determined on the basis of the 
future private returns to the different subjects. 
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coming from wealthy families to have lower costs from enrolling in tertiary 
education than individuals with a low social class background' and higher 
expected returns with respect to the latter, since they are more likely to find 
'good jobs' because of family networks. ' For these reasons, many low social 
class students may be discouraged from enrolling in high fees subjects. More- 
over, if the most remunerative subjects are also those with higher uncertainty 
(e. g., with higher variance in earnings) individuals from more disadvantaged 
backgrounds, who are likely to use student loans, may prefer to enroll in less 
remunerative, but relatively riskless (in terms of earnings variance) subjects, 
since they may perceive that if they end up in low income jobs it would be 
particularly hard to pay off the debt. Last but not least, the pressure to earn 
an income might push some students to accept the first job offer they re- 
8We are thinking about situations in which high income families pay fees and living 
costs for their children enrolled in HE without asking them to reimburse the expenses 
borne. In this case wealthy students' decision will not be affected by the introduction of 
differential fees. The reasons why families can make financial transfers to their progeny 
might be purely altruistic or strategically altruistic (see Cigno, 1991) and they can choose 
between inter-vivo transfers or bequests. Moreover, high income families may decide to use 
income contingent student loans to finance their children's education, even though they 
do not need it, since it may be cheaper than using their own resources that are invested 
in more profitable financial assets, and to refund to their children the expenses borne to 
repay the debt once they start working. 
'Hansen (2001) using data from Norway finds that individuals from high social classes 
earn higher incomes even when education and field are controlled for. Moreover, the 
advantage tends to be largest in soft educational fields (such as humanities and social 
studies). Previous research on students' expectations formation has also found a positive 
relation between social class and the expected returns to education (see Betts, 1996). 
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ceive without carefully searching for better employment opportunities, with 
adverse effects on their future labour market outcomes. 10 
3.3 Social class influences on the choice of 
field of study 
The case for strong social class influences on educational choices has been 
put forward by both sociologists and economists. Although the theoretical 
work has almost exclusively focused on the level of education, the existing 
analytical framework can also be easily applied to the choice of field of study. 
Starting from the sociological literature, Boudon's (1974) model of 'ratio- 
nal action' states that educational choices depend on the perception of the 
costs and benefits of each educational alternative available. For the choice of 
subject field, a related hypothesis elaborated by Kelsall et al. (1972) is that 
low social class students may be more inclined to choose subjects that offer 
better labour market prospects. This could happen because future labour 
market outcomes depend more on subject studied for low social class than 
for high social class students. The latter are likely to enjoy good labour 
market outcomes once they get a university degree irrespective of their field 
of graduation, thanks to 'family networks'. Moreover, Kelsall et al. (1972) 
also maintain that low social class students may tend to choose technical 
fields of study, which are closer to the occupational experience of many man- 
loStewm-t and Swaffield (1999), for instance, using UK data find that the probability of 
being low paid depends on low pay in the previous year. 
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ual working class parents. Boudon's (1974) model closely resembles the one 
commonly used by economists: Becker's (1975) human capital theory. Ac- 
cording to Becker (1975) the costs and the returns of education are the main 
factors driving educational choices. Some fields might be more closely linked 
to professions for which the presence of 'social networks' (to which high so- 
cial class students are typically better connected) is more important to ensure 
labour market success and a higher economic return of the educational invest- 
ment. Then, the expected return from different educational fields may differ 
accordingly over social classes. Previous research has shown the existence of 
family networks effects. Hansen (2001), for instance, found that the ex-post 
impact of social class on the economic rewards of education varies across 
educational fields and tends to be largest in 'soft' educational fields (such 
as social studies and humanities). Moreover, since in the presence of capital 
market imperfections low social class individuals might have higher costs of 
enrolling in HE, ` standard economic theory predicts that these individu- 
als will require a higher return from their investment in university education. 
The higher return can be obtained by enrolling in subjects highly rewarded in 
the labour market. Therefore, low social class students will choose relatively 
'high performing' subjects (in terms of earnings or employment prospects), 
a prediction very similar to that elaborated by Kelsall et al. (1972). On the 
grounds of these considerations we advance the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Low social class individuals are relatively more inclined 
" Because they need to borrow and pay back student loans while high social class stu- 
dents usually have access to cheaper, even free, family resources to finance higher educa- 
tion. 
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to enroll in 'technical' degree subjects than middle and high social class 
students (Kelsall et al. 1972); 
Hypothesis 2. Low social class individuals are more likely to enroll in 
subjects which offer better labour market prospects, i. e. higher wages or 
better employment opportunities, than middle and high social class students 
(Kelsall et al. 1972 and Becker 1975). 
Bourdieu's (1984) 'cultural reproduction hypothesis' emphasizes the role 
of education as a means of reproducing social class. In this context education 
is the instrument through which the high and middle social classes prevent in- 
dividuals from lower social backgrounds from accessing the highest positions 
in society. Two very important concepts for educational choices are those 
of 'economic capital' and 'cultural capital'. As stressed by van de Werfhorst 
et al. (2001), according to this hypothesis people from the economic elites 
prefer lucrative fields, which can ensure a comfortable life, while people from 
the cultural elites are less interested in economic returns to education and 
prefer fields in which they can acquire 'cultural capital'. Then the following 
hypothesis can be put forward: 
Hypothesis 3. High social class students are relatively more likely to 
enroll in subjects which provide cultural capital, such as arts and humanities 
(Bordieu 1984). 
This last hypothesis is also in line with hypothesis 2, since arts and hu- 
manities are usually not very highly remunerated subjects. 
We may expect that with an increased access to higher education the 
advantages of having a degree for the upper class are progressively lost, and 
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the type of degree possessed becomes an important distinguishing factor for 
labour market and social success. Highly prestigious professions, such as the 
legal and medical ones, offer socially and economically advantageous positions 
in society, and control over these professions becomes a valuable asset for the 
upper class. A theory leading to similar conclusions exists also in the domain 
of economics: the 'social networks' model elaborated by Montgomery (1991). 
Montgomery (1991) builds a theoretical model for explaining the large use of 
employee referrals as a device for screening job applicants, starting from the 
observation that workers tend to refer others who are similar to themselves 
(see Doeringer and Piore, 1971). His model explains "why workers who are 
well connected (possessing social ties to those in high-paying jobs) might fare 
better than those who are poorly connected and why firms hiring through 
referral might earn higher profits" (Montgomery 1991, p. 1414). We may 
expect that individuals from high social classes are better connected to people 
working in high-paying jobs, their parents Zn primis. Then we derive the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. High social class students are relatively more likely to 
enroll in prestigious subjects, i. e. subjects leading to highly paid and often 
entry-regulated professions, such as medicine and law. In the latter, the 
comparative advantage of high social class individuals may stem from a direct 
control over the entry of related professions (Bordieu 1984), or from the 
existence of social networks effects (Montgomery 1991). " 
12Using Universities' Statistical Record data for the UK, Mancini (2003) finds, for in- 
stance, that working class graduates in law are significantly more likely to be unemployed 
than their wealthier peers. 
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It is worth noting that the last hypothesis is in apparent contrast13 with 
hypothesis 2 since graduates in medicine or law are usually very well paid. 
In the empirical analysis, we shall compare the empirical evidence with 
the hypotheses outlined above and see which ones seem to better fit the data. 
Although the hypotheses above suggest why social class may be important 
for the choice of degree subject, they offer at the same time some counter 
arguments on the reasons why we could find that social class differences are 
not significant. Some of these reasons could be: 
1. individual preferences (or non-pecuniary costs) are not shaped by social 
class but by factors unrelated to it. One such factor might be the 
performance in specific subjects at secondary school; 
2. given the increasing demand for graduates in the period under study, 
labour market outcomes did not depend on social class, i. e. family 
networks were not important and a university degree was sufficient to 
ensure a good labour market outcome to graduates (absence of hetero- 
geneous returns to degree subjects according to social class); 
3. individuals had in the period under study the same (pecuniary) costs 
of enrolling in different subjects. This might be the case since there 
were no tuition fees for domestic students and student financial assis- 
tance was based on means-tested maintenance grants for low-income 
students. 14 
13We say in "apparent" contrast since in reality students may enroll in the subjects 
which ensure them the highest expected returns conditional on social class origin. 
"See Blanden and Machin (2004) for an outline of recent changes in the UK system 
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Thus all factors above may have contributed to making very similar the 
behaviour of individuals with different social origins. 
3.4 Previous empirical literature 
In this section, we report a brief survey of the empirical literature investi- 
gating university students' choice of field of study at the undergraduate level 
and which has also analysed the role of social class influences. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are only a handful of studies which have investigated 
social class effects using individual-level data. 
Oosterbeek and Webbink (1997) used data from the Netherlands in order 
to analyse the decision whether or not to attend technical studies. The 
authors found that children from high income families were less likely to 
enroll in technical fields, but more likely to persist in their choice once they 
had undertaken a technical education. 
Davies and Guppy (1997) analysed the choice of field of study using US 
microdata. They found that males were more likely than females to enroll 
in lucrative fields of study. Moreover, high ability individuals and low social 
of Higher Education. In brief, the expansion in the UK education system was partly 
implemented by reducing the generosity in student support. In particular, the major 
changes were the freezing of maintenance grants in 1990 and their progressive replacement 
with subsidised loans; the introduction of home students undergraduate fees of 1,000 
pounds per year, the increase in the maximum loan and the introduction of an income- 
contingent repayment system following the 1997 Dearing Report; the recent discussion 
over the introduction of top-up fees which may reach a maximum of 3,000 pounds and the 
reintroduction of a maximum grant of around 1,000 pounds for low-income students. 
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class individuals were more likely to enter high-return fields. 
Van de Werfhorst et al. (2001) using Dutch data found that children of 
the cultural elite tended to choose fields where they could acquire 'cultural 
capital', i. e. non technical fields, while students from the economic elite 
were under-represented in cultural fields (such as arts and humanities). By 
contrast, low social class individuals were over-represented in economics and 
engineering, i. e. lucrative fields. 
Rochat and Demeulemeester (2001) investigated the process of study field 
choice using Belgian data. They found that students with fathers in 'elite' 
occupations, such as managers, civil servants or professionals, were relatively 
more likely to enroll in short cycle artistic and pedagogical studies and long 
cycle curricula in engineering and less likely to enroll in long cycle business, 
economics and social studies. 
Montmarquette et al. (2002) estimated a multinomial logit model of 
subject choice using Canadian microdata. They found no effect of having 
a parent in a professional occupation, but that students supported by an 
educational loan were more likely to choose those fields (education or liberal 
arts) in which the probability of success was higher on average. 
We are only aware of one paper investigating field of study at the un- 
dergraduate level in the UK with an emphasis on social class and that is 
by van de Werfhorst et al. (2003). " The authors analysed the educational 
choices and the educational performance of the 1958 British Cohort using 
1'5We found only one other recent study analysing subject choice at the university level 
for the UK, Ashworth and Evans (2001) whose emphasis is, however, on the decision of 
studying economics and on the effect of secondary school variables. 
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data from the National Child Development Study. Since there is only this 
study for the UK, it is worthwhile to devote some space to summarizing the 
main findings. The focus of van de Werfhorst et al. (2003) is on the role of 
social class, cultural and economic capital and ability on the subject choice 
in secondary and tertiary education in Britain. We comment here only on 
the results relating to university education. Van de Werfhorst et al. (2003) 
estimated a multinomial logit model of subject of graduation considering 
six broad subject categories and including among the explanatory variables 
family background variables (such as parental social class and measures of 
ceconomic' and 'cultural capital'), ability (verbal and mathematical ability), 
and measures of comparative advantage (based on O-level subjects choice 
and performance). The authors found that children from professional back- 
grounds preferred faculties of medicine and law, even after controlling for 
ability at age 11 and exam performance at age 16. However, they did not 
find other social class differences, which, as they pointed out, is not due to the 
controls for various sorts of school attainments since a model without age-11 
and age-16 attainments also shows no other social class effects. However, the 
authors themselves stated that the lack of a strong social class effect might 
be due to the specific characteristics of the cohort studied. In fact, at the 
time of the study only a very small minority of the working class entered HE, 
and this could be considered as a very particular and selected group (e. g., in 
terms of academic ability). 
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3.5 Some econometric issues 
In a recent article Todd and Wolpin (2003) discuss the problems arising when 
researchers specify and estimate Educational Production Functions (EPFs), 
especially that of missing data on relevant factors that are likely to affect 
student performance, and which usually constrain researchers to the use of 
proxy variables. In particular, the authors maintain that: 'the relationship 
of proxy variables to measured and unmeasured inputs must be understood 
in the context of a behavioural decision model in order to analyse their likely 
impact on biases' (p. F15). We follow Todd and Wolpin's suggestion and 
put our empirical analysis in the context of a model of student behaviour, 
which, we believe, can give some useful suggestions for the specification of 
the econometric model and some insights into the potential biases of our 
estimates. 
Let us assume that at time t an individual has to decide the type of 
tertiary education j, i. e. the university degree subject, among a set of J 
available alternatives. All the following analysis is conditional on the decision 
to enter HE. For the sake of simplicity we use here, like in the bulk of the 
literature, linear functional forms. Let the utility of a student depend on her 
educational performance, her ability endowment and a stochastic term in the 
following way: 
Ujt = Tjt + 7jpo + uit 
where we have omitted for simplicity the subscript 
for the individual, 16 j is 
16The weight given to Tjt is assumed to be constant across alternatives and has been 
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the subscript for the subject, Tjt is performance in subject j at time t, P'O 
is student ability that does not vary over time and ujt a taste shifter, 17 i. e. 
an idiosyncratic stochastic term affecting the utility of subject j and unob- 
servable to the econometrician. We have chosen here to let utility depend on 
educational performance and ability only. However, the argument remains 
the same if we assume that utility depends on income and that the latter is a 
function of educational performance, or that utility depends on both income 
and performance, although the notation becomes more involved. 
We assume an educational production function of the following form: 
Tt= 7-ojt + -rljt (3.2) i 
Tjt-1 + 7'2jtFjt + T3jtpo 
where Tjt-l is performance in the subject chosen at the previous educa- 
tional stage jt-1, and Fjt some family (or educational institutions) inputs. 18 
Here, we assume a 'value added approach' also for the 'true' educational pro- 
duction function. We posit that there is a technology (EPF) which transforms 
educational inputs into an output represented by educational performance or 
'knowledge'. In this sense, past knowledge (i. e. performance) is combined 
with current inputs in order to obtain new knowledge, which is measured by 
normalized to one for simplicity. 
"This specification in which ability enters as a direct determinant of subject-related 
utilities is empirically supported by Arcidiacono (2004), who found that almost all abil- 
ity sorting across subjects is due to differences in preferences for particular majors at 
university or in the workplace. 
"We use here a non-stochastic specification for the performance function. However, 
the term involving yo is usually not observed and enters the error term in empirical 
applications. 
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Tjt. The crucial assumption is that only knowledge acquired in the imme- 
diately previous educational stage and measured by the relative educational 
performance is used to produce new knowledge (or performance) at each 
new stage, which is tantamount to assuming that the amount of knowledge 
acquired by individuals at stages 1 ...... s-2 is embedded in the knowledge 
acquired at stage s-1, where s is the current educational stage. Here, we 
consider two stages only: A-levels'9 and undergraduate university education. 
To make an example, in our case we assume that only the knowledge acquired 
through A-levels is useful for degree performance while GCSE 0-levelS20 per- 
formance, for instance, does not give any additional benefit over and above 
A-levels. In this respect, we assume an EPF different from Todd and Wolpin 
(2003) who not only assume that the 'true' EPF depends at each stage on 
the complete flow of inputs up to the educational stage under study, which 
is also true in our specification, 21 but also that past inputs contribute to the 
production of current cognitive achievement over and above the effect acting 
through past achievement (see equation (9), p. F20 in Todd and Wolpin 
2003) . 
22 To go back to our previous example, in Todd and Wolpin's spec- 
ification past educational inputs, such as the primary or secondary school 
attended or the resources devoted to education by a student's family when 
19That is GCSE 'Advanced' levels, a type of upper secondary education usually un- 
dertaken after passing GSCE O-levels (Ordinary levels) exams, normally at age 16, by 
individuals who want to enroll at a university. 
20i e. GCSE 'Ordinary' levels, which are part of compulsory secondary schooling. 
2 'This can be seen by substituting for Tjt-l in Tjt. 
22Todd and Wolpin (2003) discuss in their article the conditions under which the two 
specifications are equivalent. 
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she was a child, have a direct effect on current degree performance over and 
above that exerted through A-level Performance. Thus, in our approach, un- 
like Todd and Wolpin (2003), Tjt-l is a sufficient statistic for all educational 
inputs used in previous educational stages. It is difficult to say which one 
of the two different views of the cognitive achievement process is closer to 
reality since little is known about the process through which 'knowledge' is 
formed. In the future, a major interaction between educational economists, 
psychologists and educational researchers could give useful insights for a cor- 
rect specification of EPFs. 23 
Plugging equation (3.2) into (3.1) we obtain: 
Ujt ý Tojt + TljtTjt-l + 72jtFjt + (T3jt + yj)po + ujt. (3-3) 
Unfortunately, this specification still includes some variables unobservable to 
the econometrician. Typically the family inputs Fjt are missing in the admin- 
istrative data commonly used to estimate EPFs. However, we can suppose 
that family inputs are in turn the outcome of an optimizing process and a 
function of both observable and unobserved (i. e. missing) family exogenous 
characteristics. In particular: 
Ft-:: ý: 003t + OljtC + 02itM + 03jtPO (3.4) i 
23 However, the fact that university selection procedures are largely based on secondary 
school performance, and particularly A-levels, suggests that university selectors consider 
secondary school (or A-levels) curriculum as a 'sufficient statistic' or as the main determi- 
nant of potential degree performance. 
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where C are observed family characteristics, " such as social class, while 
M are family unobserved characteristics . 
2' By plugging equation (3.4) into 
(3.3) we obtain the following expression for a student's utility: 
Ujt ý 7'Ojt+*T2jtOOjt+TljtTjt-1 +72it0litC+7'2jt02jtM+ (72jt03jt+7-3jt+-ýj)jLO+Ujt 
(3-5) 
Let us define vjt -":: 'r2j t 02j tM +( r2jt 03jt + -r3jt + -yj) po, the error component 
due to potentially observable but missing variables. 
This gives us some useful insights into possible causes of bias. First, as 
observed by Todd and Wolpin (2003) conditioning on past education per- 
formance (Tjt-, ) makes the model susceptible to endogeneity bias. The en- 
dogeneity is due to the correlation between Tjt_1 and the error component 
vjt. This correlation arises both directly from MO, the individual unobserved 
ability endowment, and indirectly through past family (or school) inputs 
which both enter Tjt-l and are likely to be correlated with current family 
inputs (through po and M). All these reasons explain why the estimate of 
, rljt is likely to be biased. However, the bias may also extend to the estimate 
of %toljt, the effect of observed family characteristics. This may happen 
through the correlation between M and C, i. e. between observed and miss- 
ing family characteristics, or that between C and po, i. e between observed 
family characteristics and a student's unobserved ability. In our case, among 
24The formulation may be extended also to include university/school observed and un- 
observed characteristics. 
25For simplicity we consider here only time-invariant family characteristics, at least in 
the period between enrollment in secondary school and the choice of the degree subject. 
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family observed characteristics the primary focus is on parents' social class. 
Thus, the effect of social class is likely to be biased if other unobserved fam- 
ily characteristics are correlated with the former and affect students' subject 
choice or if students' unobserved cognitive ability endowment is correlated 
with parents' social class. However, on the grounds that A-level results also 
act as a good proxy for contemporaneous unobserved family inputs and stu- 
dents' ability, the 'value added specification' may help to attenuate the bias 
in the estimation of the social class effects on degree subject choice in the 
spirit of the 'proxying and matching' method in Blundell et al. (2000). We 
think that including A-level results is also important in order to attenuate 
possible problems of sample selection bias due to the fact that our analysis is 
conditional on entering HE. Indeed, if individuals with different social class 
origins who enroll in HE systematically have different levels of ability the 
effect of social class might reflect the effect of the latter factor. 
We can also translate in our context the 'contemporaneous specification' 
described in Todd and Wolpin (2003). This can be obtained by noting that: 
Fjt-l ý Oojt-1 + Oljt-lC + 02it-lM + 03it-lPO (3.6) 
Tjt-l : -- 7, ojt-l + 7, ljt-, Fjt-l 
+ 72jt-1/10 + Uit-17 (3.7) 
where we have assumed for simplicity that secondary school performance 
is only determined by contemporaneous inputs . 
2' Plugging these equations 
into equation (3.5) and collecting terms we obtain: 
26 The inclusion of past performance in the right-hand-side of equation (3.7) does not 
alter the essence of the discussion although adds unnecessary complexity to the notation. 
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Ui 
t= 
(70it + Tljt7'Ojt-1 + 7'ljt7'ljt-100it-1 + 7'2jtOOjt)+ 
" (71itTlit-101it-I + 72jtOljt)C+ 
" (7'ljt7'ljt-102jt-1 + T2ft02ft), ýl+ 
" (7'ljt(7'ljt-103jt-I + T2jt-1) + T2jt03jt + 73it + 'Yj)110+ 
Tljtujt-l + ujt. (3.8) 
Thus, with respect to the 'value added specification', when using the 'con- 
temporaneous specification' two additional terms involving M and Po enter 
the error term and increase the possible sources of estimation bias. These 
terms are (T1jtT1jt-102jt-1)A1 and 7'1jt(7'1jt-1403jt-1 + 72jt_j)po, respectively. 
In words, now that A-level results are not included in the regression, part 
of the effects of unobserved family inputs (past and present) and students' 
ability are likely to be picked up by social class. This explains why 'value 
added specifications' are often preferred by researchers to 'contemporaneous 
specifications' on the basis of the claim that they reduce the bias due to omit- 
ted variables and also why the latter usually have a reduced performance in 
terms of explanatory power of the included variables. It is also worth noting 
that the correlation between all the unobserved factors, i. e. the error terms, 
in the Ujt's both in (3-5) and (3.8) will be in general different from zero since 
all involve M and Ito, and will depend on family inputs parameters, EPF 
parameters and preference parameters. 
93 
3.6 The econometric model 
In equation (3.5) we define Ej =- vj + uj and refer to it as the 'error term', 
on the grounds that it is not observed. We assume that an individual can 
choose a subject group j among three different alternatives, jE {O, 1,21, 
which will be defined in section 3.7.2, each of them providing a utility of: 
Uoi = 00, xi + foi (3-9) 
Uli = oixi + cli 
1 U2i = 02xi + E2i 
where we have reintroduced the subscript i for individuals. Xi is the 
vector of all individual observed characteristics affecting the utility of each 
group and coi, 61i7 62i the unobserved components (errors) in these utilities. 
A possible way of modeling the choice is to use a multinornial logit model 
(MNL). However, a strong assumption of the MNL is the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, i. e. that the error terms of the utilities associated with 
the alternatives are uncorrelated, an assumption which contrasts with what 
we have seen in the previous section. Therefore, it is evidently advantageous 
to use a trinomial probit model (TNP) instead, since the covariance matrix 
of the error terms is unrestricted. As suggested by Bunch (1991) and Dansie 
(1985), among others, a convenient way of achieving identification of the TNP 
is by normalizing one of the utilities to zero. This reduces the dimensionality 
of the problem. By normalising to zero the utility of the first alternative 
(Uoi), our model becomes: 
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Uoi =0 (3.12) 
Uli = oixi + Eli (3.13) 
U2i = 02xi + E2i (3.14) 
where: 
( 
6") 
-N 
((0), ( P12 
62i 0 P112 I 
This model represents a formally identified TNP. " As observed by Heck- 
man and Sedlacek (1985) the TNP is identified so long as Xi contains a 
single regressor that varies across individuals and no exclusion restrictions 
are required for formal identification. However, as stated by Keane (1992) 
the TNP may suffer from 'tenuous' identification, and exclusion restrictions 
may contribute to improving the model identification. The problem is likely 
to arise especially when considering the choice among a number of alter- 
natives higher than three. However, as often happens in labour economics 
applications, our data set does not contain alternative-specific variables, so 
no natural exclusion restrictions are available. Since theory does not sug- 
gest any obvious exclusion restrictions for non- alternative-specific variables, 
i. e. variables affecting the utility of a specific alternative only, we can only 
estimate the formally identified TNP without exclusion restrictions. 28 
27The assumption that also the variance of the second error term is one is not strictly 
necessary, but is often found in empirical applications. In this case we assume that the 
error terms in the equations 3.13 and 3.14 are standard normal. 
2SFor a review on the multinomial probit model see also Weeks (1997). 
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The probabilities of the different outcomes are: 
PW ý 0) : -- P(UO > Uli UO > u2) 
P(El < -01 Xi 62 < -02f 1 
/X) 
= 11)2(-)ßiX5 -)62/X1P12) 
P(y =- 1) ý P(ul > u0i ul > u2) 
= P('El < IßiXi 61 - E2 < -OIX - 
O'X) 2 
1 
IX 1-P12 1 
(ý2 X, 
OIX 
- 
02 
V'22 --2 \/2- --2 #012 J012 
P(Y = 2) = P(U2 > Uo, U2 > Ul) 
1 P(E2 < j62 2X 62 - El < -021x - i31X) 
1x 
1 
012 
- 
OJX 
11- J012 (1)2 
(02Xý 
\72- --2j012 VF2 
--2P12 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
where we have omitted the subscript for the individual and 41ý2 (11) -12 JP12) 
is the bivariate standard normal distribution of the two normal random vari- 
ables cl andE2 computed at the values x, andX2, respectively, with correla- 
tion coefficient P12- 
3.7 Empirical analysis 
In the present section we describe the data set used, the choice of explanatory 
variables and the econometric model. 
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3.7.1 The data set 
In this chapter we use individual-level data from the Universities' Statistical 
Record (USR). The USR was the institution in charge of the collection of 
the statistical returns from all university institutions in Great Britain which 
formerly received Exchequer grants from the University Funding Council 
(UFC), together with corresponding institutions for the Queen's University 
of Belfast and the University of Ulster. The USR has stored data from the 
academic year 1972/1973 until 1993/1994 when it was replaced by the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) . 
2' The USR data are rich in information 
concerning the academic life and prior educational qualifications of students 
and include entire cohorts of students leaving Universities each year. 30 
Using different cohorts of university leavers, it is possible to re-construct 
the cohorts of entrant students in each academic year. Unlike other papers 
which use samples of university leavers, in particular students leaving with 
a university qualification, in this chapter we use cohorts of entrant students. 
We think that this is more appropriate to investigate factors related to the 
choice of degree subject. Indeed, obtaining a degree in a specific subject is 
only the final outcome of several processes, namely the choice to enroll in a 
"HESA data are generally comparable to USR data. However, the new data do not 
include performance by type of A-level but only A-level score in the best three passes 
and is not publicly available. The analysis in this chapter is therefore limited to the 'old' 
universities, i. e. to the institutions with a university status before the abolition of the 
binary divide between universities and polytechnics that took place in 1992. 
30 Some previous papers using USR data are, among others, Smith et al. (2000), Smith 
and Naylor (2001a, 2001b), Naylor et al. (2002), Bratti (2002b). 
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certain field, that of remaining in the same field along the course, and that 
of students' progression. Therefore, it is difficult to isolate the effect of the 
explanatory variables on each of these single processes by analysing cohorts 
of leaving students. In this chapter, we aim to analyse the first subject in 
which students enrolled and accordingly use cohorts of entrant students. 
We are aware of the fact that observing an individual enrolled in a certain 
field implies that he/she has received an offer by a university, and therefore 
that also the supply side is important. However, we have no individual-level 
data on the subject preferences stated by students at the application stage. 
We observe only students' revealed preferences. In this sense, we assume 
that all students have the same initial choice set (the complete set of subject 
fields), that they apply for their preferred subset of fields and/or institutions 
and receive offers by one or more universities. Then they make their final 
decision based on this restricted set of offers. Hence, although the final choice 
is the student's one, the process leading to it is complex and is the result of 
the interactions between students and universities. This should be kept in 
mind every time we talk of students' choices in this chapter. However, we 
would like to add that there is some evidence suggesting that our analysis of 
students' enrolled subject is very close to one of students' subject choice. In 
a recent article Leslie (2003) uses Universities' College Admissions Service 
(UCAS) data to build an indicator of quality of subjects. The author uses 
WAS data for 1996-2001 and observes that 'each applicant is permitted to 
make up to six applications (except in medicine, which is restricted to four). 
Usually these six applications are in a well-defined subject area, but they 
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need not to be so. ' (p. 330-331). Another possible criticism to our analysis 
is that it might confound the effect of social class on subject choice with that 
on the probability of receiving an offer and accepting it. However, as Leslie 
(2003) observes, entry qualifications, especially A-levels score, are the key 
determinant of applicants' success and no other family or social background 
effects emerge. Therefore, on the basis of this evidence we can argue that in 
our model we are mainly estimating the effect of social class on applications 
rather than on offers and acceptances. 
It must be noted that since the USR gathers information on university 
students only, all the empirical analysis that follows is conditional on enroll- 
ment in HE" and seeks to answer the following question: although there are 
social class differences in access to HE, once individuals from different social 
classes manage to enter HE, do they enroll in similar subjects? 
3.7.2 Sample definition and descriptive statistics 
Rom the cohort of students in each year 1981-1991, we select only non- 
mature students (students less than 21 when they entered HE), studying full 
time for a degree qualification and we exclude overseas and married students. 
Moreover, since in our specification we want to control for the type and the 
level of performance at secondary school, we consider only students with A- 
level qualifications. 32 For the definition of the subject groups we take into 
31 Such as all the literature reported in section 3.4. 
32 Since we want to focus on the choice of a typical student and investigate the effect of 
his/her parental background, the decision to restrict the analysis to non-mature students, 
studying full-time, i. e. individuals for which study is the main activity and who are likely 
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account the predictions of the different hypotheses outlined in section 3.3 
and the need to keep the econometric model estimable, 33 and aggregate all 
subjects in the following three broad subject areas: 
1. 'Non-quantitative subjects' (abbreviated as NQS hereafter): Social 
Studies (excluding Economics), Mass Communications and Documen- 
tation, Languages and Related, Humanities, Creative Arts, Education, 
Combined degrees not included in the following category; 
2. 'Quantitative subjects' (abbreviated as QS hereafter): Biological Sci- 
ences, Agriculture and Related, Physical Sciences, Mathematical Sci- 
ences and Informatics, Engineering and Technology, Architecture, 
Building and Planning, Economics, Business and Administration Stud- 
ies, General Sciences Combined degrees; 
3. Law and Medicine (L&M hereafter): Law, Medicine and Dentistry, 
Subjects Allied to Medicine. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of students by undergraduate 
field of study and social class, respectively, for all 11 years under study. In 
to be more affected by their parental and social background is natural. Mature students 
may have enrolled in HE after working for a period and have accumulated the financial 
resources necessary to enroll in HE, in any case they are likely to be more independent 
of their families. Moreover, the USR data do not provide family background information 
for mature students. We exclude students with non-traditional entry qualifications into 
HE since the level of secondary school performance, which we consider as a control for 
students' ability, is not available. However, A-level entrants represent the vast majority 
of university students in the period studied (1981-1991). 
33 See section 3.6. 
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the period 1981-1991, the number of students satisfying our sample selection 
criteria rose by about 19%, from 48,024 to 57,096 units. However, the rise 
has been unevenly distributed across social classes, with students from social 
classes I and V, 34 for instance, rising only by 3.5% and decreasing by 1.27c. 
respectively, and those from social classes 11, IIINNI, HIM and IV, rising by 
25.2,39.1,9.15 and 52.3 percentage points '3' respectively. The increase in 
the number of students was more equally distributed across subject groups. 
Both QS and NQS experienced an increase of around 20 percentage points, 
while the increase in L&M was about 7 percentage points lower. 36 
Table 3.1 reports some descriptive statistics on mean A-level score of 
entrant students by subject, " which can be interpreted as a raw measure of 
subject selectivity. L&M always ranked first in terms of mean A-level score 
of the students intake, while the second place was occupied by quantitative 
subjects until 1986 and by non-quantitative subjects from 1987 onwards. 
"Some abbreviations commonly used in the UK for social classes are: I (professional), 
II (intermediate), IIINM (skilled non manual), HIM (skilled manual), IV (partly skilled), 
V (unskilled). In the USR data social class was built using parents' occupation. We are 
grateful to Abigail McNight for providing us with the mapping information. 
35The high increase in social class IV is, however, partly determined by the low initial 
number of students with this social background in 1981. 
36AIthough the figure for this group reflects the slower dynamic for Medicine, since the 
number of medical students is determined by the Government. 
37A-level scores are computed according to the UCAS method: A= 10, B=8, C=6, D=4, 
E=2. 
101 
Table 3.2 shows average gross weekly occupational earnings of cohorts of 
student leavers since 1985. " For the whole period L&M ranked first in terms 
of average earnings, followed by quantitative and non-quantitative subjects, 
respectively. The coefficients of variation of earnings by study field generally 
show in the period of study a lower variation within QS, and a similar amount 
of earnings variation within the other subjects. 
3.7.3 Choice of explanatory variables 
The primary focus of this chapter is on the effect of social class on the choice 
of undergraduate degree subject. Previous research has identified secondary 
school curriculum (Polachek, 1978), gender (Polacheck, 1978, Blakemore and 
Low, 1984) and forward-looking factors (Berger, 1988, Rochat and Demeule- 
meester, 2001, Montmarquette et al., 2002) as the main determinants of 
undergraduate field of study. 
In the present chapter, we estimate a 'value added specification' of the 
subject choice model (see equation (3.5)) and do not consider the effect 
of forward-looking factors, such as expected incomes and academic perfor- 
mance. We decide to do so for several reasons. Firstly, past research has 
shown that the expected life-time flow of earnings is much more important 
than starting earnings for students' subject choice (see Berger, 1988) and 
that this flow is highly uncertain to students (see Wolter and Zbinden, 2002) 7 
38The author wishes to thank Abigail McNight, Robin Naylor and Jeremy Smith for 
providing data on earnings. Weekly occupational earnings are obtained by matching First 
Destination Supplement data, in the USR, with data from the New Earnings Survey. See 
Bratti and Mancini (2003) for a more detailed description of the matching procedure. 
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while from USR data it is possible to have information on graduates' early 
occupational earnings only (i. e. six months after graduation, using the First 
Destination Supplement). In the absence of data on subjective earnings ex- 
pectations by students, the construction of life-time subject specific expected 
earnings would require a substantial amount of discretion and assumptions 
on the part of the researcher. " Given that the inclusion of expected perfor- 
mance raises similar problems, the latter is also excluded from the present 
analysis. It must also be noted that our model is a reduced form model 
and therefore of descriptive nature. We want only to investigate whether 
there are statistically significant social class differences in the probability of 
enrolling in different subjects. Then, these differences may be originated by 
very different factors such as differences in preferences or in the expected eco- 
nomic returns and costs of enrolling in different subjects, but unfortunately 
we do not have enough information to identify the various channels through 
39 One possibility would be to estimate individuals' expected earnings using individual 
actual earnings data. Unfortunately, individual earnings data by subject are not available 
for the period considered (e. g., the UK Labour Force Survey does not contain any infor- 
mation on subject of degree for the period under study). Even when the data are available 
model identification requires the exclusion of at least one variable affecting earnings but 
not the degree subject choice directly, whose selection is far from being obvious. More- 
over, some studies, such as Dominitz and Manski (1996), Betts (1996), and Brunello et al. 
(2001), cast doubts on students' ability to predict their life-time future earnings. These 
studies generally show a large heterogeneity in students' beliefs about current earnings, 
which reflects a large variation in students' information. Finally, as noticed by Dominitz 
and Manski (1996): 'incorrect assumptions can yield incorrect inferences about the way 
students make schooling decisions' (P. 3). 
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which social class may exert its influence. 
In detail, we include among the explanatory variables: gender, age at 
enrollment, secondary school type (not known, grammar, independent, com- 
prehensive, 6th form college, other type), score in A-levels in specific sub- 
jects (biology, chemistry, economics, English, French, general studies, geogra- 
phy, history, mathematics, physics), 40 number of A-levels, best three A-level 
passes score, region of residence prior to university enrollment (inner London, 
outer London, other England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) and social 
class (1,11, IIINM, HIM, IV, V, armed forces, non-workers, inadequately 
described). 41 
3.7.4 Models' fit 
Table 3.3 reports some statistics for the TNP models estimated for the period 
1981-1991. For all years, the Wald test for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on all regressors but the constant are equal to zero is strongly 
rejected. The Wald tests for the omission of the variables related to social 
class and pre-university school curriculum show that both sets of variables 
cannot be omitted from the model. However, it is the latter group of variables 
which accounts for most of the explanatory power of the model as the pseudo 
R2 of the models with and without pre-university school variables show. Last 
but not least, in all years the estimated correlation P12 between the error 
components of the utilities (see section 3.6) of the QS and L&M groups is 
40 In order to keep the model tractable we choose to include only the most popular 
subjects for which a score as well as a pass indicator is available. 
"For the explanation of the abbreviations for social classes see footnote 34. 
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significantly different from zero, suggesting that the TNP model has to be 
preferred to a MNL model. We have already seen that a non-zero correlation 
between the random components of the utilities of the different alternatives 
is what is also suggested by the behavioural model outlined in section 3.5. " 
3.8 Empirical results on the effect of social 
class 
In this section we comment on the estimated probabilities obtained from the 
TNP model. 
The predicted probabilities of enrolling in the three different subject areas 
by social class are reported for each year in Table 3.4 and are computed as 
the means of the individual predicted probabilities. Standard errors and 
95% confidence intervals are computed using the delta method and Z critical 
values. We focus here only on the differences by social class. 
Firstly, although Table 3.3 shows that social class variables are jointly 
highly significant, we observe in Table 3.4 that the predicted probabilities of 
enrolling in the different subject groups are generally not statistically differ- 
ent across social classes. Apart from statistical differences, we observe that 
some predictions of the theory are met by the data. In all years considered, 
except 1982, individuals from social class I had the smallest probability to 
42 Another fact worth noting is the constant decline of this correlation over time, which 
seems to suggest that the unobservables entering the utilities of the different alternatives 
are diverging over time. 
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enroll in QS (cf. hypothesis I in section 3.3). By contrast, the same indi- 
viduals had in all years but 1991, the highest probability to enroll in Law 
and Medicine (cf. hypothesis IV in section 3.3). However, the differences 
are very low in magnitude and this influences their statistical significance. 
Moreover, there does not appear to be any dramatic change in the likelihood 
of enrolling in the different subject groups in the period under study. 
Thus, our analysis appears to show that the structure of the UK higher 
education system during the period 1981-1991 was able to ensure that indi- 
viduals with different social backgrounds had equal opportunities of accessing 
different subjects at tertiary level (conditional on accessing HE). Recall that 
the system was characterized by the absence of undergraduate tuition fees 
and by the provision of means-tested maintenance grants for economically 
disadvantaged students. Both these features of the UK higher education 
system were likely to attenuate differences across social classes in the prob- 
ability of enrolling in the different subjects by making the pecuniary costs 
of enrolling in the different fields very similar across social classes and sub- 
jects. 43 Moreover, in a period in which the number of graduates was not 
very high, possessing a degree was probably sufficient per-se to ensure high 
earnings in the labour market and more important than social class origin. 44 
43 We have already said that in the presence of imperfect capital markets less wealthy 
students may need to borrow money since they do not have the financial support of their 
families, and have therefore higher enrollment costs, and, following an economic approach, 
they are more likely to enroll in high return subjects. 
44 Compared to a situation in which the supply of graduates is high and 'family networks' 
may be important for employers to screen among graduates. 
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On the basis of these results it might be interesting to replicate our anal- 
ysis for more recent years, since the 1990s were characterized by a gradual 
substitution of the maintenance grants with repayable loans. As stated by 
Callender (2003) the replacement of student maintenance grants with sub- 
sidised loans marked a switch from a system granting a large subsidy to lower 
income students to a less generous system benefiting all students. Although 
student loans might be very close to implementing perfect capital markets, 
since students can borrow against their future incomes at a zero real interest 
rate, they are surely less generous than maintenance grants for low income 
students and may have had some consequences not only on student access to 
HE but also in terms of differentiating students' choices across social classes. 
Low income students, who are more risk adverse, might have preferred to 
enroll in less selective and "easier" subjects, in which the probability of fail- 
ure is lower or that of achieving a 'good' (first or upper second) degree class 
higher, given the growing importance of degree class over time (see Naylor et 
al. 2003), or to enroll in the subjects in which there is less earnings disper- 
sion. And, of course, it would also be interesting to study the consequences 
of differentiating the fees by subject and imposing top-up fees for the most 
popular subjects, which have the potential of producing further unequalising 
effects on the choices of students from different social classes. 
The bulk of explanatory power of our model of subject choice can be 
ascribed to the type of pre-university school curriculum and performance, 
proxied by the A-levels score, number of A-levels, school type and type of A- 
levels with the relative performance. The drop in the pseudo R' when these 
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variables are omitted (see Table 3.3) shows that they have a high explanatory 
power over and above social class (as the models with full controls show), 
which in turn has only a limited influence on pre-university school curricu- 
lum. Indeed, the explanatory power of social class remains low also when 
secondary school variables, on which the former may have an influence, are 
not controlled for. This is relatively good news in terms of intergenerational 
mobility and equal educational opportunities of the UK university system in 
the 1980s as far as subject choice is concerned: social class did not appear 
to be the main determinant of students' differences of undergraduate subject 
studied. Our analysis appears to attribute a major role to other individual 
or family characteristics, such as parenting quality or students' ability and 
motivation, or to quality of schools and teachers, which affected the type 
of curriculum and A-level performance. However, we do not exclude that 
there might have been other forms of educational inequalities across social 
classes, for instance, in terms of the type of institution enrolled (polytechnics 
vs universities, Russel group institution vs other universities). 45 
3.8.1 Sensitivity analysis 
We have seen that our econometric analysis excludes the presence of statis- 
tically significant differences across individuals from different social classes 
on the probability of enrolling in different subject groups. However, we may 
wonder whether there are differences within broadly defined subject groups, 
45This may happen since there are positive economic returns to attending prestigious 
Universities as shown by Chevalier and Conlon (2003). 
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and whether the results are determined by the specific econometric model 
chosen. 
We address both issues by considering a more detailed definition of sub- 
ject groups. In particular: Medicine, Law, Sciences, Technical, Economics 
and Business, Mathemathics, Soft Social Sciences, Art and Humanities. 46 . 
Since the high number of subject groups considered does not allow the esti- 
mation of a multinomial probit model, we use instead a flexible-thresholds 
ordered probit model (see Appendix B). However, estimation of such a model 
requires an ordering of the discrete dependent variable. We ranked the sub- 
jects in ascending order of occupational weekly earnings. In particular, we 
matched 1985-1991 university students leavers data from the USR with oc- 
cupational earnings from the NES survey and computed an average of the 
occupational earnings by subject group. On the basis of the average weekly 
occupational earnings in each year the subjects were ordered to estimate 
the flexible-thresholds ordered probit model. The ranking of the subjects is 
shown in Table 3.5 and is very similar across years. We report in Tables 3.6- 
3.7 the estimates for a benchmark year, 1985.47 Concerning 1985, it must be 
noted that the ordering by weekly occupational earnings of the broader sub- 
46The composition is: Medicine, Law, Sciences (Biological Sciences, Agriculture, Phys- 
ical Sciences, General Sciences Combined degrees), Technical (Computing, Engineering, 
Technology, Architecture), Economics and Business, Mathematics, Soft Social Sciences 
(Social studies excluding economics, Politics, Mass Communications, General Social Sci- 
ences Combined degrees), Art and Humanities (Classics and Literature, Modern Euro 
Languages, Other Languages, Humanities, Creative Arts, Education, Other combined de- 
grees). 
47 The same sensitivity analysis was also replicated for 1991 and showed the same results. 
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ject groups shown in Table 3.2 is generally preserved (i. e. Law and Medicine 
graduates had higher earnings than all QS graduates who in turn earned 
more than NQS graduates), the sole exception being Sciences, whose gradu- 
ates were at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Table 3.6 shows that 
by considering a finer disaggregation of subject groups, imposing an ordering 
and using a different econometric model our results do not change: differ- 
ences across social classes are never statistically significant. Moreover, Table 
3.6 shows that when we compute the aggregate probabilities of the broader 
subjects considered in the previous section (QS, NQS, Law and Medicine) 
by summing the probabilities of the finer subjects, they are very similar to 
those obtained from the TNP model. In summary, our results do not appear 
to be driven by the aggregation of subjects or by the type of econometric 
model chosen. 
3.9 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we investigated social class influences on degree subject choice 
at the undergraduate level, conditional on enrolling in HE in the UK. We 
have used data for several cohorts of university students in the 1980s to 
estimate a trinomial probit model of subject choice (Quantitative Subjects, 
Non- Quantitative Subjects, Law and Medicine). We have also considered 
a finer disaggregation of subjects and an alternative econometric model (a 
flexible-thresholds ordered probit) and showed the robustness of our results. 
From our empirical analysis: 
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We do not find statistically significant differences among social classes 
in the probability of enrolling in different subjects in the period 1981- 
1991. 
2. In the 'value added specification' of our model (i. e., controlling for 
secondary school variables) social class explains only a small part of 
the variation in subject enrolled, while secondary school curriculum 
(school type, A-level score and number and performance in specific A- 
levels) has a much higher explanatory power. The explanatory power 
of social class remains low also in a 'contemporaneous specification' 
of the model of subject enrolled, where secondary school variables are 
omitted, suggesting that its role may be limited also at early stages of 
the educational process. 
Both findings can be interpreted as good news in terms of intergenera- 
tional mobility of the UK university system during the 1980s as far as subject 
choice is concerned, in the sense that a student's choice of study field was 
made on the basis of characteristics generally unrelated to social class. 
For future research, it would be interesting to replicate the analysis of 
this chapter for more recent cohorts of university students. Indeed, the re- 
cent changes introduced in the UK university system, such as the gradual 
replacement of student maintenance grants with student loans, may have 
contributed to differentiating the degree subject choices of students with dif- 
ferent social class backgrounds and may give some useful insights into the 
potential effects of introducing differential fees by subject. 
ill 
Appendix B: The flexible-thresholds ordered 
probit model 
In order to check the robustness of our results to different modeling strategic,,, 
we estimated the subject choice model for the 1985 and 1991 using a flexible- 
thresholds ordered probit model. The latter represents a straightforward 
extension of the standard ordered probit model. In what follows Nve give a 
brief outline of both the standard ordered probit model and of the flexible- 
thresholds ordered probit model. 
Ordered probit model 
Following Cameron and Heckman (1998), let us assume that the direct costs 
of undertaking undergraduate education in fieldJ, given the characteristic's 
of individual i, X= ri, arc c(J*Jxi), which are assumed to be weakly convex 
and increasing in j. They might reflect, for instance, the distitility produced 
by the time devoted to study. The underlying idea is that, since we order 
the subjects according to the level of income earned, high return subjects 
are also those 'tougher' in terms of academic selectivity and effort required 
cetcrl',, ý paribus of students. " The X's, being individuals' characteristics, are 
the same across all university fields. Let us also assume that the discounted 
lifetime return to undergraduate field J is R(3*lxi, ci), concave and increasing 
in 3 (which directly derives from our ordering of subjects), where ci is a person 
"At this stage the model does not allow for heterogeneity across students in the cost 
of subjects. Such a possibility Nvill be discussed later on when presenting the flexible- 
thresholds ordered probit model. 
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specific shifter of the return to field j. We define the utility for individual 
i in subject j, i. e. Vij, as the difference between the return and the cost of 
acquiring education in field j. The optimal field of study is determined for 
each individual by solving the problem: 
Max[R(jlxi, Ej) - c(jixi)] (3.18) i 
where J= 17..., J, and J is the field with the highest economic return (which 
does not necessarily imply that it is also the highest utility field for individual 
i). 
Let us assume that Ej is stochastic, such that ej I Xi and: 
R(jlxi, Ei) = R(j)O(xi)ci (3-19) 
where E(Ej) = 1, ci > 0, while 
CUIxi) =: CU) (3.20) 
i. e. costs do not depend on individual characteristics. 
If s is the optimal undergraduate field for individual 1 then: 
[C(S) - C(s - 1)] < ci !ý 
[C(S + 1) - c(s)] 
(R(s) - R(s - 1))O(xi) - (R(s + 1) - R(s)), O(xi)' 
ci is therefore bounded by the ratios of marginal return to the marginal 
cost of the different undergraduate fields. If q is continuously distributed 
and defining: 
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exp[l(j)] = -CU) - CU - 
1) (3.22) 
then: 
R(j) - R(i - 1) 
Pr(j = sIX = xi) = Pr[exp[l(s)]0(xi)-' < Ei :ý exp[l(s + 1)]0(xi)-']. 
(3.23) 
If we further assume that O(xi) = exp(xiO) and that ci is log-normallý 
distributed, the expression above takes the more familiar form of the standard 
ordered probit model: 
Pr(j = SIX = xi) = (D[l(s) - xio: 5 A: 5 l(S + 1) - xio] (3.24) 
where p= ln(Ei). The parameters to be estimated are 0 and the thresh- 
olds 1(j)s. In this framework individual and parental attributes increase or 
decrease the return to education and therefore affect the probability of en- 
rolling in the different fields. The specification can be adjusted so that it can 
allow for both the return and costs to education to depend on individual and 
family characteristics (see, for instance, Lauer, 2003). However, this has no 
empirical relevance, since only the effect of the covariates; on the ratio of the 
marginal return to the marginal cost of the educational qualifications (see 
equation (3.24)), and not on the single components (return and cost), can be 
identified. 
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Flexible- thresholds ordered probit model 
In this section, we offer an economic rationalization for the flexible- thresholds 
ordered probit (FT-OP, hereafter) model, introduced by Pradhan and van 
Soest (1995), in the spirit of Cameron and Heckman (1998). Let us start 
from the same theoretical framework introduced for the simple ordered probit 
model and define the cost functions for the different fields as follows: 
33 
c(s I xi) =E exp (61) rj exp (Jj (xi)), (3.25) 
j=1 z=2 
and the return functions as follows: 
81 
R(sixi, ei) == Ei Z exp(01)0(xi) 11 exp(oj (xi». (3.26) 
j=l z=2 
Hence, both cost and return depend on individuals characteristics. We 
assume that students enroll in the field which maximize their utility. If 
1s<J is the optimal undergraduate field for individual 1, then in our 
specific case: 
exp(61) flj=2 exp(6j(xi» 
< Ei < 
exp(01)Ilj=2exp(0j(xi»0(x) - 
,q+I 
CXP(61) Ili=2 CXP(6j(Xi)) 
5+1 exp(ol) rlj=2 CXP(Oj(Xi))O(X) 
(3.27) 
By further assuming that Oj(xi) = exp(Ojxi) and 6j(xi) = exp(6jxj) and 
V)(xi) = exp(xi, 3) the last expression can be rewritten as: 
3 exp(exp(6jxi)) cxp(61) fl", cxp(cxp(6jx, )) CXP(61) Ilj=2 
-<C< 
j=2 
CXP(Ol) CXP(Xi)3) flj=2 CXP(CXP(OiXi)) CXP(Ol) CXP(XIO) Fljj=2 CXP(CXP(OJ (Xi))) 
(3.28) 
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If we define exp (1 (s, xi)) =- exp (61 -0 1) r1i=2 exp ((Jj - Oj) xi), and 6j - oj 
Aj and assume that Ei is log-normally distributed, 
S S+1 
Pr(j = sIX = xi) = 4D [A, +E exp(Ajxi)-Oxi :5 mi :5 \1+1: exp(, \j xi) - 3x, 
j=2 i=2 
(3.29) 
where pi = ln(ci), we obtain the flexible-thresholds ordered probit model 
introduced by Pradhan and van Soest (1995). The thresholds 1(s, xi) are 
allowed to depend on the variables xi. As Pradhan and van Soest (1995) 
observed, this model allows greater flexibility compared to the standard or- 
dered probit model. Indeed, model identification only requires one threshold 
to be fixed. Therefore the generality of the model can be increased by let- 
ting the other thresholds depend on individual characteristics. In particular, 
while the choice of the lowest return field depends on the index xi'3 only, 
the choices of the other subjects also depend on the xiAj's indexes. Despite 
being more flexible than the ordered probit model the flexible- thresholds or- 
dered probit model requires the ordering of the outcome variable and it is 
therefore less general than a multinornial probit model although much easier 
to estimate. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Average A-level score of entrant students by subject (USR data) 
Year QS 
mean C. V. 
NQS 
mean C. V. 
L&M 
mean C. V. 
1981 20.418 0.308 20.220 0.292 23.774 0.195 
1982 21.130 0.281 21.071 0.264 24.214 0.179 
1983 22.020 0.247 21.699 0.237 24.663 0.161 
1984 22.123 0.250 21.849 0.237 25.027 0.155 
1985 22.076 0.255 21.657 0.239 25-055 0.157 
1986 21.947 0.259 21.774 0.234 25.140 0.153 
1987 21.728 0.266 21.897 0.231 24.910 0.164 
1988 21.794 0.268 21.971 0.231 25.015 0.161 
1989 21.883 0.270 22.324 0.214 25-199 0.158 
1990 21.939 0.269 22.631 0.208 25.097 0.164 
1991 21.710 0.277 23.129 0.197 25-110 0.172 
Note. QS: 'Quantitative Subjects'; NQS: 'Non-Quantitative Subjects'ý UNI: Law and 
Medicine (see section 3.7.2). The table reports average A-level scores of entrant students 
by subject and the coefficient of variation (c. v. ) within subject groups. The average A-level 
score are computed on the estimation samples (i. e. non-mature, non-overseas, unmarried 
students studying for a first degree qualification and with A-levels). 
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Table 3.2: Average gross weekly occupational earnings of leaving students 
by subject -3 groups 
Year QS 
mean C. V. 
NQS 
mean C. V. 
L&M 
mean C. V. 
1985 445.5 0.2 430.5 0.2 564.6 0.2 
1986 487.1 0.2 468.0 0.2 612.1 0.2 
1987 537.4 0.2 524.8 0.2 699.8 0.2 
1988 598.7 0.2 567.9 0.2 785.6 0.2 
1989 656.6 0.2 626.9 0.2 871.6 0.2 
1990 677.1 0.2 661.3 0.2 980.9 0.2 
1991 710.7 0.2 690.8 0.3 1044.7 0.3 
1992 735.7 0.2 716.2 0.3 1071.4 0.3 
1993 761.4 0.2 747.1 0.3 1085.3 0.3 
Note. QS: 'Quantitative Subjects'; NQS: 'Non-Quantitative Subjects'; L&M: Law and 
Medicine (see section 3.7.2). The table reports average gross weekly occupational earnings 
in current pounds (from the New Earnings Survey) of leaving students by subject and 
the coefficient of variation (c. v. ) within subjects. Average earnings are computed on the 
estimation samples (i. e. non-mature, non-overseas, unmarried students studying for a first 
degree qualification and with A-levels). 
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Table 3.4: Predicted probabilities (%), with standard errors and 95% confi- 
dence intervals, of enrolling in the different study fields by social class 
Social Class 
Prob 
QS 
left right 
Subject group 
NQS 
Prob left right Prob 
L&M 
left right 
1981 
1 0.48 0.46 0.51 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.16 0.13 0.18 
if 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.15 
IIINM 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.15 
film 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.10 0.14 
IV 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.12 0.10 0.15 
V 0.52 0.48 0.57 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.12 0.08 0.15 
Armed forces 0.48 0.44 0.52 0.40 0.37 0.43 0.12 0.09 0.15 
Inadequately described 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.12 0.10 0.15 
Non workers 0.49 0.45 0.52 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.12 0.10 0.15 
1982 
1 0.47 0.45 0.49 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.17 0.14 0.19 
11 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.12 0.16 
IIINM 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15 
film 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.12 0.10 0.14 
IV 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.16 
V 0.47 0.43 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.16 0.12 0.21 
Armed forces 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.14 0.11 0.17 
Inadequately described 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.38 0.36 0.41 0.13 0.10 0.15 
Non workers 0.37 0.34 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.26 0.23 0.29 
1983 
1 
11 
IIINM 
HIM 
IV 
V 
Armed forces 
Inadequately described 
Non workers 
0.46 
0.49 
0.50 
0.51 
0.51 
0.52 
0.47 
0.48 
0.48 
0.44 
0.47 
0.47 
0.48 
0.48 
0.48 
0.43 
0.45 
0.45 
0.49 
0.52 
0.52 
0.53 
0.53 
0.57 
0.51 
0.51 
0.52 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
0.38 
0.38 
0.36 
0.37 
0.34 
0.35 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.35 
0.38 
0.38 
0.37 
0.38 
0.38 
0.41 
0.41 
0.38 
0.40 
0.18 
0.15 
0.15 
0.13 
0.14 
0.10 
0.15 
0.16 
0.14 
0.16 
0.12 
0.12 
0.11 
0.11 
0.07 
0.12 
0.13 
0.12 
0.20 
0.17 
0.17 
0.16 
0.16 
0.14 
0.19 
0.19 
0.17 
1984 
1 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.17 0.15 0.19 
11 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.16 
IIINM 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.17 
HIM 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.14 0.12 0.16 
IV 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.17 
V 0.48 0.43 0.53 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.14 0.10 0.18 
Armed forces 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.15 0.12 0.19 
Inadequately described 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.15 0.13 0.18 
Non workers 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.15 0.12 0.18 
1985 
1 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.17 0.15 0.19 
11 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.15 
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.15 
HIM 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.15 
IV 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16 
V 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.35 0.32 0.39 0.12 0.09 0.15 
Armed forces 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.12 0.09 0.15 
Inadequately described 0.52 0.49 0.55 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.16 
Non workers 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.13 0.11 0.16 
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continued 
Social Class 
Prob 
QS 
left right 
Subject group 
NQS 
Prob left right Prob 
L&M 
left right 
1986 
1 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.15 0.19 
11 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16 
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16 
HIM 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.15 
IV 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.14 0.12 0.16 
V 0.46 0.42 0.50 0.37 0.33 0.40 0.17 0.13 0.21 
Armed forces 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.36 0.33 0.39 0.12 0.09 0.15 
Inadequately described 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.15 0.12 0.17 
Non workers 0.50 0.46 0.53 0.36 0.33 0.39 0.14 0.12 0.17 
1987 
1 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.15 0.19 
11 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16 
IIINM 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.13 0.12 0.15 
HIM 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.14 0.12 0.16 
IV 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.14 0.12 0.17 
V 0.53 0.48 0.57 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.14 0.11 0.18 
Armed forces 0.51 0.47 0.55 0.34 0.31 0.37 0.15 0.11 0.18 
Inadequately described 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.15 0.13 0.18 
Non workers 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.12 0.09 0.14 
1989 
1 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.16 
11 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.14 
IIINM 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.12 0.10 0.14 
HIM 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.14 
IV 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16 
V 0.52 0.47 0.56 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.18 
Armed forces 0.51 0.47 0.55 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.12 0.09 0.14 
Inadequately described 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.16 
Non workers 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.12 0.09 0.14 
1990 
1 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.13 0.16 
11 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.11 0.14 
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15 
HIM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15 
IV 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15 
V 0.51 0.46 0.55 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.18 
Armed forces 0.50 0.46 0.54 0.40 0.37 0.43 0.10 0.08 0.13 
Inadequately described 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.18 
Non workers 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.16 
1991 
1 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.14 0.13 0.16 
11 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.11 0.14 
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.12 0.11 0.14 
HIM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.14 
IV 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.14 0.12 0.16 
V 0.50 0.46 0.55 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.16 0.12 0.20 
Armed forces 0.50 0.46 0.54 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.12 0.09 0.15 
Inadequately described 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.13 0.11 0.15 
Non workers 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.14 0.11 0.17 
Note. QS: 'Quantitative Subjects'; NQS: 'Non-Quantitative Subjects'; L&M: Law and 
Medicine (see section 3.7.2). Social Classes: I (professional), II (intermediate), IIINNI 
(skilled non manual), HIM (skilled manual), IV (partly skilled), V (unskilled). Standard 
errors and confidence intervals were computed using the delta method and Z critical values. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of students by broad field of study, 19, 'SI-1991 USR 
data 
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No t c. QS: 'quantitative subjects'; NQS: 'non-quantitative subjects'; LEM: law and 
medicine (see section 3.7-2). The graph refers to full-time, unmarried, non-mature, horne 
students xvith A-levels and aiming at. a first, degree qualification (i. e. the estimation sam- 
ple). 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of students by social cla-ss, 1981-1991 USR data 
.......... 
All 
........... ao 
00 
n en n- na rar. 
co 
CC) 
I . .. 00 
0 
CN 
0 
El 
13 
Note. Social Classes: I (professional), 11 (intermediate), IIINNI (skilled non manual), HIM 
(skilled manual), IV (partly skilled), V (unskilled), ID (inadequately described). The 
graph refers to full-time, unniarried, non-mature, lionie students with A-levels and aiming 
at, a first degree qualification (i. e. the estimation sample). 
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Chapter 4 
Variations in the returns to a 
first degree: evidence from the 
British Cohort Study 1970 
128 
4.1 Introduction 
Higher education policy in Europe is in flux, not least in the UK which has 
witnessed considerable and ongoing policy change over the last half-century. 
One aspect of the UK experience has been a steady shift in the burden of 
funding higher education (HE, hereafter) away from the taxpayer and to- 
wards students and their families. Maintenance grant provision has been 
removed substantially and has been replaced by a system of repayable loans. 
Furthermore, since 1999, uniform university tuition fees have been paid by 
all full-time UK university students from within the European Union. The 
ceiling on fees has been recently increased to L3,000 and English universities 
will be free to charge 'top-up fees' from September 2006. Contemporane- 
ously, there has been a significant expansion in the HE participation rate 
since the early 1980s, associated both with a reduction in the prior academic 
performance required for university admission and in the unit of resource in 
the teaching of university undergraduates. 
In this context of ongoing policy change, it is important to examine the 
magnitude of private returns to HE and the extent to which they have 
changed over time. Using data on the 1958 British birth cohort from the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS), Blundell et al. (2000) report 
an estimated return to a degree of around 17% for men and 37% for women, 
relative to a control group who obtained one or more A-levels (the highest 
secondary school qualification) but who did not proceed into HE. In part, 
estimates of sizeable private returns to university degrees have been cited as 
evidence in support of policies shifting the burden of costs on to students. 
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Graduates in the cohort analysed by Blundell et al. (2000) would most typ- 
ically have graduated circa 1979, at just about the time that public sector 
financial support to university students began to decline significantly. Also 
at this time, UK government policy changes sought to raise substantially the 
HE participation rate. Rapid expansion of student numbers since the early 
1980s is likely to have exerted downward pressure on average returns to a de- 
gree. Against this, skill-biased technical change (SBTC) during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century is likely to have increased the demand for 
graduate labour. The direction of the net effect of these changes on graduate 
returns is ambiguous. It seems timely, therefore, to update the estimates ob- 
tained by Blundell et al. (2000) with the application of their analysis to data 
for a more recent cohort. We also note that, while research has concentrated 
on average returns to qualifications, the issue of variations according to level 
of performance, given qualifications, is under-explored. In the current chap- 
ter, we examine both the average returns to a degree and also variations by 
specific factors. In particular, we address the argument that over a period in 
which the graduate population has expanded, better-performing graduates 
might have experienced a relative increase in the premium for a 'good' degree 
performance (see Naylor and Smith, 2004), thereby raising the returns for 
such students. ' 
Section 4.2 of this chapter provides a brief review of evidence on trends 
in the returns to a degree in the UK. The subsequent analysis conducted in 
I In the UK undergraduate degrees are classified, according to degree performance, in 
descending order as first, upper second, lower second, third, non-honour degree, fail. First 
and upper second class degrees are often referred to as 'good' degrees. 
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this chapter is based on data from the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70). 
This cohort would, typically, have graduated circa 1991, some 12 years after 
the 1958 cohort analysed in Blundell et al. (2000). In view of the various 
supply and demand-side changes occurring between the late 1970s and the 
early 1990s and their likely effect on graduate returns, this 1970 cohort is 
interesting to contrast with the 1958 cohort. It is also of particular interest 
to address the question of how returns to higher education vary by specific 
observed characteristics. In the current chapter, we focus on the issue of how 
returns to a degree vary with both (i) the class of degree awarded and (ii) 
the subject of the degree studied. 
Variation in returns by class of degree has received relatively little at- 
tention in the literature. This is largely a consequence of the fact that few 
data-sets contain adequate information on class of degree awarded. The issue 
is of interest, however, for two reasons. First, if there is significant variation 
by degree class around the average return to a degree, then the investment 
in HE could yield a low return to poor-performing students. Shifting the 
burden of university fees further towards students then risks generating a 
greater disincentive to HE participation than would be the case with rel- 
atively little variation around the average: a narrow focus on the average 
return is inadequate for policy purposes. Second, it is of general interest to 
examine the extent to which the labour market rewards the graduate's class 
of degree. Estimates of returns to education have tended to focus on years of 
schooling or on levels of qualifications. Yet, as there is substantial clustering 
of labour market entrants on both these criteria, one would expect employers 
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to discriminate between candidates on factors such as grades achieved: that 
is, on degree class awarded in the context of higher education in the UK. 
This itself is likely to vary with the proportion of a cohort investing in a 
university degree. 
Variation in returns by degree subject has received more attention, as we 
discuss in more detail below. Since the introduction of flat-rate fees, a number 
of authors have argued that there is a theoretical case for differentiating fees 
by subject (see, for example, Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). The strength of 
the case for differentiating fees depends in part on the strength of evidence 
that the return to a degree varies by subject studied and/or by institution 
attended. At the time of writing, legislation to introduce differential fees 
has just passed through the UK parliament. The proposed legislation would 
permit fees to vary by university and by course. In the current chapter, we 
provide a brief review of the literature on this and present new estimates on 
log-wage premia by subject studied. Our data do not enable us to estimate 
ceteris paribus variations in returns by institution of study. On this issue, 
see Chevalier and Conlon (2003). 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Following a brief survey in 
section 4.2 of recent evidence on returns to HE in the UK, section 4.3 provides 
a description of the data set and the sample selection procedure used in our 
analysis. In section 4.4, we discuss the issue of the endogeneity of educational 
qualifications and describe a way of addressing it, the so-called proxyZng and 
matching method. In section 4.5, we present a replication study of Blundell 
et al. (2000) comparing results for the 1958 and the 1970 birth cohorts using 
132 
the proxying and matching method. Section 4.6 reports estimates of the re- 
turn to a first degree based on our most preferred specifications for the 1970 
cohort and provides evidence on variations in returns according to degree 
class awarded and area of subject studied. Section 4.7 describes an alterna- 
tive way of addressing the issue of endogeneity, using the so-called control 
function approach, while section 4.8 explores the possibility of heterogeneity 
in the returns to a first degree according to observed characteristics in a het- 
erogeneous treatment framework. Finally, section 4.9 summarises the main 
findings and concludes. 
4.2 Evidence on the returns to a degree in 
the UK 
One of the most influential analyses estimating the returns to a degree in 
Britain is that of Blundell et al. (2000). This study used data from the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS), an ongoing survey of all indi- 
viduals born in Britain in the week 3 rd_gth March 1958. The data are par- 
ticularly rich in information useful in the estimation of returns to education, 
such as ability measures, educational qualifications and family background 
characteristics. The approach adopted in Blundell et al. (2000) is to com- 
pare individuals with HE qualifications with those individuals who did not 
go on to HE but whose secondary school qualifications (A-levels) would have 
permitted them admission to HE. Hence, the estimated returns are to be 
interpreted as conditional on having performed well at secondary school. 
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As is well known, the estimation of educational returns is potentially sus- 
ceptible to problems of endogeneity bias arising from the fact that typically 
unobserved - and hence omitted - characteristics (such as ability) affecting 
educational outcomes are also correlated with subsequent labour market out- 
comes. Blundell et al. (2000) exploit the fact that the NCDS data are rich 
in information on typically unobserved characteristics and include these as 
regressors in their log-wage equations. This proxy and matching approach 
assumes that HE decisions are made on the basis of (i) observed and included 
characteristics and/or (ii) unobserved characteristics which are well proxied 
by the included observed variables. 2 If these assumptions are valid, then the 
wage returns estimated using OLS are consistent. We discuss these issues in 
more detail in section 4.4 of the chapter. 
Blundell et al. (2000) estimate the impact of different levels of HE on 
gross hourly wages at age 33. They estimate the raw returns to a first degree 3 
to be 21% for men and 39% for women, relative to the control group of cohort 
2 Wooldridge (2002) discusses two assumptions which make a proxy variable a perfect 
proxy variable. In our case, the first is that the proxy variable must be uncorrelated 
with the error term of the 'true wage equation', i. e. the model including the unobserved 
characteristics, but highly correlated with the unobserved characteristics. The second 
condition is that when running a regression of the unobserved variable on the proxy variable 
and the other control variables included in the wage regression, the coefficients on the latter 
converge to zero. 
3 Heckman et al. (2003) stress that in estimating rates of return it is necessary to take 
account of, among other factors, the direct and indirect costs of schooling, taxes, and the 
length of working life. In what follows, we often use the term wage 'return' although it 
should be interpreted in the narrow sense of a log-wage premium. 
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members with A-level qualifications but without HE. When the full set of 
controls is included in the estimation, the estimated returns to a first degree 
fall substantially in the case of men - to only 12% - and only slightly in the 
case of women - to 34%. Without controls for ability at age 16 or A-level 
score, the estimated returns are 17% for men and 37% for women. The ceteris 
paribus returns to higher degrees (such as Master and Doctoral degrees) are 
estimated to be 8% for men and 32% for women, relative to those with just 
A-levels, when all controls are included. 
Blundell et al. (2000) also report different returns estimated for different 
courses studied at HE, finding that returns for men tend be relatively low in 
Biology, Chemistry, Environmental Sciences, and Geography and for women 
tend to be relatively high in Education, Economics, Accountancy and Law 
and in 'Other social sciences'. As the authors acknowledge, splitting the 
NCDS graduate sample by subject leads to relatively small cell sizes and 
hence produces poor precision in the estimates at the subject level. 
As Blundell et al. (2000) also acknowledge, analysis of wage returns to an 
undergraduate degree based on the NCDS cohort refers to individuals who, 
typically, were making HE decisions in the late 1970s and graduating around 
1980. As we noted earlier, there have been substantial changes in the HE 
sector and in the graduate labour market in the last two decades and hence 
it is interesting to compare and contrast the results obtained for the 1958 
birth cohort with results based on the analysis of the more recent 1970 birth 
cohort. This forms a principal focus of the current chapter. We are also 
particularly interested in how returns to a degree might vary with the class 
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of degree awarded and with the HE subject studied. 
There have been a number of studies using a variety of data sources in 
order to estimate the private return to a university first degree in the UK. 
Dearden (1999b), also using NCDS, reports an estimated wage return to 
a degree of 17% for men and of 32% for women, based on OLS, and also 
finds that the conventional OLS estimates are reasonable approximations of 
the true causal impact of higher education on wages. Harkness and Machin 
(1999) examine changes in wage premia to education in the UK between 1974 
and 1995 using data from the General Household Survey (CHS). They report 
time-varying estimates of the wage premium associated with various educa- 
tional qualifications. For the period 1979-81, the estimated wage premia to 
a first degree, relative to A-level qualifications, is 14% for men and 21% for 
women. By the period 1993-95, these estimated premia have risen to 20% 
and 26%, respectively. Harkness and Machin (1999) conclude that despite a 
rise in the relative supply of workers who have a degree in the UK, the fact 
that the return to a degree was rising in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that 
relative demand - for example induced by SBTC - rose faster than relative 
supply. Walker and Zhu (2001), using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from 
1993-2000, estimate the average return to a degree over A-level to be approx- 
imately 25% for men and 30% for women. The return to a first degree was 
20% for men in 1993 and about 26% in 2000, while for women it was 33% 
in 1993 and about 25% in 2000. These figures suggest, therefore, an increase 
over time in the return to HE for men and a decrease for women. 
The differences in the estimates from different studies referring to the 
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same period often stem from the specification adopted which in turn de- 
pends on the nature of the data used. Longitudinal studies, such as those 
based on the NCDS or BCS70, are rich in information on family background, 
ability-related and past educational variables, which are important to ad- 
dress the issue of ability bias and whose inclusion often results in reducing 
the estimated return to education (see Card, 1999, and Blundell et al., 2003, 
among others). For the same reason, the studies using other data sources, 
where these variables are not available (such as the LFS) estimate higher 
returns. Moreover, Heckman et al. (2003) discussing the differences between 
cross-sectional and cohort-based estimates of the return to education, sug- 
gest that the latter should be used when the purpose is to estimate historical 
returns and make comparisons over time, since cohort changes are likely to 
affect the cross-section estimates slowly as more and more individuals from 
the new cohorts enter the labour market. 
In addition to the study of Blundell et al. (2000), a number of other 
studies have also investigated the extent to which returns to a university 
degree vary by subject studied. Because of problems of small cell size, most 
studies consider broad subject groups. Lissenburgh and Bryson (1996) using 
the Youth Cohort Study estimate returns of 9% for Science relative to Arts 
and Social Sciences for both males and females combined. Harkness and 
Machin (1999) find that for men Social Sciences always give the highest wage 
premium with respect to A-level (24.6% in 1995) while Science ensured the 
4 highest premium for women (44.8%). It should be observed that while male 
4 Including controls for age, age squared, dummies for degree subject, teacher status, 
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graduates generally did not have statistically significant wage premia from 
UG degrees in Arts, female Arts graduates earned significantly higher wages 
in all years considered, especially in 1995 when the wage of Arts graduates 
was higher than that of Social Sciences graduates (with premia of 31% and 
23.4%, respectively) . 
Walker and Zhu (2001) use quite disaggregated definition of subjects (13 
in total), but based on their disaggregated estimates, for males (females) in 
1999 the returns with respect to A-level are 19% (41.6%), 23.7% (45.8%) and 
4.3% (20.8%) for Science, Social Sciences and Art and Humanities, respec- 
tively. 5 Therefore, both males and females appear to obtain higher returns 
for Social Sciences degrees. Moreover, women have higher returns than men 
in all degree subjects, and in particular in Arts and Humanities. Neither 
Harkness and Machin (1999) nor Walker and Zhu (2001) control for family 
background variables, and this may have inflated their estimates of the return 
to undergraduate degrees. 
One of the problems facing estimates of returns to degrees by subject 
studied - where degree subject information even exists in the data - is that of 
small cell sizes. This problem is overcome when data from graduate surveys 
are used. There are two sources of such data. First, there are follow-up 
surveys of samples of graduates from the graduating cohorts of 1960,1970, 
region and industry. 
5Science includes Health, Nursing, Science, Maths, Engineering, Arthitecture. Social 
Sciences includes Economics, Law and Social Studies. Art and Humanities includes Lan- 
guage, Education, Art and Combined degrees. Their specification includes controls 
for 
age, age squared and dummies for marital status, race, union status and region. 
138 
1980,1985,1990 and 1995. Each of the cohort samples generates, on average, 
several thousands of observations on graduates and their early labour market 
experiences, including earnings. With these data one can estimate earnings 
premia by degree subject studied. A second source of graduate cohort data 
comes from matching administrative data on the entire population of UK 
university students - as collected formerly by Universities' Statistical Record 
(USR) and now by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) - to the 
information contained in the responses to the first destination survey of all 
graduates. This matched data-set is very rich in information on graduates' 
education (including university, course, degree class, pre-university schooling 
and attainment), personal characteristics and family background. The post- 
university outcome provides information on the graduate's occupation six 
months after graduation. 
Using the follow-up surveys of samples of graduates, Dolton and Make- 
peace (1990) and Dolton et al. (1990) analyse earnings data from the 
1986 survey of one in six of the 1980 UK university graduates. Unlike the 
HESA/USR data, the information on degree, other qualifications and family 
background do not come from administrative data but from personal re- 
call. The 1986 survey generated earnings information for 5,002 graduates. 
Dolton et al. (1990) find significant earnings premia for Science and So- 
cial Sciences students compared to Humanities or Education students. A 
positive wage premium for Mathematics-related degree courses is a common 
finding in studies using the graduate sample follow-ups: see Chevalier et al. 
(2002), Belfield et al. (1997), and Battu et al. (1999) for results pertaining 
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to the 1996 follow-ups of the 1985 and 1990 graduate cohorts. Chevalier et 
al. (2002) analyse 1998 earnings data for a sample of 8,264 graduates from 
the 1995 graduate cohort. They report that relative returns are highest for 
Mathematics (at 29% for men and 19% for women), compared to the field of 
Education studies. They make the important point that differences in rela- 
tive returns across cohorts are to be interpreted with care given differences 
across cohorts in the method of classifying degree subjects. Chevalier et al. 
(2002) provide a comprehensive survey of estimates of returns to HE. 
With respect to differences in returns to a degree according to the degree 
class obtained, Battu et al. (1999), using graduate cohort data, estimate a 
significant log-wage premium associated with a first class over a second class 
degree. Naylor et al. (2003), using HESA-USR data for 39,454 individuals 
responding to the first destination survey of all 1993 graduates, estimate an 
occupational earnings premium of 3.9% (3.6%) for a first class degree rel- 
ative to an upper second class degree for men (women). The premium for 
a first over a third class degree is estimated to be 13.8% for men and 8.9% 
for women. Replicating the analysis on earlier graduate cohorts, Naylor et 
al. (2003) find that the premium for a first class degree has been growing 
over time. It is noticeable that while for the earlier cohorts there was no 
statistically significant premium associated with the class of degree awarded, 
a significant differential has developed and grown over time. One hypothesis 
for this is that as the population of graduates has grown, greater importance 
is attached by employers to the signal emitted by a graduate who has per- 
formed well at university. For a more formal treatment of this hypothesis, 
140 
see Naylor and Smith (2004). 
One focus of the current chapter is to test for corroborating evidence on 
the extent of any degree class premium from a different data source. Using 
BCS70, our attention focuses on a cohort of young people who, typically, 
would have been graduating in the very early 1990s - the period of time for 
which Naylor et al. (2003) estimate significant relative premia for a ýgood' 
degree performance. 
Finally, we note that there has been some work on the extent to which 
returns to degrees vary by institution attended. From first destination survey 
data, Naylor et al. (2003) estimate statistically significant differences, ceteris 
paribus, in occupational earnings across universities. Chevalier and Conlon 
(2003), using data from the follow-up surveys of samples of graduates for 
1985) 1990 and 1995, conclude that graduating from one of the more highly 
regarded UK universities (that is, a Russell Group institution) is associated 
with a wage premium of up to 6% for men, compared to the default case 
of having graduated from a new university. From this estimate, Chevalier 
and Conlon (2003) infer justification for a policy of differentiating fees by 
institution. 
4.3 Data and sample selection 
In this chapter we use data drawn from the BCS70. The BCS70 began in 
1970 when data were collected on the births and families of 17,198 babies 
born in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland between the 5" and 
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the 11th of April of that year. There are currently five complete follow-up 
surveys available: at 5,10ý 16,26 and 30 years after the original survey. In 
this chapter we use data on gross hourly wages collected in the 30-year follow- 
up survey, while family background and individual characteristics come from 
the 10-year follow-up survey. Based on the sample of respondents to the 
30-year follow-up survey (11,261 individuals), and in analogy with Blundell 
et al. (2000, p. F84), we select only individuals who have obtained at least 
one A-level, which is our population of interest, and analyse the return to 
HE qualifications with respect to those individuals who did not complete 
any form of HE. As observed by Blundell et al. (2000), individuals with at 
least one A-level but who did not continue into HE are probably a better 
comparison group for students undertaking undergraduate degree courses 
than for those enrolling in courses leading to a non-degree HE qualification, 
since the latter group usually has non-traditional entry qualifications (i. e. 
different from the standard A-level qualification). The same can be said 
for individuals undertaking postgraduate studies, as they must possess a 
first degree, and for whom individuals with A-levels only are not a very 
good comparison group. This should be kept in mind when interpreting our 
empirical results on, for example, postgraduate students. For these reasons 
in the chapter we focus on the return to undergraduate degrees only. 
Rom our sample of individuals who have at least one A-level (a total 
of 2,755 cases), we primarily focus on those who also replied to the 10-year 
follow-up survey (2,553). This is done since in the estimation of the 
log- 
wage regressions we will include individual and 
family background control 
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variables which are provided by the 10-year follow-up. Among this sub-set 
we choose individuals who worked as employees full-time or part-time (2,092 
individuals) and exclude those individuals with missing data on their gross 
hourly wage (114 cases dropped). In order to maintain the sample size, and 
in analogy with Blundell et al. (2000), individuals with missing values for 
other variables were kept in the data set and missing value dummy variables 
were included in the regressions. The final sample includes 1,978 individuals. 
Since our analysis examines a sample derived from matching the 10-year 
and 30-year follow-up surveys of the BCS70, it is useful to show how our 
sample compares with respect to the 30-year follow-up survey. In Table 4.1 
we report the distribution of educational qualifications and the sample mean 
of gross hourly wages in natural logarithm for various samples. From Table 
4.1 the number of matches between the 30-year and the 10-year follow-up 
surveys is higher than that between the 30-year and the 16-year follow-up 
surveys by about 8.5 percentage points. Together with a higher incidence of 
item-non response in the 16-year wave, this is the main reason for our use of 
family background variables at age 10, along with the availability of an indi- 
cator of 'innate' or 'early' ability (the British Ability Scale score, see Elliot et 
al., 1979) at this age. As can be seen from Table 4.1 the distribution of edu- 
cational qualifications is very similar across samples. This evidence suggests 
that survey non-response and panel attrition, although of non-negligible size, 
might be random with respect to educational qualifications. In relation to 
wages, means are very similar across samples. In particular, the average of 
the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages is 2.270 in the 30-year follow-up, 
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2.267 in the 30-year and 10-year matched sample, 2.267 in the 30-year and 
16-year matched sample and 2.265 in the sample of individuals matched in 
all three waves. 
4.4 OLS, endogeneity and the proxying and 
matching method 
When we estimate the returns to different educational qualifications, we con- 
sider the effect of a multiple treatment, namely educational qualifications, 
denoted as j=1,.. J, on individual wages, wi We consider four differ- 
ent educational qualifications: A-level only (j 1, the reference group), 
Non-degree Higher Education (j = 2), undergraduate (UG, or first) degrees 
(j = 3) and postgraduate (PG, or higher) degrees (j == 4). If we define as 
wi the gross hourly wage of individual i, our model can then be written as 
follows: 
i 
In wi = rnXi +E bj Q, 3 + ui. 
j=2 
where mXj is a linear function of the observed variables Xj, which we will 
refer to as the no-treatment outcome, Qjj are dichotomous variables assum- 
ing value 1 if individual i has as her/his highest educational qualification a 
qualification j and 0 otherwise, and the bj's are the effects of these educa- 
tional qualifications on log-wages, i. e. they are our parameters of interest. 
We abstract for the moment from problems concerning the correct specifi- 
cation of the no-treatment outcome and assume that a linear function is an 
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appropriate representation of the log-wage data generating process, as is the 
usual assumption in most of the existing empirical literature on the returns 
to education. In the case E(ui JXj, Qjj) = 0, the bj parameters can be esti- 
mated without bias using ordinary least squares (OLS, hereafter). Assuming 
no heterogeneity in the returns to education, the Average Treatment on the 
Treated (ATT), the Average Treatment on the Non-Treated (ATNT), and 
the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) all coincide and are recovered by the 
bj 's. 
However, there are several reasons why we may expect a non-zero corre- 
lation between educational qualifications and the error term in the log-wage 
equation. These are outlined, for instance, in Blundell et al. (2003) and 
include: 
1. Ability bias (absolute advantage). We might assume that the error term 
ui in equation (4.1) consists of two components, i. e. ui = ai + Ej, one 
reflecting unobserved earnings capacity (ai), with E(ajjXj, Qjj) :ý0 
and the other some unobserved factors uncorrelated with all covariates 
included in the wage regression E(cjjXj, Qjj) = 0. It is the non-zero 
correlation between unobserved earnings capacity (also referred to in 
the literature as ability) and education which causes the so-called 'abil- 
ity bias'. In particular, we may expect high ability individuals both to 
acquire more education and to earn higher wages. Earnings capacity, 
is observed by the individual but not by the analyst; 
2. Return bias (comparative advantage). The returns to the different edu- 
cational qualifications may not be the homogeneous across individuals. 
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In this case, we will have a distribution of bij's, where j is the subscript 
for the educational qualification and i that for the individual. There is a 
return bias when E(bjjjXj, Qjj = 1) =ý 0, i. e. individuals self-select into 
the different educational qualifications according to their idiosyncratic 
returns, which depend in turn on characteristics that are observable to 
the individual but not to the researcher; 
I Measurement error bias. The educational variables may be measured 
with error. In our case, where education is a categorical variable, mea- 
surement error is non-classical and in general it is not possible to say 
anything on the direction and magnitude of the bias (see Kane et al., 
1999). 
In our analysis in the current chapter, we focus only on the first source of 
bias, i. e. ability bias, and assume the absence of a return bias. Although het- 
erogeneous returns according to unobserved characteristics may exist, there 
is a return bias only if individuals are able to correctly predict their idyo- 
sioncratic gains in the return distribution, that is they know bij, and use this 
information to choose their level or type of educational qualification, which 
is a strong assumption. In this regard, there is an interesting stream of lit- 
erature on students' income expectations. Betts (1996) using US data finds 
that students can predict their starting salaries quite well and better than 
life-time earnings profiles and tend to underestimate wages in fields outside 
their own. He also finds that the most widely used source of information 
for wages are newspapers and magazines, which would suggest a substantial 
homogeneity in income expectations. Dominitz and Manski (1996) find using 
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US data that students are very uncertain about their own future earnings, 
both at ages 30 and 40 and tend to be more uncertain about their earnings 
with a university degree than about earnings with only secondary school. 
The authors also find substantial heterogeneity in students' beliefs about the 
actual earnings distribution. Wolter and Zbinden (2002) use Swiss data and 
find that students' expectations are much closer to actual wages at the time 
of graduation while their prediction errors are higher when considering the 
pattern of wage increase during the first 10 years of their careers. 
Therefore, most studies show that individuals are able to predict more 
accurately their starting wages, while their predictions are much less precise 
for earnings later on in the life-cycle, which we consider in this chapter since 
individuals from the BCS70 with a first degree typically have in 2000 about 
9 years of labour market experience. Blundell et al. (2003) using NCDS 
data find the absence of both an ability and a return bias when interactions 
between educational qualifications and individuals' observed characteristics 
are included in the log-wage equation estimated through OLS. Unfortunately, 
they are able to provide this evidence only in the case of a single treatment 
model (first degree vs. other educational qualification) since the size of their 
sample, which is very similar to ours, does not allow the exploration of hetero- 
geneity of returns with respect to observed characteristics when considering 
a multi-treatment model in a regression framework. ' Finally, we think that 
the third source of bias should be less severe when including educational 
6We tried to interact the educational qualifications with social class, however probably 
due to small cell size the interactions generally turned out not to be statistically significant. 
147 
qualifications, as we do, rather than the number of years of schooling. 
possible approach to tackle endogeneity issues when the data set is 
particularly rich, as in our case, is the so-called proxy and matching method. 
This is the approach followed in Blundell et al. (2000) and in the replication 
of their analysis on BCS70 data reported in section 4.5. This consists of 
including among the individual characteristics Xi factors which might affect 
both the educational qualification achieved and wages, and by proxyIng the 
unobserved component ai with observed factors highly correlated with it, so 
that ui = ci. As observed in Blundell et al. (2000) equation (4.1) can be 
viewed as a form of regression- based linear matching. Thus, the estimates 
presented in sections 4.5 and 4.6 can be argued to have been obtained using 
a method which addresses the issue of ability bias. 
4.5 Comparison with the 1958 British Cohort 
In this section we compare BCS70 and NCDS data, the latter rcfcrring to the 
1958 British cohort - analysed in Blundell et al. (2000). Comparing the 
first 
column of Table 4.1 - with the descriptive statistics reported in Blundell et al. 
(2000, p. F86)' we observe a reduction in both the proportion of pcoplewith 
A-levels not completing any form of HE, and in the proportion of individuals 
'For the simple fact that recall errors should be only ininor for the highest educational 
qualification achieved by age 30. 
8The percentage of men (women) completing non-degree HE, a first degree or a higher 
degree are 21% (25%), 38% (331, ") and 17% (14%), respectively, in the sub-sample of the 
NCDS considered by Blundell ct al. (2000). 
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taking non-degree HE qualifications. We also note a large increase in the 
proportion of individuals completing first degrees, and a slight increase in the 
proportion of people with postgraduate degrees. These figures are consistent 
with the widening access to HE that took place in the UK during the 1980s, 
when graduates of the 1970 British cohort typically entered HE. Our data 
show a particularly marked increase in the supply of female graduates with 
respect to the 1958 cohort. On the basis of the observed increase in the 
number of graduates, we would expect a reduction in the return to a first 
degree, ceteris paribus. However, demand-side forces, working, for example, 
through skill-biased technological change (SBTC) might have counteracted 
this tendency and brought about an increase in the return to a first degree. 
In order to gauge the extent of any change in the return to a first degree 
between the 1958 and the 1970 cohorts, we attempt to replicate the analysis 
in Blundell et al. (2000). We have included the same kind of explanatory 
variables and used the same classification of educational qualifications as 
those underlying the log-wage equations estimated in Blundell et al. (2000), ' 
in order to ensure as high a degree of comparability as possible. Inevitably, 
however, there are some coding and other data differences across the two 
surveyed cohorts. For example, it should be noted that the wage data in the 
BCS70 refers to age 30, while Blundell et al. 's (2000) analysis of NCDS refers 
'PG degree: all higher degree qualifications; UG degree: first degree; Non-degree HE: 
non-degree NVQ Level 4, HNC/HND, BEC/TEC higher, university diploma or certificate, 
professional or nursing qualifications, HE diploma or certificate, C&G full technology 
certificate or insignia award in technology; A-level: A-level qualification, Scottish Higher 
or Scottish Six form college. 
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to age 33. 
Following Blundell et al. (2000) we estimate a gross hourly wage regres- 
sion in natural logarithms using three specifications: 10 
1- including only educational qualification dummies; 
2. including educational qualification dummies, plus British Ability Scales 
score in the non-verbal and verbal questions separately, regional dum- 
mies and school type, all at age 10; 
3. including all the variables in the previous specification, plus family 
background variables at age 10 (parental education, parental social 
class, number of older siblings, number of younger siblings, house own- 
ership), socio-demographic variables (% of children's fathers in social 
class I and % of children's fathers in social classes IV-V in the child's 
school at age 10), school attendance at age 10 (number of missed days of 
school), employer characteristics in 2000 (firm size, union membership 
dummy, private sector dummy). 
The estimates from the three specifications conducted on the BCS70 are 
reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, for men and women respectively, alongside 
the equivalent estimates for the NCDS 1958 cohort reported in Blundell et al. 
(2000), indicated with 1', 2' and 3', respectively. Rom specification 1, males 
with a first degree earn significantly more than those with just A-levels: the 
"We are not able to consider specification 4 in Blundell et al. (2000, p. F91, Box 1) 
since we cannot compute the UCAS score, as A-level grades are not available in the BCS70 
data set. 
150 
wage return is 0.20. This is remarkably close to the point estimate of 0.21 
for the 1958 cohort. In general, the returns to the other types of HE appear 
to have decreased over time. For females, the coefficients of all educational 
dummies are statistically significant. In specification 1, the estimated wage 
return associated with an undergraduate degree is 0.27, compared to an 
estimate of 0.39 for the 1958 cohort. 
Typically, adding control variables leads to reductions in the estimated 
returns to the different HE qualifications. In the most complete specification, 
specification 3, the return to an undergraduate degree turns out to be 0.15 
for males and 0.23 for females. The equivalent figures from the corresponding 
specification in Blundell et al. (2000, p. F90) are 0.17 for men and 0.37 for 
women. 
It appears, then, that while the private return to a first degree for men 
is remarkably similar in the two British cohorts (1958 and 1970), there is a 
striking fall in the return to a first degree for women in the 1970 cohort. For 
men, the results are consistent with the idea that the opposing supply-side 
and demand-side pressures on returns to a first degree have approximately 
balanced each other. We note that the 1970 birth cohort would, typically, 
have graduated in the early 1990s and that their earnings are observed in 
1999/2000. The 1958 cohort would have graduated around 1980 and their 
earnings were observed in 1991. Hence, our results call in to question the 
findings based on US and GHS data of a rise in the return to a degree for 
males during the 1980s and 1990s. Our estimate of a log-wage premium of 
0.20 for males, based on specification 1, is very similar to those reported in 
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our survey of UK evidence in section 2. However, the fact that when we 
introduce other control variables - not typically observed in other datasets - 
in specification 3 the estimate falls to 0.15 suggests that other studies have 
tended to over-estimate the return to a degree for men in the UK. 
For women, our finding that the estimated return to an undergraduate 
degree has fallen between the two cohorts is consistent with results reported 
in Walker and Zhu (2001). There are various interpretations which one could 
put on this. First, we note that the very high estimated returns for female 
graduates in the earlier (NCDS) cohort could be interpreted as arising in 
part from greater gender pay discrimination at lower education levels. Some 
evidence in this direction is provided by Makepeace et al. (1999), who anal- 
ysed the 1948 and the 1958 British cohorts and found a positive effect of the 
Equal Pay Legislation in reducing gender pay gaps and that the reduction 
was relatively higher at the bottom quantiles of the earnings distribution. 
Hence, the legislation was particularly effective in reducing the gender pay 
differential for low paid women, who were also likely to be low educated 
women. If this tendence has continued in recent years, then this would have 
contributed to reducing the estimated return to education also for women 
in the 1970 cohort. Second, we note that the expansion in the number of 
graduates between the two cohorts was a particularly female phenomenon. 
Thus, to the extent that there was a particular shortage of female graduates 
among the 1958 birth cohort, this was likely to have been less true for the 
1970 cohort. Hence, the supply-side shift in the number of graduates was 
much greater for females than for males. To the extent that the graduate 
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labour market is 'gcndcr-neutral', this should not have implication.,., for the 
magnitude of any gender difference in returns to a degree. However, to the 
extent that male and female graduates are either not perfect substitutes or 
do not have equal preferences, then it is likely that the relative incre&se in 
the supply of female graduates will have been associatcd with the observed 
reduction in the gender difference in the return to an undergraduate degree. 
The supply-side argument is sometimes presented as associated with a 
form of over-cducation: see, for example, Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Ilar- 
tog (2000) and Chevalier (2003). Similar findings of an underutilisation of 
graduates' skills in a context of expanding student numbers are reported in 
Rigg et al. (1990), Mason (1995) and Green et al. (1999). We note however 
that the very similar estimated return for men in the 1958 and the 1970 birth 
cohorts, runs counter to a strong version of the over- education hypothesis. 
4.6 Preferred estimates using the proxying 
and matching method 
4.6.1 Return to a first degree 
We have already said that the application of the proxying and matching 
mcthod requires the availability and inclusion among the Xj's of a wide set 
of individual characteristics affecting education and wages. In section 4.5, ()Iir 
choice of specification was dictated by our attempt to replicate the analysis 
of Blundc1l ct al. (2000). In this section, wc present estimates of the return 
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to a degree based on our most preferred specifications for the BCS70 dataset, 
under a proxying and matching approach. 
In particular, we include among the Xi's in the starting specification: 
1. personal characteristics: region of residence at age 10, ethnicity. 
2. family background variables: father's education and social class, 
mother's education and social class, presence of the mother, presence 
of the father, home ownership, family income, number of younger sib- 
lings, number of elder siblings, parental interest in child's education, 
all at age 10. 
3. age 10 school variables: school type at age 10, school attendance at 
age 10, % of children whose father is in social class I (professionals) and 
% of children whose father is in social classes IV-V (partly skilled and 
unskilled, respectively) in the school attended at age 10. 
4. ability at age 10: score in the verbal and non-verbal sections of the 
British Ability Scales questionnaire, as proxies for verbal and quanti- 
tative innate (or early) ability. 
Therefore, we included most of the variables already included in the repli- 
cation reported in the previous section but unlike Blundell et al. (2000) we 
did not include employer characteristics for two main reasons. Firstly, they 
may be endogenous, i. e. choice variables for the individual and jointly 
de- 
termined with wages. Secondly, employer characteristics may be affected 
by 
educational qualifications, and by excluding them we estimate the 'overall' 
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effect of education, both on wages and on the likelihood of working for cer- 
tain types of employers (see for instance Blundell et al., 2003, and Pereira 
and Martins, 2004). 
We firstly estimated the model including all factors 1-4 above in the 
sample of matched individuals from the 30-year and the 10-year follow-up 
surveys and performed some F-tests for the significance of the various groups 
of variables. After selecting a 'parsimonious' specification (specification 1), 
by keeping the groups of regressors statistically significant or only marginally 
not significant at the 10% level, we also estimated additional specifications 
which include past educational variables available from the 30-year follow-up 
survey. " Specifically, specification 11 adds: 
S (Supplementary), A (Advanced) and AS (Advanced Supplementary) 
level information (i. e. age 18 educational variables): including the 
number of S-, A- and AS-levels in various categories (A-C and D-E for 
S- and A-levels and A-C and D-G for AS-levels), obtained from the 
30-year follow-up survey. 
0 (Ordinary) levels, CSE's (Certificate of Secondary Education), 
GCSE's (General Certificate of Secondary Education) information (i. e. 
age 16 educational variables): including the number of O-levels, CSE's 
and GCSE's levels divided by grades (A-C, D-E for O-levels and 
GCSE's and 1,2-5 for CSE's), obtained from the 30-year follow-up 
survey. 
"The results of the F-tests are available upon request. 
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Including past educational variables may be important, since secondary 
school educational performance is likely to affect both individualsý demand 
for HE, i. e. the selection into educational qualifications) and wages. However, 
these variables, being based on retrospective questions, may be affected by a 
recall bias. 
All results are shown in Table 4.4. In the parsimonious specification the 
wage return to a UG degree is about 0.19 for men. Adding past educa- 
tional variables (specification II) reduces the return to 0.14. For men, the 
estimate of 0.19 is slightly higher that that reported in Table 2 for spec- 
ification 3. However, as we have commented, specification 3 controls for 
employer characteristics whose effect is generally to reduce the coefficient on 
the educational qualifications. For women, the parsimonious specification, 
specification 1, produces an estimate of the return to a degree of 0.23 - the 
same as that reported under specification 3 in Table 2. Thus, for women, 
there is little impact from the inclusion of employer characteristics in the cs- 
timated equation. Specification II, however, produces an estimated return of 
0.18. We conclude from our most parsimonious specification that the return 
for an undergraduate degree in the UK for the 1970 birth cohort was 0.19 for 
men and 0.23 for women. The inclusion of additional secondary education 
variables causes these estimates to fall to 0.14 and 0.18 for men and women, 
respectively. 
Thus, in general, including past educational variables reduces the csti- 
mated return to a first degree. This comes as little surprise since individuals 
are likely to decide whether to continue in HE in part on the basis of their past 
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educational performance. Moreover, HE institutions also select potential stu- 
dents on the basis of their pre-university educational performance. In both 
cases, therefore, we expect a positive correlation between secondary school 
performance variables and the highest educational qualification achieved, and 
accordingly a reduction in the return to a first degree. A surprising thing 
is perhaps the fact that both HE dummies and past educational variables 
are statistically significant, representing therefore distinct sources of wage 
variation. However, this may be an artifact of the specific functional forni 
chosen for the no-treatment outcome, in particular the constraint that the 
Xj's have the same effect on the outcome (log-wage) for both the treated 
and the non-treated. " We will return to this issue in section 4.8. It must be 
noted that, as with the HE qualifications dummies, past educational qualifi- 
cations may be affected by the same problems of endogeneity, i. e. correlation 
with individuals' unobserved earnings capacity, but this is the main reason 
why they are included in the log-wage regression following the proxy and 
matching approach. 
4.6.2 Differences by degree class 
In the previous section we have considered UG degree education as a homoge- 
neous good. However, students may be more or less successful in completing 
their UG studies. In particular, previous work has shown the positive effect 
of a 'good' degree performance on graduates' earnings. Battu et al. (1999) 
"For instance the effect of past educational variables on wages may be significant only 
for individuals with only A-level qualifications. 
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using data on two cohorts of graduates (from 1985 and 1990) found a posi- 
tive log-wage premium of a first class honours degree with respect to upper 
and lower second class degrees (for females in 1985 and 1990 and males in 
1990) on graduates' earnings one year after graduation. Furthermore, the 
degree premium associated with a 'first' turned out to be always significant 
six years after graduation, for both males and females and for both cohorts 
of graduates. 13 
Similar evidence of an important role of degree class is also obtained by 
Naylor et al. (2003), using USR data for several cohorts of university leaN'Crs 
(from 1985/6 to 1993/4). The authors found, for instance, a significant 
positive premium, growing over time, associated with a first class degree on 
first destination occupational earnings of UK graduates. Neither the Battu 
et al. (1999) nor Naylor et al. (2003) papers are able to address the issue 
of returns to degrees relative to non-graduate outcomes as these studies are 
based on graduate data only, with no control group of non-graduates. 
The BCS70 provides degree class for UG degrees, and here we are able to 
investigate differences in the return to an UG degree according to the class of 
degree awarded. In particular, in order to avoid small cell size problems we 
consider only two broad degree classes: 'good' degrees (first class or upper 
second class honour degrees) and 'lower' degree classes. This distinction is 
also suggested by the common practice of some employers of conditioning 
job offers on the attainment of a 'good' degree result. 
13Battu et al. (1999) control for several individual characteristics which include the 
change of region, degree class, firm size, being self-employed and others. 
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The estimation results are shown in Table 4.5.14 We base the analysis 
on specifications I and II from the previous section of the chapter, replacing 
the dummy variable for obtaining an undergraduate degree with two dummy 
variables: one for obtaining a 'good' degree class and one for obtaining a lower 
degree class. For males, compared to an average return to an undergradu- 
ate degree of 0.19 (see Table 4.4) the estimated returns to a 'good' degree 
and lower degree classifications are 0.24 and 0.15, respectively - when con- 
trols for past educational qualifications are not included -a difference which 
is marginally significant at the 10% level. Adding past educational coritrol 
variables again reduces the return to a 'good' degree to 0.19 and to 0.11 for a 
lower degree classification. An F-test for the equality of the return to differ- 
ent degree classes cannot now be rejected at conventional significance levels. 
Hence, our point estimates show a substantial distance between the log-wage 
premia to 'good' and to lower degree classifications, although the effects are 
not very precisely estimated, probably due to small cell sizes. Again, the 
change in the point estimates when including secondary school variables is in 
the direction we would have expected given the positive correlation between 
secondary school performance and performance in HE. 
For females, compared to an average return to a first degree of 0.23 (see 
Table 4.4) the returns to a 'good' degree and a lower degree class are 0.26 
and 0.18, respectively, when past educational variables are not included -a 
difference which is significant at the 5% level. Inclusion of past educational 
variables reduces the size of the wage return to 'good' and a lower degree 
14 The sample size falls to 957 for men since 4 individuals did not report degree class. 
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class to 0.21 and 0.14, a difference which remains significant at the 10% level. 
Thus, our evidence supports findings by Battu et al. (1999) and Naylor et 
al. (2003) of variation in the returns to degrees according to the graduate's 
level of academic performance at university. 
4.6.3 Differences by degree subject 
In this section, we consider another possible source of heterogeneity in the 
return to UG degrees: the degree subject studied. Here, we are only able 
to consider some broad aggregations of subjects studied because of the size 
of our sample. We focus on the following aggregation of subjects: Sciences 
(includes: Medicine and Dentistry, Subjects Allied to Medicine, Biological 
Sciences, Agriculture, Physical Sciences, Mathematical Sciences, Computing, 
Engineering, Technology and Architecture), Social Sciences (includes Social 
Studies, Law and Politics, Business and Mass Communications), Art and 
Humanities (includes Classics and Literature, Modern European Languages, 
Other Languages, Creative Arts, Education and Other) 
Table 4.6 shows our estimates-15 For men our estimated returns for the 
different subjects are not very different from those of Walker and Zhu (2001). 
Compared to an average return to a first degree of 0.19 estimated in Table 4.4, 
Social Sciences have the highest wage return (0.26), and Art and Humanities 
the lowest wage return (0.12), which is not statistically different from zero 
at the 5% level. Adding controls for past educational variables reduces the 
15The sample size falls to 930 for men and 996 for women since we 
dropped the individ- 
uals who did not report degree subject. 
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estimated return to a first degree irrespective of subjects. However, their 
relative positions in terms of return do not change. F-tests for the equality 
of returns across all degree subjects cannot be rejected at the conventional 
statistical levels of significance, However, when considering Social Sciences 
vs Art and Humanities, the difference is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
For women, we observe the same ordering of subjects as for men, although 
the spread of the estimates around the average return of 0.23 estimated in 
Table 4.4 is much tighter, with Social Sciences having the highest Nvage return 
(0.25), and Art and Humanities the lowest return (0.18). When including 
secondary school variables the relative order of subjects remains unchanged, 
however the fall in the estimated returns is generally bigger than in the case 
of men. In neither case are the subject returns estimated precisely enough 
to make the differences statistically significant. However, as for males, the 
return to Social Sciences seems to be some distance apart from that of the 
other two subject groups. It is interesting to observe that unlike for men, 
women with a first degree in Art and Humanities earn significantly more 
than those with A-levels only, findings that is in line with Harkness and 
Machin (1999) and seems to suggest that women might self-select into Art 
and Humanities since they have comparative advantages with respect to men. 
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4.7 An alternative approach to endogeneity: 
the control function approach 
In the previous sections, we addressed the issue of potential endogencitY bia. ", 
in estimating the return to a degree and used an approach based on a prox- 
yZng and matching method. The idea underlying the proxyiny and matcliii? y 
method is to proxy the unobserved characteristics, which may cause cildo- 
gencity problems, with highly correlated observed characteristics. Although 
the BSC70 data set is very rich in information concerning family background, 
past education and ability-rclated variables, nothing really prevents the pos- 
sibility that even after controlling for these characteristics there might still 
be some other omitted variables responsible for some residual correlation 
between the educational qualification dummies and the error term in the 
log-wage equation. 
A possible alternative approach to the issue of endogeneity, associated 
with the selection into educational qualifications through unobservables, is 
the control function approach (CFA hereafter, see Heckman and Robb, 1985). 
The CFA consists of simultaneously modelling both the process of educational 
attainment and the process of generating wages. In particular, let us assume 
that educational qualifications are achieved according to the following pro- 
cess: 
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Qil: -, -,.,: '(Qi*j < A, ) 
Qi2 : --I (/-Il :5 Qjj < P2) 
Qi3 :ý Qi*j < A3) 
QA ý--I(Qi*j ý-ý* A3) (4.2) 
with Qj*j = BVj + vi, where Qj*j is a latent educational variable and Vi some 
covariates affecting educational attainment, with E(vjjVj) = 0. The pj's are 
some parameters (thresholds) to be estimated. 
If we assume that: 
(vi, ui) N2 
(0 
p or 07 
P17 
then it is straightforward to show that by including conditional mean terms 
or 4control functions' in equation (4.1) it is possible to obtain consistent 
estimates of the bj's by running OLS on the following augmented regression: 
ii 
In wi =mXi +E bj Qij +E E(ui I Qij = 1) + LL)i 
j=2 j=l 
ii 
=mXi +E bjQij + 1: por, \ijQij + wi 
j=2 j=l 
ii 
=mXi + 1: bjQij + pa 
E, \ijQij + wi (4.3) 
j=2 j=l 
where 
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E(uj Ivi < cli) = por poAjj if Qil = 
E(uilcli Vi < C20 = por 
O(Cli)- O(C20 
E(uilQij = 1) = 
C2i ý- 4(Cli) = PO'A2i if Qi2 = 
E( 0 C2i -O(C3i) = UiIC2i Vi < C30 =P POrA3i if Qi3 = C30 - 4)(Cýi) 
O(C3i E(uilvi C30 = POr - porA4i if Qt4 = 
and cli = p, - BVj, C2i = A2- BVj andC3i = A3- BVj and E(wi I Xj, Qjj, Aj) 
o. 16 
Given the coefficient restriction on the artificial regressors Ajj's, estimat- 
ing equation (4.3) is equivalent to estimating the following: 
i 
In wi = rnXi + 1: bjQij + porAi + wi (4.4) 
j=2 
where Ai = Ejj.. =1 
AjjQjj. Hence in equation (4.4) it is sufficient to include only 
one conditional mean term. The 'generalised residual' Ai is estimated from 
an ordered probit model of equation (4.2). Although the model is formally 
identified by the non-linearity of the education equation, it is usually thought 
that exclusion restrictions are necessary in order not to rely exclusively on 
functional form. Therefore, an 'economic' identification requires that at least 
one variable included in the education equation (i. e., in Vj) is excluded from 
the log-wage equation (i. e., from Xj). 
In the following sections we use the CFA to estimate the log-wage pre- 
mia to different educational qualifications and to different levels of degree 
performance. 
"See also Vella and Verbeek (1999) on how to model and estimate endogenous treatment 
effects. 
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We use as identifying variables some variables that were not significant 
in the log-wage equation estimated with OLS but that previous research has 
shown to be highly correlated with children's education: parents' educational 
qualifications (see Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001a, and Chavalier and Lanot, 
2002, among the others). " In particular, in the light of the fact the father's 
education turned out to be significant in women's wages, we use father's 
education for men and mother's education for women following therefore a 
'gender role model' approach. Some recent evidence supporting a stronger 
parents' effect on children's education for same-sex parents is provided by 
Chevalier (2004), for instance. For both men and women we use a parsimo- 
nious specification of the ordered probit model including only age 18 and age 
16 educational variables and the indentifying variables (father's highest edu- 
cational qualification for men and mother's highest educational qualification 
for women). 
The CFA offers a direct test for the endogeneity (or self-selection through 
unobservables), which can also be interpreted as a specification test in the 
spirit of Heckman's (1979) seminal paper. In particular, the absence of en- 
dogeneity can be tested by testing whether the coefficient of the generalised 
17However, if education is endogenous the coefficients on the educational dummies as well 
as those on the other regressors, including the candidate 'instruments', will be affected 
by the 'endogeneity bias'. For this reason we replicate the test of significance of the 
instruments on the log-wage equation estimated with the CFA and without exclusion 
restrictions and report them in Table 4.8. Since the model using the CFA is identified 
without exclusion restrictions, through the functional form, the endogeneity problem is 
formally addressed and the coefficients on the instruments are consistent. 
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residual (i. e. pa) equals zero. Implicitly, what the test says is whether the 
omitted variables in the log-wage equation, entering ui, and in the education 
equation, entering vi, are correlated or not, and therefore whether or not 
the educational qualifications dummies are correlated with ui. If they are 
not correlated the log-wage equation (4.1) should be estimated using OLS, 
otherwise OLS should be applied on equation (4.4). Thus the t-test on the 
coefficient of the generalised residual can also be interpreted as a test for 
the omission of variables correlated with educational qualifications from the 
log-wage equation, i. e. as a test for omitted variables. 
Table 4.7 shows the estimation results from the CFA for both males and 
females. In the light of the significance of the past educational qualifications 
on the log-wage shown in tables 4.4 and 4.5, we estimated only specification 
II, including both age 18 and age 16 educational variables. Table 4.7 reports 
the results of F-tests for the significance of the identifying variables. Our 
'instruments' do not appear to be 'weak': 18 parents' educational qualifica- 
tions are generally highly significant in the selection equation (the ordered 
probit) but not in the log-wage equation. In all cases the coefficient of the 
generalised residual is not significant, showing the absence of an endogeneity 
problem. 
We used the same framework (i. e. two-stage estimation of the log-wage 
equation with a selection equation estimated through an ordered probit) to 
test the potential endogeneity of degree class. In particular, the generalised 
residual was estimated using an ordered probit with five categories (in in- 
18Such a test is suggested in Bound et al. (1995). 
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creasing order: A-level, Non-degree HE, lower degree class, 'good'degree, PG 
degree). Table 4.8 reports the results. We used the same identifying vari- 
ables employed to address the endogeneity of the educational qualifications, 
and found them to be generally valid, as the F-tests suggest. As we also 
saw for the educational qualifications, there is no evidence of an endogene- 
ity problem: the coefficient of the generalised residual is never statistically 
significant. 
Unfortunately, our data are not sufficiently rich to permit convincing tests 
for the potential endogeneity of degree subjects, along the lines suggested by 
Lee (1983). We would need variables affecting subject choice but not wages. 
Parents' education appears to be a much less appropriate instrument for the 
choice of degree subject than for the level of education or degree performance. 
Moreover, past educational variables, which are likely to affect the type of 
subject chosen appear to have a significant impact also on wages and therefore 
are not suitable instruments. 
Hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that our estimates of degree sub- 
ject returns may be affected by a selection bias. However, we do conclude 
that there is no evidence of ability bias in the estimation of either the return 
to educational qualifications or to degree class. Individuals do not seem to 
self-select into educational qualifications according to their earnings capac- 
ity; in other words, individuals who expect to earn more do not necessarily 
acquire more education or have a better degree performance. 
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4.8 The case of heterogeneous returns 
Our previous analysis suggests the absence of an ability bias both in the es- 
timation of the returns to a degree and in that for returns by class of degree. 
However, as in the case of selection exclusively on observables, OLS estimates 
will recover the unbiased ATT only if the no-treatment outcome has beeii 
correctly specified (i. e. the model is correctly specified in terms of the covari- 
ates included and the functional form chosen) and if the treatment effect is 
homogeneous across individuals with different observed characteristics (i. e. 
treatment has only an intercept and not a slope effect). A method that allows 
us to relax these assumptions is the estimation of average treatment effects 
based on propensity score matching (PSM). A description of the method can 
be found in Becker and Ichino (2002). In this section we estimate the return 
to a first degree using propensity score matching. 
Let us define Xi as a vector of variables affecting both educational quali- 
fications and wages, Qj the treatment variable that equals one for the treated 
and zero for the non-treated (in our case it will be the dummy for having 
a first degree) and wl, and w0i the log-wage for individual 1 in the case of 
treatment and no-treatmcnt, respectively. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) the propensity score is defined as: 
p(Xi) =- PrfQi = ljXjj = EfQilXil, (4.5) 
i. e. the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment 
characteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the following two 
hypotlic, ses hold: 
168 
1. Balancing hypothesis: If p(Xi) is the propensity score, then Qj I 
Xi IPA); 
2. Unconfoundedness hypothesis: Suppose that assignment to treatment 
is unconfounded, " Le. w1j, woi -L 
QjjXj. Then assignment to treatment 
is unconfounded given the propensity score, i. e. w1j, woi 1 Qjjp(Xj); 
then the Average Treatment effect on the 'fteated (ATT) can be estimated 
as follows: 
ATT = Efwli - woilQi = 11 
= EfElwli - woilQi = i, p(Xi)}l 
=EfEfwlilQi=l, p(Xi)I-EfwoilQi=O, p(Xi)}IQi=l}. (4.6) 
In our case propensity score matching and ATT are implemented using 
the procedures pscore and attnd created by Becker and Ichino (2002), the 
latter using as options Nearest Neighbour Matching with replacement and a 
probit model to compute propensity scores. The procedure pscore also offers 
some diagnostics for the balancing property. Both for males and females, the 
balancing property was satisfied for all variables used for the computation 
of the propensity score. Standard errors for the ATT were computed using 
bootstrap and 500 replications. Table 4.9 reports the OLS estimates of the 
return to a first degree using the specification II in section 4.4 for the com- 
putation of the propensity scores, on the common support sample, in order 
19This hypothesis is also called the Conditional Independence Assumption, i. e. selection 
only on observables, and cannot be tested within the PSM-ATT framework. 
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to assess the impact of the potential lack of common support. For males the 
ATT computed is 0.12, not statistically significant at the conventional levels, 
and lower than that computed in section 4.6.1 using OLS that was 0.14. Lack 
of common support does not seem to be a problem, since more than 99% of 
observations fall in the common support . 
20 The OLS estimates in the com- 
mon support are very similar to the ATT computed using propensity score 
matching showing that for males a linear specification of the no-treatment 
outcome and the hypothesis of homogeneity of treatment effects are reason- 
able assumptions. The effect estimated is slightly lower than that reported 
in section 4.6.1. The difference is probably due to the fact that here we are 
considering only the sample of individuals with A-levels or a first degree, i. e. 
the two groups of individuals who are more directly comparable (see section 
4.3). This suggests a careful choice of the control group when assessing the 
impact of the treatment outcome in order to ensure that the treated and 
control groups are as similar as possible. Furthermore, for women, the lack 
of common support also appears not to be a major problem, and again the 
estimated effect is lower than that in section 4.6.1. For females the estimated 
effect from the PSM-ATT procedure is 0.15, statistically significant at 5%, 
and lower than that obtained using OLS that was 0.18. 
20This is the percentage of observations whose propensity score belongs to the inter- 
section of the supports of the propensity score of treated and control observations. The 
problem of 'lack of common support' arises when the intersection of the two supports, of 
the treated and untreated groups, is very small, suggesting that treated and untreated 
individuals have very different observed characteristics and are not easily comparable. 
170 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have estimated the return to a first degree using data 
from the 1970 British cohort (BCS70). In order to tackle the issue of poten- 
tial endogeneity of educational qualifications we have used the proxying and 
matching method that consists of including in the log-wage equation factors 
affecting both educational attainment and wages. This approach may be a 
viable solution to the possible endogeneity problem given that the data set 
used is very rich in information related to family background, ability related 
variables and past educational performance. We have replicated the analysis 
of Blundell et al. (2000) on BCS70 and have shown that while the return 
to a first degree is largely unchanged for men belonging to the 1958 and 
the 1970 cohorts, the return for women has declined substantially over the 
two cohorts. We estimate the wage return to be 0.15 for men and 0.23 for 
women in the 1970 cohort compared to 0.17 and 0.37, respectively, for the 
1958 cohort. Our own preferred specifications for the 1970 cohort leads to 
an estimated return to a degree of 0.19 for men and 0.23 for women not 
controlling for secondary school performance, and 0.14 and 0.18 for men and 
women, respectively when controlling for it. 
We have also analysed differences in returns according to both degree 
class and degree subjects. Our estimates show the existence of a positive 
additional log-wage premium for 'good' degrees compared to lower 
degree 
classifications. For both men and women, the premium for a 'good' 
degree 
over a poor degree is about 8 percentage points. However, our estimates are 
not very precise, probably because of relatively small cell sizes, and 
in our 
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samples the hypothesis of no difference between degree classes can be rejected 
at the 10% level only for women when the full set of controls is included. 
Our results qualitatively confirm previous findings by Battu et al. (1999) 
and Naylor et al. (2003) who also found wage premia, for a 'good' degree 
performance, using larger samples where the effects can be more precisely 
estimated, albeit without information on a non-graduate control group. Our 
analysis of log-wage differences by degree subjects also confirms findings from 
related work. As far as the ranking of subjects is concerned, for instance, we 
have in decreasing order: Social Sciences, Sciences and Art and Humanities, 
both for men and women (compared with Walker and Zhu, 2001). Moreover, 
Art and Humanities degrees give a positive return (relative to workers with 
A-levels) only to women (compared with Harkness and Machin, 1999). Al- 
though our estimates suggest the presence of differences in degree subjects, 
the effects are not precisely estimated and only the difference between Social 
Sciences and Art and Humanities appear statistically significant for males. 
We have also tested for the presence of endogencity in our estimates of 
the return to a first degree and to degree class using the control function 
approach. In both cases the hypothesis of an absence of endogencity could 
not be rejected by our data. This is perhaps not a very surprising result 
since in the present chapter we consider a sample of individuals who 
have 
attained at least an A-level education. Once we have controlled 
for several 
family and individual characteristics including early academic ability, this 
sample is likely to be relatively homogeneous with respect to unobserved 
characteristics. 
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Finally, we have explored the issue of the heterogeneity of returns to a 
first degree by observed household and individual characteristics, other than 
degree class and degree subject, and the adequacy of the linear specifica- 
tion using a Propensity Score Matching-Average Týeatment Effect approach. 
Our results suggest that when estimating the return to a first degree and con- 
sidering as the control group individuals with A-levels only, the absence of 
common support is not an issue and that the linear specification and the ho- 
mogeneity of treatment effects does not seem to be too strong an assumption 
in our sample. 
In conclusion, our estimates suggest that for males, the return to a uni- 
versity degree in the UK is remarkably similar across the 1970 birth cohort - 
typically graduating in the early 1990s - and the 1958 birth cohort, typically 
graduating in 1979 or 1980. This is despite the significant changes taking 
place in UK HE during the 1980s. In contrast, our estimates suggest that 
the return to a degree for females fell considerably across the two cohorts. 
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Table 4-4: Estimates of the log-wage premia (wage 'returns) to a first degree 
(BCS70) - OLS 
Specification 
Return to Il 
UG degree Coef. S. C. Cod. S. C. 
Men 
UG degree 0.189 0.039 0.142 *** 0.042 
F-test A-level info. (p-value) 0.004 
F-test O-level info. (p-value) 0.003 
N. obs. 961 961 
R2 0.092 0.125 
Women 
UG degree 0.229 0.033 0.180 *** 0.035 
F-test A-level info. (p-value) 0.056 
F-test O-level info. (p-value) 0.009 
N. obs. 17017 1,017 
R20.133 0.165 
Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages. 
Specifications I also includes for men: region of residence, British ability scales 
scores (both quantitative and non quantitative), school type and father's social 
class. Specification I includes for women: region of residence, British ability scales 
scores (both quantitative and non quantitative), school type and father's educa- 
tion. Specification II includes all the controls of specification I and controls for age 
16 and age 18 secondary school performance. The regressors included in specifi- 
cation I were chosen by performing F-tests on the general specification including 
all controls listed in section 4.6-1. Robust standard errors for the presence of het- 
croskedasticity in parentheses. 'Significant at the 1% level; "significant at the 
5% level; *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.5: Estimates of the log-wage premia (wage 'returns') by degree class 
(BCS70) - OLS 
Specification 
Return to Il 
UG degree class Coef. s. e. Coef. s. e. 
Men 
'Good' degree 0.239 0.050 0.187 0.051 
Lower degree class 0.153 0.044 0.112 0.047 
F-test A-level info. (p-value) 0.004 
F-test O-level info. (p-value) 0.005 
F-test 'good'=Iower (p-value) 0.101 0.145 
N. obs 957 957 
R2 0.095 0.127 
Women 
'Good' degree 0.262 0.037 0.211 Ob38 
Lower degree class 0.183 0.041 0.142 0.041 
F-test A-level info. (p-value) 0.061 
F-test O-level info. (p-value) 0.010 
F-test 'good'=Iower (p-value) 0.046 0.071 
N. obs 1,017 1,017 
R2 0.137 0.168 
Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages. 
Specifications I also includes for men: region of residence, British ability scales 
scores (both quantitative and non quantitative), school type and father's social 
class. Specification I includes for women: region of residence, British ability scales 
scores (both quantitative and non quantitative), school type and father's educa- 
tion. Specification II includes all the controls of specification I and controls for age 
16 and age 18 secondary school performance. The regressors included in specifi- 
cation I were chosen by performing F-tests on the general specification including 
all controls listed in section 4.6.1. Robust standard errors for the presence of het- 
eroskedasticity in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level; "significant at the 
5% level; *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.6: Estimates of the log-wage premia (wage 'returns') by degree sub- 
ject (BCS70) - OLS 
Return to I 
Specification 
li 
UG degree subject Coef. s. e. Coef. s. e. 
Men 
Sciences 0.192 0.046 0.131 0.050 
Social sciences 0.259 0.059 0.212 0.060 
Art and Humanities 0.117 0.066 0.082 0.065 
F-test A-level info. (p-value) 0.004 
F-test O-level info. (p-value) 0.005 
F-test Science = Social Sciences (p-value) 0.272 0.179 
F-test Science = Art and Hum. (p-value) 0.269 0.449 
F-test Social Sciences = Art and Hum. (p-value) 0.067 0.084 
F-test all subjects equal (p-value) 0.184 0.205 
N. obs 930 930 
R2 0.099 0.132 
Women 
Sciences 0.208 0.039 0.136 0.040 
Social Sciences 0.246 0.052 0.185 0.053 
Art and Humanities 0.181 0.043 0.121 0.043 
F-test A-level info. (p-value) 0.018 
F-test O-level info. (p-value) 0.005 
F-test Science = Social Sciences (p-value) 0.456 0.343 
F-test Science = Art and Hum. (p-value) 0.536 0.231 
F-test Social Sciences = Art and Hum. (p-value) 0.221 0.724 
F-test all subjects equal (p-value) 0.472 0.479 
N. obs 996 996 
R2 0.136 0.174 
Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages. 
Specifications I also includes for men: region of residence, British ability scales 
scores (both quantitative and non quantitative), school type and father's social 
class. Specification I includes for women: region of residence, British ability scales 
scores (both quantitative and non quantitative), school type and father's educa- 
tion. Specification II includes all the controls of specification I and controls for age 
16 and age 18 secondary school performance. The regressors included in specifi- 
cation I were chosen by performing F-tests on the general specification including 
all controls listed in section 4.6.1. Robust standard errors for the presence of het- 
eroskedasticity in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level; "significant at the 
5% level; *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.7: Estimates of the log-wage premia (wage 'returns') for an UG 
degree (BCS70) - CFA 
Specification II 
Return to 
UG degree Coef 
Men Women 
S. C. Coef. S. C. 
UG degree 
po, 
N. obs. 
R2 
F-test father's education (p-value) 
- Education equation 
- Log-wage equation 
F-test mother's education (p-value) 
- Education equation 
- Log-wage equation 
0.000 
0.756 
Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages. 
Specifications II includes all the controls listed in section 4.6.1. Standard errors 
are bootstrapped with 500 replications since the model is estimated in two stages. 
'Significant at the 1% level; "significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% 
level. 
0.143 0.044 0.176 0.035 
-0.0003 0.0069 0.0001 0.0004 
961 1,017 
0.126 0.165 
0.015 
0.726 
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Table 4.8: Estimates of the log-wage premia (wage 'returns') by degree class 
(BCS70) - CFA 
Specification Il 
Return to 
UG degree Coef 
Men Women 
s. e. Coef. s. e. 
'Good' degree 
Lower degree class 
po, 
N. obs. 
R2 
F-test father's education (p-value) 
- Education equation 
- Log-wage equation 
F-test mother's education (p-value) 
- Education equation 
- Log-wage equation 
0.000 
0.707 
Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages. Stan- 
dard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications since the model is estimated in 
two stages. 'Significant at the 1% level; "significant at the 5% level; *significant 
at the 10% level. 
0.186 0.052 0.211 0.037 
0.112 0.044 0.142 0.043 
0.0002 0.0035 0.0014 0.0017 
957 11017 
0.128 0.1685 
0.014 
0.719 
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Table 4.9: Estimates of the log-wage premia (wage'returns') using PS. NI-ATT 
(BCS70) 
Specification 11 
Return to 
UG degree 
Men Women 
N-obs. Coef. s. e. N. obs Coef. s. e. 
PSM-ATT (a) 672 0.123 0.074 664 0.149 0.071 
OLS on common support 672 0.125 0.043 664 0.158 0.036 
OLS 675 0.124 0.043 669 0.161 0.036 
PSM diagnostics 
% obs. in common support 99.56 99.25 
Balancing property (b) OK OK 
Probit pseudo R2 
(c) 0.170 0.244 
Note. The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages. (a) Av- 
erage Treatment on the Treated (ATT) computed using Propensity Score Match- 
ing (PSM), in particular Nearest Neighbour Matching with replacement, see Becker 
and Ichino (2002). Bootstrapped standard errors (since propensity scores are esti- 
mated using a probit model), 500 replications. M test for the balancing property, 
see Becker and Ichino (2002), in particular the balancing property is not rejected 
only in the case it holds for every single variable using to compute the propensity 
score. (1) Pseudo R2 of the probit model used to compute the propensity scores, 
which includes all the explanatory variables listed in specification II in section 
4.6.1. 'Significant at the 1% level; "significant at the 5% level; *significant at 
the 10% level. 
1 ý,: 3 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Main findings 
In this Thesis we investigate the determinants of two distinct cducational 
choices in the UK, the choice to enroll in post-compulsory education and that 
of enrolling in different degree subjects at the undergraduate level, and one 
of the consequences of the choice to acquire a university education, namely 
the wage return to a first degree, to different degree subjects and to different 
levels of degree performance. 
The decision to enroll in post-compulsory education is the first educa- 
tional choice that an individual faces in the UK. This choice has important 
consequences in terms of future labour market outcomes. In chapter two we 
investigate the role of an individual's family background, particularlY Ills/her 
parciits' income, on the decision of staying-on at school at age 16 u-sing data 
from the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70). With respect to the previ- 
184 
ous literature our main innovations are: 1) the use of the grouped income 
variable provided by the BCS70, which has been converted into a continuous 
variable using interval regression techniques, while the other paper using the 
BCS70 and a continuous measure of income we are aware of, Blanden and 
Gregg (2004), uses income imputed from the Family Expenditure Survey; 
2) an attempt to address the issue of endogeneity of family income using 
Instrumental Variables techniques, in particular we seek to identify exoge- 
nous variations of family income using parents' industry of employment and 
grandfathers' social class, following Shea (2000) and Maurin (2002); 3) an in- 
vestigation of the issue of the effects of income non response on the estimate 
of the effect of family income. Our main findings suggest that even when all 
these issues are addressed, family income has only a very limited impact on 
children's staying-on decisions, while other family influences, such as those 
running through parents' education, social class and proxies of parenting 
quality (e. g. parental interest in a child's education) are much stronger. We 
also observe that our findings do not necessarily contrast with the recent 
experimental evidence supporting the effectiveness of the Education Mainte- 
nance Allowances (EMAs, such as Ashworth et al. 2002), since we estimate 
the effect of unconditional transfers in family income that are very different 
from the EMAs. 
Chapter three contains an analysis of the decision to enroll in different 
degree subjects in the UK. In this chapter we use data from the Universi- 
ties' Statistical Record (USR) 1981-1991. This topic is very important given 
the differences in graduates' labour market outcomes by degree subject. We 
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introduce a behavioural model that suggests that the unobserved factors af- 
fecting the utilities that an individual derives from different degree subjects 
are likely to be correlated and that an econometric model allowing for this 
correlation, such as a multinomial probit model, is likely to offer several ad- 
vantages with respect to models based on the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) assumption. We consider the decision to enroll in three 
groups of subjects: Quantitative, Non- Quantitative and Law and Medicine 
and focus in particular on the effect of social class. Both economists and so- 
ciologists postulate important social class influences on the choice of degree 
subject that might have important implications in terms of intergencrational 
mobility. We estimated a trinomial probit model for each of the eleven years 
considered, and do not find any statistically significant social class difference 
in the likelihood of enrolling in the different subject groups. Our sensitiv- 
ity analysis suggests that this is not the result of the particular grouping 
of subjects adopted or of the econometric model chosen. The main expla- 
nation for the absence of social class differences may stem from the specific 
characteristics of the UK university system during the period studied, when 
there were no undergraduate tuition fees and poor students were supported 
by means-tested maintenance grants. This suggests that the innovations re- 
cently introduced in the UK university system, such as the introduction of 
undergraduate fees or the gradual replacement of student maintenance grants 
with student loans might have changed the earlier situation and increased the 
differences across social classes. Moreover, the possible introduction of dif- 
ferential fees could also exacerbate these differences. 
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In chapter four we switch from the analysis of the determinants of the 
educational choices to that of some economic consequences of the decision to 
acquire a first degree. In particular, we analyse the log-wage premium related 
to a first degree with respect to workers possessing only A-level qualifications. 
Also in this chapter, like in chapter two, we use data from the BSC70. We first 
compare the estimates of the wage return to a first degree in the BCS70 with 
those from the National Child Development Study (NCDS) data, relating to 
the 1958 British cohort and reported in Blundell et al. (2000), who used a 
'proxy and matching method' approach. We observe that while the return 
for men has remained virtually unchanged, that for women has registered 
a remarkable fall. Then, we analyse the differences in the return to a first 
degree by degree class. Our estimates suggest differential wage premia by 
class of degree, graduates with a 'good' degree (first class or upper second 
class honours degrees) earned more than those with lower degree classes. 
The differences, although non negligible both for men and women, turn out 
to be statistically significant at conventional levels only for the latter. Also 
our estimates of the differences of returns by degree subjects appear to be 
remarkable, though they are not statistically significant. We think that this 
may mainly be the result of small cell size, since the number of graduates in 
the different fields is low in the BCS70. In this chapter we also seek to address 
the problem of endogeneity of education for the estimates of the return to 
a first degree and to degree class using a different approach, the so called 
Control Function Approach (CFA). The estimates using the CFA do not 
suggest the existence of an endogeneity problem, a result which is probably 
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due to the high homogeneity of our sample, once we have controlled for seN, Cral 
individual and household characteristics, which includes only individuals with 
at least one A-level. We also analyse the issue of heterogeneous returns 
using propensity score matching and find that even when allowing for this 
heterogeneity the estimated returns are very similar to that obtained with 
the 'proxy and matching method'. 
5.2 ]Further research 
There are several ways in which the analysis in this Thesis could be extended. 
As to the analysis of staying on at 16, one possibility is to use data from 
the Youth Cohort Study (YCS) and model the transition from school to work 
as a polycothomous variable (see Andrews and Bradley, 1997) distinguish- 
ing, for instance, between school continuation, youth training, employment 
and unemployment. Although the YCS does not supply data on household 
income it is nonetheless possible to analyse the effect of other family back- 
ground characteristics. Bradley and Nguyen (2004), for instance, use YCS 
data for 1992,1994,1996 and 1998 and a multinomial logit model with six 
outcomes to investigate the school-to-work transition in the UK. It would 
be possible to update their analysis using more recent cohorts of the YCS 
and also using a multinomial model which is not based on the restrictive IIA 
(independence of irrelevant alternatives) assumption, such as a multinomial 
probit model. 
The analysis of subject of enrollment at the undergraduate level of chapter 
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three can be extended in several directions. Firstly, we have already said that 
our analysis using USR data relates only to 'old' universities and is limited 
to the period 1981-1991. Given the relatively low number of low social class 
students enrolled in HE in the period under study, they might be considered 
as relatively more motivated or abler, charateristics that are generally unob- 
servable in administrative data (our analysis assume that A-level information 
is a sufficient control for individual ability and academic motivation) which 
may have some consequences in terms of observing social class differences. 
Moreover, we have argued that in the period analysed the design of the UK 
HE system was likely to attenuate social class differences. Therefore, it would 
be interesting, were they publicly available, to consider recent administrative 
university data from the HESA. These data would allow the analysis of the 
(new) universities (i. e. former-polytechnics), which are likely to have a dif- 
ferent subject-mix with respect to 'old' universities and recruit individuals 
from relatively lower social class backgrounds. Both these combined factors 
along with the recent changes of the UK HE system might have contributed 
to increasing the social inequality of the system in terms of subject choice. 
Secondly, it is also possible to perform an analysis of undergraduate subject 
choice using data from the YCS. By comparing both analyses it would be 
possible to analyse the bias in the estimates obtained using administrative 
HESA data produced by the fact that many family background variables are 
not available, unlike in longitudinal data such as the YCS. Last but not least, 
the YCS also allows the possibility of analysing subject choice at secondary 
level and social class influences at that educational stage. This is important 
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in order to address the question of whether social class exerts its effect mainly 
at early stages of the educational process. 
As to the analysis of the returns to a first degree by degree subject and 
degree class (with respect to A-level only), we have already said that it would 
be useful to have access to data sets containing a higher number of graduates, 
which have to provide also information on non-graduates and individuals' 
family background and, of course, wages. However, at present there are 
data sets which safisty only some of these requirements. The Labour Force 
Survey, for instance, has data on a high number of graduates but does not 
contain a set of background variables comparable to longitudinal studies such 
as the NCDS or the BCS70. The BCS70, that we have used in chapter four, 
gathers a wealth of information on family background variables, individual 
educational variables and wages, but has a limited number of graduates. 
The YCS contains many information on background variables, a sufficient 
number of graduates but does not have data on wages of graduates except for 
cohort three which was also observed at age 23. Hence, a possible extension 
of our work is the analysis of 'early' wages of graduates using the latter 
cohort, which refers to individuals born in the early 1970s and therefore 
highly comparable with the individuals from the 1970 cohort observed in the 
BCS70- 
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